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AUTHOR'S PREFACE 
In design, this LEAA project offered the prospect of combining the 
funds and rational planning resources of a large Federal agency with the 
humanitarian values and the use of volunteers that have been hallmarks 
of the non-profit sector. The opportunity to evaluate this combination 
was exciting_. 
Over the past 14 months, this excitement has grown. At the national 
level the relationship between the public and private sectors has some-
times been cumbersome and lack of consensus problematic, but the success 
of the local program efforts have exceeded my initial expectations. 
The evaluation of the program has stretched our research capabilities 
and required methodological innovations, some of which proved to be more 
successful than others. I wish to acknowledge our gratitude to and 
dependence on all of those persons who cooperated in the evaluation 
process, both locally and nationally. An estimated total of 275 days of 
staff time of national and local organizations were used in the evaluation 
plan. I particularly appreciate the time and energy contributed by the 
local and national project staff, especially Bob Murphy at the national 
office. 
My professional gratitude goes also to the local field researchers 
for their dedication and persistence. The commitment of five senior 
social scientists to a part-time research effort was humbling. The 
names and accomplishments of these professionals are listed in Auxiliary 
Appendix E. 
My professional colleagues at the Center for Applied Urban Research 
(GAUR) at the University of Nebraska at Omaha, the support staff, especially 
Joyce Carson and Scott Samson, and the graduate student assistants, 
Carole Davis, Jim Gahan and Henry Jason, were invaluable. 
I wish to acknowledge especially the support and contribution to 
the project of Jim Marley, who helped the evaluation from the program 
i 
perspective and who was involved from the beginning. Special thanks go 
to Robert Bick and Gary Gentry, my research assistants; Beverly Walker, 
who read and interpreted my handwriting; Linda Ferring, who edited; 
Betty Mayhew, who made all arrangements for everything; and Dr. Murray 
Frost, Acting Director of CAUR, who critically reviewed the report and 
facilitated the final push. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Introduction 
In 1975 the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration awarded funding 
to an unusual program designed to organize the voluntary youth serving 
1 
agencies to better serve status offenders and to be an aid to the whole 
process of the removal of these young people from institutions. The 
program was unusual in that it was not developed by a single agency but 
rather by a collaboration of 16 (later l5) national agencies proposing 
to deliver community services by forming and supporting local collaborations 
focused on the issue of the status offender. These organizations were 
members of the National Assembly of National Voluntary Health and Welfare 
Organizations and had been meeting for over a year under its sponsorship 
and staffing in an attempt to develop an effective plan for working together 
2 in program areas. 
This proposal for status offenders represented the first attempt to 
take the group's ideas about collaboration from theory to practice. The 
basic methodology of the proposed program was to staff a National Juvenile 
Justice Collaboration office and to form and staff five local community 
collaborations. The local collaborations would be formed to deal with 
status offender issues and have the responsibility of offering programs 
in the areas of advocacy, capacity building, and direct services. The 
local collaborations would also help develop a process of collaboration 
which would be useful in delivery of services in the future. 
1
status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent on 
the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors but 
which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults. 
2National voluntary agencies participating throughout the collaboration 
were American National Red Cross, Association of Junior Leagues, Boy's Clubs 
of America, Boy Scouts of America, Camp Fire Girls, Girl Scouts of the U.S.A., 
Girls' Clubs of America, National Jewish Welfare Board, National Council for 
Homemaker-Home Health Aide Services, National Council of Jewish Women, 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency, Salvation Army, Travelers Aid 
Association of America, YMCA of the USA, and YWCA of the USA. 
xi 
General Findings 
The evaluation of the program goals concluded that all local collabor-
ations were successful in achieving the organizational development and 
program planning as called for in the proposal. The level of success in 
the actual implementation of the planned programs and the degree of 
development of a collaborative process varied from site to site. The 
achievement of successful organizational and planning capacities by the 
local collaborations reflects the quality of management which the project 
received from the national level. The national collaboration also offered 
organizational and program assistance to the locals with varying success 
but did not implement adequate capacity building and advocacy programs 
for the collaborating national agencies. 
It is difficult to summarize the success of the process goals at 
each site. Most of the seven local, the regional and the national collabor-
ations demonstrated real progress toward building the trust necessary for 
an inter-agency collaborative work style. All collaborations were successful 
in some areas, and all encountered problems in other areas. 
How Were the Collaborations Successful? 
This summary of findings for specific areas should be seen as highlights 
of the total process, which is presented in detail in the body of the 
evaluation report. The project was evaluated by the extent to which it 
was successful in its three major program tasks: 
1. building collaboration organizations 
2. planning and implementing programs 
3. affecting member organizations 
The extent to which the National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Project 
was successful in developing of the collaboration process at each site was 
also evaluated. 
Building Collaboration Organizations 
The collaborations were highly successful in developing the membership 
of local youth serving agencies affiliated with the original national 
collaboration. In the five local sites 90 percent of National Assembly 
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affiliates participated. In addition, 65 other non-profit agencies also 
participated in the local sites. All sites except Spokane sought the 
inclusion of public agencies, with 76 agencies participating at the four 
sites. The Connecticut collaboration which was the only regional structure 
was especially active in this regard having 51 active public agencies. 
A key element in each of the local collaborations was the relation to 
the public agency responsible for service to deinstitutionalize status 
offenders. Such local collaboration site was able to involve the public 
agency in their area as an active member of the collaboration. The 
collaboration was thus the vehicle for a beginning relationship between 
a large number of the voluntary youth service agencies and the public 
agencies dealing with community care for status offenders. The public 
agency recipients of the DSO Grants were extremely supportive of the 
collaborations and were often a resource for collaboration staff in the 
process of implementation. They viewed the effort as long overdue and 
generally gave the collaboration more support and respect than they would 
offer individual agencies. The collaborations thus were able to establish 
themselves by activating a large number of the youth service agencies and 
achieving cooperative working relationships with the public sector. 
Another area of concern to the evaluation was the degree of partici-
pation in the collaboration. This was evaluated in terms of: 
1. recognition by participants of a common community problem. 
2. formal commitment to participation in the collaboration, 
3. allocation of some organizational resource to work on collaboration 
goals. 
4. participation in activity related to collaboration goals. 
Of these measures the allocating resources and the participation in work 
related to the collaboration goals were the most significant index of 
participation. 
The level of participation according to these measures was a minimum 
of 4,082 recorded days of work representing a salary figure of $378,411. 
This minimum figure takes into account the contribution of only the 
National Assembly affiliates and thus was undercounted in two sites. It 
does not include the participation of the many fine non-affiliates and 
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public representatives. This participation occurred during a period when 
almost none of the affiliates had staff increases and some in fact absorbed 
budget and staff cuts. 
The evaluation also considered the level of agency participation and 
the priority assigned to its work and index of participation. Forty-one 
percent of all affiliate representatives were executive directors ranging 
from a high of 58 percent (Spartanburg) to a low of 14 percent (national 
collaboration). 
Planning and Implementing Programs 
Three aspects of program planning and implementation were evaluated: 
a) the nature of the community needs assessments, b) the nature of the 
planning process and the plan itself, and c) the implementation process. 
All collaborations performed needs assessment studies using statistics 
and youth surveys. An inventory of resources was completed by four of the 
sites. These assessments were accomplished in a very short time and under 
the press of deadline and show the results of such compression. It was the 
view of the locals that the national collaboration did not assist the local 
assessment process. The difficulty with needs assessments is a good 
illustration of the problem of compressing the time allowed for the 
development process in order to meet task goals of the grant. The fact 
that the decision by LEAA to wait for one collaboration (Tucson) to be in 
place before the others started meant that Tucson was rushed and the other 
sites had a six month delay in starting. Thus the needs assessment at 
each site, a sensitive area in need of careful procedures, was not fully 
developed. The national collaboration, under the press of project manage-
ment, developed only a very general needs assessment. The Tucson 
collaboration, recognizing the value of a needs assessment, has now 
developed and implemented a complete document for future planning. 
The planning process which resulted in the phased action plan 
represented another area of stress between planning procedures and the 
need to achieve project milestones. It was perhaps the most difficult 
of all the collaboration tasks with the most time spent in the attempt 
to produce it, the most committee activity--and the most frustration. 
The locals consistently reported frustration at so little help being 
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available from the national office and the national reported frustration 
at the difficulty of the pressure of compressed time lines and increasing 
responsibilities and demands. A basic pattern in all the collaborations 
(local and national) was the rush to get established, meet deadlines and 
plan as well as possible as they went along. For better or for worse, 
each collaboration inherited a whole system of previously existing relation-
ships and problems. This affected the ability to respond to common time 
lines and milestones. The plans were produced with a varying degree of 
completeness and satisfaction and resulted from a great deal of effort, 
but clearly lacked sufficient time and organization to have served as a 
fully functioning planning instrument. 
Programs were able to be implemented in all sites with over 1,000 
status offenders and children at risk served. More than 2,900 community 
leaders and youth program staff for both public and non-profit agencies 
attended capacity building training sessions. Innumerable others received 
informational communication or in-depth planning instruments from three 
sites. In addition, all sites used public relations and media coverage. 
Four of the five local sites were able to implement programs which were 
collaborative in operation; these represented from 20 to 40 percent of 
all programs, excluding collaboration meetings or committees. 
Cost efficiency was arrived at by dividing program cost by days of 
program contact per person to determine cost per person per day. In 
almost all cases costs were lower than the cost -of similar service reported 
by the DSO Grantee of the public sector. 
The five local collaborations and the national collaboration in the 
project then was able to plan and implement 116 different programs in 
14-18 months in widely scattered communities. The fact that planning had 
to be rushed and sometimes altered in mid-stream should not detract from 
the very significant accomplishment in this area. 
Affecting Member Organizations 
One notable program effect was the participation of agencies in the 
program. Clearly agencies which have been involved in status offender 
planning and programs have increased their experience, knowledge and 
expertise. The evaluation also attempted to evaluate the actual change 
within participating agencies using before and after measures. The 
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outcomes from this analysis were limited due to the difficulty in obtaining 
sufficient material and the great variation of local factors. The fact 
that the evaluation was not funded to compare the five sites to sites 
without the collaboration was another limit on our ability to generalize 
about organizational changes. 
One measure which allowed documentation was changes in attitudes of 
board members of the collaborating agencies. The evaluation showed that 
three of the five sites increased in their positive attitudes about non-
profit agencies mixing status offenders with other children. These 
individuals were the decision makers of their communities, and thus their 
attitudes were significant. 
Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources 
to develop programs and program material to use for direct service to 
status offenders and children at risk at other than collaboration sites 
either during the term of the project or before it began in the Fall of 
1976. Incomplete and non-comparable data precluded further conclusions 
regarding the direct effect of the project in this area. This was also 
true in regard to training programs operated by the national organizations. 
Some excellent staff training by national appeared to be offered, but it 
was not documentable by the evaluation. 
Building the Collaborative Process 
The collaborations were all successful in getting o¥ganizational 
representatives working together on the problem of status offenders and 
other children at risk. In the second interview of organizational represen-
tatives, 41 percent reported that the collaborations had been most successful 
in getting people together and 82 percent said that they would involve their 
organizations in the collaboration again. Some conclusions concerning 
factors that affected the success in building collaborations were: 
1. Geographical boundaries should be well defined and similar to 
organizational regions. 
2. Collaborations are facilitated in areas where previous collabor-
ation has been satisfying to participants. 
3. Competing inter-organizational groups working on the same problems 
or issues should be consulted and included in the collaboration 
if possible. It may be necessary either to compromise with such 
groups or to allocate some control to them for a better use of 
community resources. 
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4. Unequal power among members may lead to unequal input of ideals; 
the group process must allow for input for all members. 
5. The interpersonal skills, attitudes and work roles of staff 
coordinators must be clearly defined. 
6. The lay leadership is extremely important in continuity, role 
perspective and loyalty. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION TO THE EVALUATION 
The Program 
In late 1974, the staff and several members of the National Assembly 
and Welfare Organizations made juvenile of National Voluntary Health 
. . h . 1 JUStlce a program emp as1s. An ad hoc task force on juvenile justice was 
formed to determine ways in which this emphasis could be advanced in member 
organizations both nationally and locally. Some of the member agencies of 
the Assembly were already involved in a National Coalition for Youth which 
met regularly in Washington. That group had worked for the passage of the 
Juvenile Delinquency and Prevention Act of 1974. Further, some Assembly 
member organizations had already placed high national priority on 
juvenile justice. 2 
After several months of meetings, the juvenile justice task force 
applied for a grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) 
under the first phase of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
Act, which was devoted primarily to the deinstitutionalization of status 
3 
offenders. The major proportion of the deinstitutionalization funds went 
to public agencies in local communities to develop alternatives to 
1Members of the National Assembly are listed in Appendix A, Table 1. 
2The Auxiliary Appendixes {Volume II) contain additional tables, 
research rationale, research procedures and instruments, additional program 
information and the bibliography. It may be obtained by writing to the 
National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration, 345 East 46th Street, 
New York, New York, 10017. 
3
status offenders are youth who have been adjudicated as delinquent 
the basis of acts which are offenses because of their status as minors 
but which would not be offenses or crimes if committed by adults. 
1 
on 
institutionalization of status offenders in detention or correction centers. 
Recipients of the public grant are ·referred to as the Deinstitutionalization 
of Status Offender (DSO) Grantees. The purpose of the grants was to remove 
status offenders from institutions and to provide some demonstration of 
how they could be served in local communities rather than in institutions. 
The Juvenile Justice Task Force suggested also funding non-profit 
community based youth serving agencies also on the following assumptions: 
1. Non-profit agencies can provide valuable services to status offenders. 
If status offenders are to be served in local communities, then local 
non-profit youth serving agencies should also be experimenting with 
ways to increase services to such youth. 
2. Non-profit agencies can be valuable and powerful advocates for 
status offenders. If status offenders are to be served in local 
communities, then there must be a major effort to educate citizens, 
to change laws and to urge public service agencies to understand 
and accept status offenders in the community. 
3. Services and advocacy provided by a collaborative effort are more 
effective than each agency providing a separate effort. Local 
services to youth are often fragmentary with a great deal of dupli-
cation in some areas and gaps in service in other areas. All 
local providers of service to a specific client group must work 
together to meet the needH of the cl i_ents i_n a more complete way. 
Police, probation, schools, social agencies, and public recreation 
must be aware of and supportive to each other!s programs to serve 
status offenders. 
4. Non-profit agencies can develop the capacity to work with status 
offenders. Status offenders have not been a traditional client 
group of most non-profit local affiliates of National Assembly 
agencies. However, non-profit agencies will be in the community 
long after LEAA monies are gone. If these agencies have a commit-
ment to working collaboratively with each other and with the local 
public agencies and have increased their ability to provide needed 
services, then the money is well spent. 
Based on these assumptions, the National Assembly's Juvenile Justice 
Task Force developed a proposal for a program grant: 
To develop the capacity of the national voluntary organizations and 
their local affiliates to serve status offenders and to develop, through 
collaboration, community-based services for status offenders as an 
alternative to detention/correction institutions.4 
The basic method of the program was to bring together organizations 
with common values of service to youth in order to work together more 
4 Program Proposal, p. 11. 
2 
effectively and without duplication of effort to deinstitutionalize status 
offenders. The process to develop the common, cooperative effort called 
for the organizations to work together with mutual exchange of information 
and ideas, sharing of resources and expertise, respect for each others' 
efforts and programs and a cooperative offering of needed services. A 
formal organization of these youth organizations would be formed and 
termed a collaboration. 
A national collaboration was established to manage the program, work 
with the national organizations and assist in the development of local 
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collaborations at five sites around the country. The national collaboration 
was composed of 15 member organizations of the National Assembly whose 
representatives were the national task force. The task force and the staff 
which was hired to assist in implementing the program formed the working 
parts of the collaboration. 
Each local collaboration was a formal organization of a core of local 
affiliates of the National Assembly organizations, other public and private 
youth-serving agencies and the DSO Grantee. They were developed with 
assistance from the national collaboration. The separate organizations 
were to work together through the collaborations and separately tn develop 
needed services for status offenders in the community. 
The local collaborations were implemented by staff coordinators and set 
up offices. The organizational linkages, diagramed in Figure 1, indicate 
that the efforts of all organizations and staff are directed to the ultimate 
presence of community services to enable status offenders to be deinstitutiona-
lized. In October, 1975, LEAA funded the National Assembly's juvenile 
justice program collaboration proposal for two years. The sites selected 
were Oakland, Spartanburg, Spokane, Tucson and a Connecticut region 
encompassing Danbury, Torrington and Waterbury. 
The Goals of the Juvenile Justice Program Collaborations 
Four goals were identified as the program became operationalized. 
Three of themwere program goals and one was a process goal. 
5Each of the cities also included a public agency that had received 
one of the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (DSO) Grants from 
LEAA. 
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FIGURE 1 
THE NATIONAL JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION PROGRAM 
local Deinstitu-
tionalization of r------LEAA Status Offenders 
Public Grantees 
National Juvenile 
National Assembly Justice Program 
of National Collaboration local community 
Voluntary Health 
-task force of collaborations 
based 
and Welfare local task force services 
Organizations organizational 
representatives or steering 
for 
committee status (hire and advise) 
offenders 
-national staff 
organizational 
representatives 
~ organizational national representatives 
youth-serving r-
organizations local 
to: 
affiliates 
The program goals for both the national and local collaborations were 
1. Develop a viable collaborative organization of non-profit youth 
serving agencies. 
2. Plan and implement needed programs and services. 
a. Programs that would increase the capacity of member agencies 
to serve status offenders. 
b. Programs that would enable the collaborations as organizations 
and its members separately to serve as advocates for status 
offenders. 
c. Direct services and programs for status offenders in the 
community. 
3. Increase the capacity of member organizations to serve status 
offenders and other children at risk in the community. 
The process goal was to develop a real collaborative style of operation 
among the non-profit agencies and between the public and non-profit 
agencies that would lead to future unified delivery of services. 
Program and process goals are diagramed in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 2 
RELATIONSHIP OF PROGRAMS AND GOALS OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS 
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The Evaluation 
The evaluation used two major methodologies. The first was descriptive 
analysis of both the development of the collaborative process and the 
collaboration programs. This entailed three procedures: a) monitoring the 
group process using the methods developed in small group research, 
b) analyzing the collaborations' organizational procedures and programs 
using accepted criteria of human service programs, and c) describing 
program activity and participants. 
The second methodology was a quasi-experimental design to measure the 
effect of the program on a) commitment of the local organizations to the 
collaboration, b) the change in capacity of local organizations to serve 
status offenders and children at risk, and c) the degree of success in 
the service goals of the collaboration--advocacy and direct service. The 
procedures used were interviewing organizational representatives, content 
analyses of organizational media, analysis of organizational records such 
as budget and board minutes, and measures of board attitudes. Measures 
of these three factors were taken at the beginning of the program in 
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Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977. 
the evaluation. 6 
Figure 3 diagrams the rationale of 
FIGURE 3 
METHODOLOGIES USED IN EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS 
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General Findings 
Program Development and Outcomes 
I--
The national collaboration had four major tasks: 
after 
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to manage the entire 
program grant, to provide assistance to the local collaborations, to staff 
the national collaboration's development of its own program goals, and to 
increase the service of member organizations to status offenders and other 
children at risk. 
The evaluation shows that the national collaboration was effective in 
managing the project. The collaboration's assistance to the local collaborations 
6 See Auxiliary Appendixes B and C for a complete discussion of research 
rationale and data instruments. 
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was hampered by a shortage of staff and was more successful in some tasks 
than others and more successful in some sites than others. It was more 
successful in assisting organizational development than in assisting 
program development, and it was more successful in Tucson, Spartanburg 
and Spokane than in Connecticut and Oakland. 
The development of the national collaboration's own programs, while 
recognized as important by the national staff, was of considerably lower 
priority to them in comparison with the necessity of helping the local 
collaborations become operational. 7 
The National Assembly organizations who participated in the national 
collaboration reported growth in their services to status offenders around 
the country in addition to the five sites. Since 1972, some of the 
national organizations have developed sound program materials and technical 
assistance for their locals to use with children at risk. During the 
course of the evaluation, most of the national organizations showed increases 
in communications about status offenders to their local affiliates around 
the country and many showed increases in their national advocacy activities. 
The local collaborations had three major tasks: to develop a viable, 
working organization to work for status offenders, to plan and implement 
programs and services for status offenders, and to increase the services 
of members to status offenders. In general, the collaborations were very 
successful in organizing local youth serving agencies around the issue of 
local service to status offenders. Most were successful in planning 
capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs. The success in 
implementing programs varied somewhat according to the start-up time, the 
nature of the site and the difficulties of organization. The programs 
are continuing to be implemented since the cessation of data collection. 
The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations increased 
their capacity to serve status offenders and other children at risk. Many 
were educating their boards and membership and training staff for future 
direct services. Many also donated part of their own facilities and staff 
in implementing the collaboration programs and some reported more status 
offenders in their regular programs than a year earlier. 
7
This task is a major priority in a proposal to continue the project 
for two additional years. 
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Process Development and Outcomes 
In the process analysis, we found that the collaborations were success-
ful, using a number of techniques. The most successful technique was local 
staff persons encouraging the involvement of the collaboration members in 
all aspects of the program with the goals well defined around a specific 
problem, and with some consensus on goals, roles and methods. Collabora-
tions that emphasized direct service to young people convicted of status 
offenses worked better if the collaborations had mnre homogeneous organi-
zations or had smaller numbers of service deliverers involved. 
Design of the Report 
The remainder of this report will examine in detail the results of the 
evaluation of the National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration in three 
program areas and one process area. The program areas are: 
1. The manner in which local collaborations were organized. 
2. The extent to which the collaboration planned and implemented 
needed programs and service in 
a) capacity building programs 
b) advocacy programs 
c) direct services for status offenders. 
3. The extent to which member organizations increased their capacity 
to serve status offenders and other children at risk. 
The program areas are the heart of the evaluation for the purpose of 
program accountability for LEAA, and is the subject of Chapter 2. 
The process area is the nature of the collaboration process that 
developed and the situational and process factors that affected the 
collaborations. This is the major interest of non-profit organizations 
in terms of developing inter-organizational collaborations of service 
agencies in the future. In Chapter 3 we examine the process of small 
groups and describe each of the collaborations. 
In Chapter 4 we look at the program and process together and indicate 
factors that affected the success of the collaboration and its program. 
This chapter includes the major scientific interest of the evaluation, the 
hypothesis that the group process affects the successful attainment of 
program goals. Chapter 4 also indicates some of the difficulties of the 
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evaluation process and suggests changes in methodology that would be 
helpful in further studies, and aspects of the problem in which further 
research would prove fruitful. 
The appendix of this report contains tables referred to in the text. 
A separate volume of auxiliary appendixes includes the full research 
rationale, research instruments, additional data tables, the full 
bibliography, and persons involved in the programs and the evaluation. 
How to Read this Report 
There are several ways to read this report. Readers who are short of 
time will wish to read the attached Executive Summary and Chapter 4. Those 
interested in the organizational procedures of the collaborations and in the 
development and implementation of programs and services to status offenders 
and children at risk will wish to read Chapter 2. Those interested in the 
development of the collaboration process and its effect on program will 
wish to read the introduction of Chapter 3 and all of Chapter 4. 
Readers interested in the development of a specific collaboration 
will find a section of Chapter 3 which relates to the particular site, in 
addition to the introduction to the chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROGRAM 
Introduction 
The major program method of the Juvenile Justice Collaboration Pro-
gram funded by LEAA was to form a national juvenile justice collaboration 
which would then form collaborative organizations at five sites around 
the country. Representatives of 16 national organizations from the 
National Assembly formed the national task force. They, and the staff 
they hired to implement the program nationally and locally, comprised 
the working body of the national collaboration. The national task 
force and the national staff persons worked with local organizations 
involved in service to youth to form the local collaborations. The 
local collaborations then hired staff coordinators and began to plan 
and implement programs to serve status offenders to the community 
and thereby avoid their institutionalization. 
The Sites 
The five sites were Spartanburg, South Carolina; Tuc~on, Arizona; 
Oakland, California; Spokane, Washington,and the State of Connecticut. 
The sites were chosen because a) they were recipients of the LEAA 
public Deinstitutionalization of Status Offender Grants (DSO Grants); 
b) they represented different sections of the country; c) they 
represented variation in size and cultural diversity. 
Spartanburg is a city of 46,000 in rural South Carolina. While 
it has been a traditional southern regional center, it is currently 
experiencing rapid economic and industrial growth. 
Tucson is a major metropolitan area in the southwestern United 
States. The Tucson collaboration encompasses all of Pima County, with 
a population of about half a million. It has grown to this size from 
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about 50,000 in the 1940's so that a majority of residents are migrants 
into the area. 
Oakland is an industrial suburb of San Francisco with a population 
of 360,000. The population has been slowly declining, with an increas-
ing proportion of minority residents, and increasing unemployment. 
Spokane is a city of 174,000 in eastern Washington. It is the 
regional center for about 200 miles. It had been a relatively old 
traditional city until the 1960's. During that decade, the population 
increased nearly 40% with younger, more educated, more politically 
liberal population. 
In Connecticut, three towns in the eastern region were eventually 
selected for delivery of service since the voluntary organizations 
are not organized on a state basis. Danbury,with a population of 57,000, 
is in southeastern Connecticut. It is a growing town and becoming 
a suburb for New York middle management personnel. Waterbury, with a 
population of 113,000, is an industrial city which is currently economi-
cally depressed. It has high unemployment especially among youth. 
Torrington is a town of 32,000 located in rural northeastern Connecticut. 
While it is a mannfRcturing town it retains much of the rural culture. 
The Goals 
The program goals are diagramed in Figure 1, page 4. They were: 
1. To form collaboration organizations of National Assembly 
affiliates and other youth serving agencies. 
2. To plan or implement 
a. programs to develop members' capacities to serve status 
offenders 
b. programs or services that will increase community advocacy 
for status offenders 
c. programs or services that meet the direct service needs of 
status offenders. 
3. To cause change in member organizations in their capacity to 
serve status offenders. 
The General Findings 
It is the conclusion of the evaluation that all of the program 
goals were achieved to some extent. After the early preorganizational 
tasks (including LEAA' s insistence that one site be organized prior to 
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sign off), only 14 months remained for the achievement of the three 
program goals. The most successfully achieved goals are those which 
occurred earliest. A continual monitoring of the later tasks is 
necessary to report the results completely. 
The building of collaboration, the first goal, was very successful. 
A total of 62 affiliates, 65 other non-profit youth serving organizations 
and 76 public organizations were involved in the seven sites. One 
national, one state, one regional and four local offices were established 
with support personnel and facilities. A documented total of 12 years 
of 7-hour person work days was contributed by members of these organiza-
tions in formal planning and program activities and an estimated addi-
tional 10 to 12 years in other collaboration activity. 
The member organizations were committed to work for status offenders. 
For two-thirds of the participants the collaboration and/or work with 
status offenders was a high priority in their work. 
The planning and implementing of programs was also highly success-
ful. A total of 116 programs were planned, 62% of which had been imple-
mented or were in operation by the end of the data collection. More 
than 1,000 status offenders and other youth at risk were served in a 
variety of programs. A total of c2, 770 persons, primarily youth work 
professionals, participated in capacity building programs. 
Over 3,600 community leaders and youth work professionals had 
sustained informational and educational contact about status offenders 
and innumerable additional people had short term media contact of 
some kind. 
Some of the programs were not as successful as others but the 
total effect was to initiate public awareness, educate and train 
people who work with youth, and create some local community services 
for youth. 
The building of member organizations' capacity to serve status 
offenders in their own programs showed fewer results in the short time 
after the implementation of programs. The national organizations, 
many of which have had status offenders as a priority for a longer 
period of time, showed the greatest increase in capacity since the 
beginning of the grant. The local agencies showed some increase in some 
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areas at some sites. 
The remainder of this chapter details the degree to which the 
collaborations were successful in achieving these three program goals. 
In the first section, we will set the stage for the evaluation program 
by describing early tasks and the evaluation methods. In the second 
section, we will present the detailed evaluation of each of the three 
program goals. 
Setting the Stage for the Program Evaluation 
Before discussing the degree to which program goals were achieved, 
we need to set the stage for both the program and the evaluation of 
the program. This section will describe the early tasks involved in 
the collaboration and briefly describe the methods used in evaluating 
the program. 
Early Developmental Tasks 
Three early tasks preceded the local collaboration program activities 
and established the work style of the national collaboration. These 
tasks were the local site selection, the national work plan and local 
organizational development. 
Site Selection. The task force and the staff developed criteria 
for the selection of the five local collaboration sites, modifying some-
what the criteria in the program proposal. Site selection was limited 
by several realities. First, local collaborations had to be in sites 
where the members of the National Assembly had sufficient numbers of 
local affiliates with which to build a collaboration. In addition, 
the LEAA insisted that the collaboration site be a location with a 
recipient of the public DSO Grant. There was apparently also some 
political maneuvering among national organizations over locations 
of sites. Finally, the -national organizations wanted some geographical, 
demographic and cultural diversity among the sites. 
The national task force and staff also developed a set of criteria 
for site selection based on the nature of the various systems to be 
involved: the DSO Grantee, other state and local public agencies, the 
nature of the voluntary organizations, and the needs of the community. 
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With the data all in, the national task force selected six sites by 
vote. The practical realities appear to have been more important in 
the selection than the service system criteria. 
In the six sites selected, local affiliates of members of the 
National Assembly's Juvenile Justice Task Force members were contacted 
to inform them of the collaboration program and arrange for a visit 
by a team from the task force. One of the affiliates was selected to 
organize the visit, to invite appropriate persons and organizations to 
a meeting and to convene that meeting. The purpose of the meeting was 
to discuss the project and elicit interest from local affiliates. 
From the six sites five were selected, leaving the sixth site quite 
hostile. 
National Work Plan. The national staff had three functions in 
developing the local collaborations: organizational development, program 
assistance and fiscal management. In addition, they had these same 
functions for the national collaboration. There is no evidence of an 
explicit plan that adequately defined the jobs to be done, specified 
priorities or allocated adequate personnel to the various functions. 
¥or instance, plans were either explicated retrospectively to fit what 
had already developed or developed later to solve problems resulting 
from unplanned developments. For instance, job descriptions of local 
staff persons were developed long after they had been hired. Job 
differentiation at the National Assembly office was developed late in 
the first year. Additional personnel were hired as they were needed. 
For organizational development, the program proposal said that 
national staff should spend one or two weeks at each site to help local 
organizations develop structure and help committees organize. National 
staff spent the time in Tucson, the first site to organize. The other 
sites started developing on their own in most cases with the bulk of 
the staff input at a later stage in their development or with less time 
at each visit because of the growing press of management matters on 
the national collaboration. 
Some assistance in organizational development was offered at staff 
meetings with local staff from all five sites meeting together several 
times and all local staff and chairpeople twice. Other guidelines 
were offered by letters and phone calls to chairpersons and staff 
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outlining the committees and tasks of the collaboration, giving guidance 
in selection of personnel and further explaining the nature of the 
collaboration program. 
All of the local coordinators except Tucson perceived a lack of 
structural guidelines for organizational development. The four later 
sites had more trouble than Tucson in their early stages. Several 
problems developed during this time that continued to plague the local 
collaborations: definition of membership, voting relationships between 
affiliates and non-affiliates, the staff-chair role relationships, the 
national-local staff relationships including the supervisory role, 
and the degree of freedom of the local collaborations from national 
control of program. 
For program assistance, the program said that national task force 
members, who were staff persons with expertise in their own organizations, 
were to assist the locals in organizational development and in program 
materials. Technical assistance panels were to be organized and available 
on call from the local sites. Teams of national task force members were 
available for site visits from time to time. However, no workable plan 
for using the expertise of national organization's staff persons in 
program assistance was developed. At a later stage of the program, 
a technical assistance procedure was developed on paper. It involved 
primarily a file of material with bibliographic and program references 
and possible program personnel. Most of the program personnel were 
consultants rather than local or national National Assembly affiliate 
staff. 
Other program assistance was offered by national staff by phone 
calls, on-site program assistance and some program assistance at staff 
meetings. Since the national staff were not themselves program special-
ists, most of this program assistance was of greater use in managing 
organizations than in developing programs. When the local coordinators 
were asked about problems, their most mentioned problem related to lack 
of knowledge of programs and their difficulty in getting assistance from 
the national staff. 
The program proposal specified few guidelines for fiscal management. 
However, the resulting contract and the LEAA program monitor set down 
the criteria. The national staff hired a full time fiscal officer. In 
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addition the project director spent a great deal of time in fiscal and 
organizational management. The written guidelines for fiscal policy and 
procedures were much more explicit than those on organizational develop-
ment or program. The time spent ori fiscal management during staff 
meetings was greater and the manner of presentations more creative than 
those on organizational development or program. 
This degree of emphasis appears to reflect both the values of LEAA 
and the personal style of the project director. 
Several early organizational and program problems of the local 
collaboration resulted from a lack of attention to needs at crucial points 
in their development. This will be illustrated in Chapter 3. Several 
of the national collaboration's problems were also due to the absence of 
a plan which outlined program priorities. Attention to change of role was 
needed by the national task force as it changed functions and the absence 
of clear program plans for the national collaboration illustrate the 
problem. 
In reality, the original two national staff, even when augmented 
by two additional staff persons, were not sufficient for the proposed 
tasks of the program. The lack of a rational plan m~rely meant that 
tasks not well attended to were a result of the selection of staff 
rather than a rational allocation of resources. 
Local Organizational Development. Before LEAA would sign off on the 
total program, they required that one site be organized and a viable plan 
developed. Tucson was selected for the test because it was felt that the 
inter-organizational climate, the judicial stance around status offenders 
and the nature of the city would facilitate a rapid development. 
The organizing process was similar in all sites. 8 Following the site 
visit, a temporary chairperson called another meeting or two to discuss 
the extent of interest of local organizations and to give further 
explanations, if necessary, to potential members. In all sites, the 
local organizations were eager to participate. In most sites, they 
began the organizational process after hearing of their selection from 
New York, even before LEAA gave clearance to begin the other sites. 
8
The specific sections of Chapter 3 describe minor variations in the 
organizing process at each site. 
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The first committees dealt with membership, statement of purpose and 
selection of personnel. A national staff person returned several times 
to most sites or advised the temporary chairpersons by phone. A national 
staff person was present for final screening and hiring of the coordinators. 
Summary of Early Development Tasks. Even with the problems noted, 
each collaboration developed a working organization with office and staff 
within three to eight months of the first meeting, a remarkably short time 
for organizational development. 
Two problems that limited the success of the total program are 
related. First, only a short period of time was allowed to develop 
relationships, build new collaborative organizations, and to plan and 
implement services to status offenders. LEAA's insistence on the one 
trial site without extending the life of the project deprived the other 
four sites of the time necessary to mount the program approved in the 
original proposal. The national task force might well have insisted on 
a written extension for the complete program when LEAA insisted on the 
trial site. At a later date an extension was asked for and received but 
by that time the rushing of decisions and processes had already created 
problems. 
The second problem was a lack of adequate planning. With LEAA's 
stipulation of immediately organizing one site before the others could 
begin, the time for advanced planning was severely limited. 
The Evaluation Method 
The National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force issued a 
request for proposal for the evaluation in June,l976, and signed the 
contract in September, 1976, nine months after the project began. This 
left no opportunity for pretesting the early national organizational or 
collaborative process nor for any systematic monitoring of organizational 
procedures. A major reason for the delay was LEAA's ambivalance about 
evaluating this program. Originally, LEAA exempted the National 
Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration from its evaluation of the other 
DSO programs, even though the national task force had requested its inclu-
sion. After the grant was announced, LEAA demanded that an evaluation 
be purchased with- program money even though the program money had already 
been allocated. 
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The complete rationale for the evaluation, the research instruments 
and procedures are included in Auxiliary Appendixes B and C. At this 
point we will outline the program goals and briefly outline the major 
methodologies, the research personnel, the development of research 
procedures and instruments,and the data gathering techniques used. 
Program Goals. To determine the proper methodology, it was necessary 
to clarify which aspects of the program were to be evaluated. 
Three aspects of human services can be evaluated: program input, 
program throughput and program outcomes. Evaluation of program input 
would include the assessment of external resources that are used such as 
funding, source of staff expertise and participation of external organi-
zations. Evaluation of program throughput would assess what goes on 
inside the organization, including the background for planning, the plans 
themselves, the intervention logics, the program operations and insti-
tutional development and maintenance, Evaluation of program outcomes 
includes independent tests to determine the causal relationships between 
the program and the desired outcomes. 
In this case, complete evaluation of all three aspects of human 
service programs was not considered feasible or essential. The national 
collaboration's decision was that a thorough assessment of the program 
throughputs, or the organizational development, planning and operations, 
would be most useful to future program planners. A complete test of the 
effect of the program on the deinstitutionalization of status offenders 
was considered too costly and complex. 
However, an attempt to measure the organizational outcome was judged 
to be worthwhile. This included an analysis of youth who participate in 
direct service programs. This analysis included demographic and offense 
records on the youth and some case and program data. In addition it 
included some outcome data from some programs. 
The national collaboration also agreed to the evaluation of a 
second aspect of the organizational development, the process of the group 
formation and activity. Figure 4 shows the structure of the program in 
relation to the above discussion. We evaluated three program through-puts 
The program throughputs were a) to organize collaboration of youth 
serving organizations around the issue of community services to status 
offenders,b) to develop a collaborative process that will increase 
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FIGURE 4 
ORGANIZATION OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION PROGRAMS 
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inter-organizational cooperation, and c) to plan and implement programs 
that will enable status offenders to be served in the community. The 
programs are capacity building, advocacy and direct service. 
The program outcome evaluated was the change from Fall, 1976, to 
Fallc,l977, in the capacity of the National Assembly affiliates to serve 
status offenders. The definition of the goals, the operational indicators 
for these goals and the criteria for evaluation are included at the 
beginning of each of the evaluation sections. 
Major methodologies. Two major methodologies or research logics 
were used in the evaluation: descriptive analysis of the through-put 
goals and quasi-experimental analysis of one outcome goal. The descrip-
tive analysis treated the collaborations as service planning and delivery 
systems rather than as organizational structures. This kind of analysis 
required much data, gathered with a variety of techniques. The analysis 
also required a variety of techniques, including analysis of causal 
factors within each collaboration and comparison among collaborations, 
descriptive case history of organizational activity, and systems analysis 
of progress toward goals. 
The quasi-experimental methodology was used to evaluate organizational 
change, the outcome goal. Organizational data were gathered in the Fall of 
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1976 and again in the Fall of 1977. Analysis varied from a simple com-
parison of percentages to a more complicated test of probability used on 
the attitude scales. Figure 3 in Chapter 1 diagrams the methodology. 
Research Personnel. The evaluation was directed by a sociologist 
with extensive background in research methods and evaluation of human 
service programs. In September and October, 1976, a research team was 
formed, including a social scientist in each of the local sites and a 
social agency executive with expertise in human service organizations to 
be part of a research team. The remainder of the research team consisted 
of four graduate students, three in social work and one in criminal 
justice. The research. staff at the Center for Applied Urban Research at 
the University of Nebraska at Omaha provided additional research support. 
Dr. Richard Hall, an expert in inter-organizational relationships from the 
University of Minnesota, was a consultant. The research team gathered in 
Omaha in early November, 1976, along with the local program coordinators 
and the national staff personnel to work out details of the evaluation. 
Development of Research Procedures and Instruments. Before the 
first Omaha Conference, a library search was initiated to discover previous 
research, theories to guide the evaluation and instruments that might 
have already been validated. Working papers were developed and prelimi-
nary work on the attitude questions began. 
At the conference, the researchers and the program people worked 
together for one day, with the program people identifying what they 
would like to know about their programs, what interference they would 
object to and discussing the delicate relationships in their collaboration. 
The researchers met after that and wrote and sequenced questions 
for the interview schedule, worked on the group process analysis and 
selected and revised the attitude questions. They also worked together 
doing a process observation to assure greater reliability. 
The ongoing staff interviews and the procedures for analysis of 
organizational data were developed from theories of leadership styles, 
9 The local researchers were responsible for much of the local data. 
They are identified in Auxiliary Appendix E; the details of the 1976 
Omaha planning conference and a subsequent 1977 Omaha planning conference 
can be found in Auxiliary Appendix C. 
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role behavior and organizational structure at a later date. Procedures 
for enhancing the response from organizations to our request for such 
items as budgets and board minutes were revised every six months as 
10 
we repeatedly failed to receive these data. 
The research proposal called for evaluation of program outcomes. 
However, the national task force felt the time was too short for out-
come to be apparent. Therefore, we substituted evaluation of through-
puts or program plans and implementation procedures. Our criteria were 
developed from program theories. 
Data Gathering Techniques. Six data gathering techniques were used 
in the evaluation. First, the local researchers interviewed participants 
in the local collaboration at the beginning and again at the end of the 
program. Because of the lateness of getting the evaluation contract, 
"before" interviews with representatives of the national collaboration 
were not possible. 
Second, continuous running records of the collaborations were 
gathered to monitor the organizational factors and procedures. Third, 
organizational data from one program year before the collaboration 
started were collected in order to establish the organizational capacity 
and organizational services to status offenders during a base period. 
These data were collected again after six months to determine change. 
Fourth, longitudinal analysis of staff activities was performed 
by developing a log for local staff to keep their daily activity. 
Fifth, the local staff persons were interviewed four times during the 
study period to determine their perceptions of their jobs, their inter-
actions with their collaboration's members and their perceptions of the 
National Assembly office. Finally, an attitude scale about status 
offenders was developed to determine the attitudes of local affiliates' 
boards of directors. These scales were administered by the local field 
researchers at the beginning of the collaborations and again in Fall, 
1977. 
10 
Our solution and recommendation are included in Auxiliary Appendix c. 
22 
Did the Collaborations Achieve Their Program Goals? 
In this section we will evaluate what the collaboration actually 
did. There will be a sub-section corresponding to each program goal: 
building collaboration organizations to coordinate services for status 
offenders, planning and implementing programs and affecting the capacity 
of member organizations to serve status offenders. 
Building Collaboration Organizations 
In the program proposal, the objectives of the collaborations as 
organizations were to: 
••• develop and make operational in five project sites a 
collaboration of the 14 participating national voluntary 
agencies and other voluntary agencies ..••. develop a 
formal working relationship between the collaboration and 
the local action Grantee ..... to work together via a 
collaborative mechanism. 
There were two criteria for evaluating the degree to which colla-
borative organizations were developed: a) did National Assembly 
affiliates join with other youth serving agencies in a collaboration? 
and b) to what extent did they participate in the work of the 
collaborations? The following sections report the nature of the 
collaboration's membership and the degree of participation. 
Nature of Membership. The collaborations were highly successful 
in attracting the membership of local youth serving agencies affiliated 
with the National Assembly organizations. The membership by site is 
seen in Table 1, Appendix A. In all sites, 90% of National Assembly 
affiliates joined the collaborations. 
It is difficult to evaluate membership of affiliates in Oakland 
and Connecticut, as both of these sites cover large areas with several 
branches of the affiliates. For instance, two different Girl Scout 
Councils are involved in the Connecticut region. 
The collaborations varied on their inclusions of non-profit 
agencies that were not members of the National Assembly. A total of 65 
are included in all sites. In most collaboration sites, these agencies 
were non-voting members. They were not included in the national collabo-
ration. 
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The collaborations also varied on their inclusion of public youth 
serving agencies. Oakland, Spartanburg, Tucson and Connecticut actively 
sought public agency participation. A total of 76 public agencies 
were active at the four sites, as compared with only 23 National Assembly 
affiliates. 
The Spokane collaboration made a decision not to include public 
agencies. However, the Spokane DSO Grantee is a public-private youth 
planning council which created Youth Alternatives as the operational unit 
for the grant. 
A public agency in each collaboration site which had received a DSO 
Grant to provide community services for deinstitutionalizing status offenders 
was a principal participant of each collaboration. The nature of the 
DSO Grantees in the five sites varied. In Tucson it was the Juvenile 
Court; in Oakland, the probation department; in Spartanburg, the Youth 
Bureau, in Connecticut, the Department of Children and Youth Services; 
and in Spokane it was Youth Alternatives as mentioned above. 
The LEAA stipulated that the public and private programs complement 
and not duplicate each other. For this reason a working relationship was 
essential and the collaborations were natural vehicles for coordination. 
In each of the local sites, the DSO Grantee was active in the 
collaboration. Both the national collaboration and LEAA required a 
written Working Agreement between the DSO Grantee and the collaboration 
specifying the mechanisms of the relationship. Most of the collabora-
tions served as vehicles for a beginning relationship between this part 
of the public youth service sector and the private sector. The presence 
of the DSO Grantee in the collaboration served two major functions. First, 
it gave the private sector a realistic perspective on the particular 
client population--status offenders. The DSO Grantee was less likely 
to romanticize possible programs, more in touch with status offenders 
and other children at risk and more practical. Second, some coordinators 
used the DSO Grantee as an ally to get the tasks of the collaboration 
under way. Because most of the local coordinators had had more previous 
experience in public agencies than in non-profit youth serving agencies, 
they were often frustrated with the committee process of the non-profit 
agencies and used the public agencies to help define the task and push 
toward the goal. 
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Most of the DSO Grantees wanted the collaborations in their cities. 
They recognized the benefits of having the extra money, extra interest 
in developing alternatives to institutionalization for status offenders 
and extra staff. The Grantees generally respected the collaborations, 
but were somewhat less respectful of the local individual agencies. 
They recognized that the collaborations had something to offer which they, 
with their more rigid mandate, could not. Most Grantees worked hard 
to move the collaborations toward their own goals, using them as resources 
to fulfill their goals. 
Degree of Participation. The literature on inter-organizational 
relationship and community organization suggests that the relationships 
can range from loose informal interaction to hierarchical coordinating 
councils. The collaborations defined in the program proposal fell into 
a middle range between these two extremes, without the power of a 
hierarchical council such as United Hay, but with more formal structure 
than either a coalition or merely informal interaction. 11 The program 
proposal said, "it requires shared decision making, and subsequently some 
reduction in individual agency prerogatives. It requires a process of 
give and take with different participants making different kind of 
'b . .,12 contr1 ut1ons. 
The criteria of collaboration participation used in the evaluation 
of successful collaboration are: 
1. Recognition by participants of a common community problem or need. 
2. A formal commitment or contract to participate in collaboration 
goal activity. 
3. Allocation of organizational resources to work on collaboration 
goals. 
4. Participation in activity related to collaboration goals. 
5. Participation in shared decision making process. 
The fifth criterion, the decision making process, will be discussed 
11 
Klonglan, et al., "Models for Developing Interorganizational Cooperation," 
from Voluntarism and America's Future (Hashington, D.C.: Center for A 
Volun-tary SoCiety, 1972), pp. 53-62. 
12Project proposal for National Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration 
(New York: National Assembly, October, 1974), p. 8. 
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in Chapter 3. In this section we will describe the degree to which the 
other criteria were met in each site. The time sequence of the criteria 
is diagramed in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 5 
INDICES OF PARTICIPATION IN INTER-ORGANIZATIONAl COLLAEORATION 
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Participation in a collaborative organization requires recogn~tion 
of a common problem or need. In the first interview, collaboration members 
at each site were asked, "From your knowledge of youth and the community, 
what would you say are the THREE most important problems with youth 
here? (accept more than three if volunteered)." The responses are 
shown in Table 3, Appendix A. Most of the responses to the open-ended 
question related either to services for status offenders or to causal 
factors related to status offenders. 
Tucson had the greatest consensus on any one problem with 69% of 
respondents reporting school and education as problems. Both Spartanburg 
and Waterbury respondents had 65% consensus on a problem. Spartanburg 
had the most total consensus. Sixty-nine percent of all responses 
were on the three most mentioned problems. Torrington had least con-
sensus on the three most mentioned problems. 
A formal commitment to the collaboration indicates the formal 
participation. The program plan called for a formal letter of commit-
ment, with the intent that it be based on official board decision. The 
data on this measure were incomplete. Some coordinators were conscientious 
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in pursuing the letter and some were not. It was apparent to the evaluators 
that many organizations which produced a formal letter of commitment were 
inactive and many which produced no letter were very active. 
The degree to which an organization allocates its own resources for 
collaboration goal related activity indicates participation in a colla-
boration. This measure represents a key factor in inter-organizational 
collaboration. Since many National Assembly affiliates had declining 
incomes, any new activity reduced the activity toward organizational 
goals. This is especially true in organizations with few professional 
staff. We measured the allocation of resources in three ways: 
1. The number of days spent in collaboration activity; 
2. The amount of salary that this represents; 
3. The amount of in-kind contribution to the collaboration. 
We measured the days in formal activity in two ways. In the 
interviews, we asked all respondents approximately how much time they 
spent each month in collaboration activity. We also counted the attend-
ance recorded on board and meeting minutes. In most cases the latter 
numbers were greater than the former. Table 4 ln Appendix A shows these 
data. We estimated each collaboration meeting at one half working day 
including travel, preparation and follow up. National collaboration 
meetings were one full day. The time of other formal meetings was taken 
from collaboration records. A total of 2,623 working days were recorded 
in formal collaboration meetings of all members. This is the equivalent 
of 12 working person-years at an average of 220 working days per year. 
We consider this an under-recorded amount since records from Connecticut 
were incomplete and some sites had no records of subcommittee meetings. 
We had additional recorded or estimated activity from the affiliates 
because of the organizational analysis. An additional 2,136 days or 
9.7 years can be documented or closely estimated. Both Oakland and 
Connecticut are under represented in this figure since some of the 
estimates were from calendars and logs of the coordinators. The 
additional participation of non-affiliates is completely unreported. 
In summary, the national task force reported the most days of 
participation with an average of 142 per member agency. National 
activity covered a period of two and one half years while the local 
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collaboration activity covered from 15 to 21 months. Tucson reported 
the most local participation with an average of 84 days per affiliate 
(Table 4, Appendix A). Spartanburg and Spokane, for which data were more 
consistent, reported an average of 48 and 47 days per agency, respectively. 
The amount of staff salary represented by the participation of 
affiliates in collaboration activity was calculated (Table 4, Appendix A). 
Locally, the mean salary for professionals in each agency was used. It 
was applied to volunteers from that agency also. Nationally the median 
figure for all National Assembly organizations by organizational rank 
was used. This figure was taken from a survey of national organizations 
by the National Assembly. A total of $378,411 is the estimated figure 
allocated by National Assembly affiliates to collaboration work. 
Seventy-four percent of this total was from the national organizations. 
The Tucson collaboration reported the greatest salary allocation of the 
local organizations, with Spokane and Spartanburg similar. 
Reported "in-kind" contributions from all affiliates to all colla-
borations was $2,145. We believe that this item was under-reported. 
Several items of which we are aware were not reported. In addition, 
unmeaRnrable under-reported items should not be overlooked. For 
instance, several National Assembly affiliates used their own contacts 
with funding sources to gain grants for the "match" that LEAA required. 
The degree to which organizational members participate in collabora-
tion Eoal related activity is a fourth measure of degree of commitment to 
the collaboration. The number of days of staff time given to the colla-
boration reported above is an indicator of collaboration goal related 
activity as well as of allocating own organizational resources. Two 
additional measures were used: the organizational status of the 
collaboration representatives and the priority of collaboration work 
in the portfolio of the organizational representatives. 
The status of organizational representatives is shown in Table 4, 
Appendix A. Forty-one percent of all affiliate representatives were 
executive directors. The Spartanburg collaboration had most, where 58% 
of their representatives were executive directors, and the national 
collaboration had least, where only 14%were executives, 13 58% were other 
.
13
nivision heads on the national level were considered to be the 
same level of influence and power as executive Directors of local 
collaborating agencies. 
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staff persons and 13%wereboard members. The Spokane collaboration 
reported the largest percentage of board members, 43%, beaause their 
members decided to include one board member from each affiliate. 
The priority of the work in the collaboration for the representa-
tives is also in Table 4, Appendix A. Collaboration work,had the lowest 
priority among national collaboration representatives. Only 41% reported 
it among their list of the top 10 priorities. Ninety-two percent of 
the Connecticut representatives reported the collaboration among their 
top 10 priorities. Only 34% of Tucson representatives reported the 
collaboration among their top 10 priorities. Both the national and the 
Tucson representatives reported in the interviews that the collaboration 
had been a higher priority previously, especially during the planning 
stages. 
Summary of Collaboration Building. At all sites, the collaborations 
organized collaboratively with formal commitments to work on the problem 
of local service to status offenders. Oakland and Connecticut collabo-
rations had the lowest active participation from affiliates and from the 
DSO Grantees. Spartanburg and Connecticut had the most representation 
from other public. Most active participation in work toward collaboration 
was reported by the national collaboration and the Tucson and Spartanburg 
collaborations. The most active when average number of professional 
staff per agency is included was Tucson. 
Planning and Implementing Programs 
The actual work of the collaborations, once organized, was to plan 
and implement community based programs and services based on the service 
needs and the characteristics of young people charged with status offenses 
in each community, and the strengths of the local member agencies. The 
programs were to be developed collaboratively with input from the local 
DSO Grantee and other youth-serving agencies (public and private) to 
avoid duplication and to gain the support of possible users of the program. 
It was also hoped that by participating in planning and implementing 
programs and services for status offenders, the National Assembly affiliates 
would gain experience and therefore increase their capacities to serve 
status offenders in the future. 
Four aspects of the collaboration planning and program implementation 
29 
were evaluated: a) the nature of the community needs assessments, 
b) the nature of the planning process, c) the plan itself, and d) the 
program implementation. 
Needs Assessment. An essential ingredient in the program plan for 
each collaboration was a needs assessment, At this point the DSO Grantees 
were particularly helpful. A wide variety of techniques was used at the 
different sites (Table 5, Appendix A). 
The program proposal perceived the needs assessment as a joint public-
private activity not only to determine service gaps and devise programs 
to fill them, but also as a means of educating and involving agency 
leaders in the needs and problems of status offenders. The criteria 
for evaluating the needs assessment are: 
1. The degree to which service inventory and service gaps in the 
community were determined. 
2. Participation of affiliates in the process. 
3. The degree to which gaps in service of the affiliates themselves 
were identified. 
Nearly all collaborations gathered area demographic data on popula-
tion characteristics and statistics on the number and nature of the 
status offender population. Three of the five used some youth input--
two were previously completed youth surveys. Four used community input 
either in the form of assessment of community facilities or interviews 
of community youth work professionals. Four completed inventories of 
affiliate resources, programs and/or needs, two had brainstorming sessions 
with input from the affiliates and one collaboration analyzed 100 juvenile 
cases to assess their needs. 
The national collaboration needs assessment procedures were limited. 
However, a great deal of preliminary documentation of overall needs of 
status offenders went into the preparation of the program proposal. 
All of the local collaborations documented the service needs of 
status offenders in their communities. Spokane and Connecticut had the 
most complete inventory of community resources. 
Tucsonappearedto have had the most input of affiliates in their 
needs assessment procedures, Oakland and Spartanburg the least. 
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There was little organized agency self-assessment. While a self-
assessment document was used in Tucson and national, both the return rate 
and the quality of the response was poor. 
Several problems were apparent from evaluating the needs assessment 
procedures. First, the press of time did not allow for adequate needs 
assessment. If time had been allowed, this procedure could have been a 
factor educating and sensitizing the local organizations as well as the 
community. The Tucson collaboration recognized the weakness of its 
procedures and has since developed and implemented a complete document 
for use in future planning. It presents location and type of community 
service which will enable planners to recognize gaps in services. 
Since the beginning of the program, the National Camp Fire Girls 
have developed a technical assistance package for local communities on 
how to determine needs for new programs. They suggest a 6-8 month time 
period and the extensive use of staff and volunteers. In contrast, the 
local collaborations had only a few weeks and had several other program 
priorities at the same time. 
Second, there was a general lack of knowledge on the part of local 
coordinators and organizational representatives about procedures for 
needs assessment. Technical assistance, including some well produced 
guidelines and training, might have helped. While there was some on-site 
assistance from national staff in this area, four of the five coordinators 
reported in the second interview that they had requested assistance on 
how to do needs assessment but had received none. 
Third, a major part of the program proposal was for national and 
local organizations to assess what they needed to better serve status 
offenders. Hostility usually greeted any mention that organizations 
needed to be assessed. The organizations appeared to be loath to admit 
weaknesses. The national collaboration soon gave up when its members 
said that they would do needs assessment for their own use and not bring 
it back to the· collaboration. 
The Planning Process. Following the needs assessment, the collabo-
rations were to develop a plan of action, or phased-action plan, for 
the remainder of the grant. The plan was called the phased action plan. 
Each collaboration was to develop programs that would fill gaps in services 
31 
identified in the community and organizational needs assessments. The 
plan was to be developed collaboratively with a sharing of information, 
resources and program expertise. 
The planning process was perhaps the most difficult of the local 
collaboration tasks. The most time was reported spent on this task by 
members, the most committee activity, the most frustration and the 
least satisfaction. Most of the participants had never developed a program 
plan with national intervention for behavioral change included. Most 
had not planned for program evaluation and most lacked experience in 
procedures such as short-term staffing procedures and grants accounting. 
The planning process was different in each collaboration and depended 
to a large extent on the selected perception and interests of the staff. 
In structure, most local collaborations had program planning committees 
that worked with the needs assessment material to develop the over all 
program. 
In practice, the process did not work so eollabotatively or efficiently. 
One coordinator, described the development process as: "I decided what 
they should do and manipulated them to do it. I had three committees; 
I staffed each meeting; I asked for a think piece or product; I gave 
assignments and provided information.'' 
In another site, because of shortness of time, the collaboration 
members submitted program ideas, some a lit.tle vague, and the coordinator 
and chairperson fitted the various ideas into a plan. 
Another site circulated a list of programs for participants to 
indicate program areas to which they might respond. Few of the plans 
were developed through a collaborative process with members hashing out 
the details of the plan that fitted their own agencies participation 
patterns. 
The national collaboration planning around program was different 
at each stage. Program planning during the early stage when the program 
proposal was being developed appears to have been by collaborative 
effort. After the program proposal was accepted, planning appeared to 
have been by the executive committee which, at that time kept no minutes. 
In later program planning, the staff decided what areas of program 
needed decisions, and prepared position papers for a committee. The 
committee decisions followed fairly regularly the points of the position 
papers. 
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The local DSO Grantee had a great deal of input into program planning. 
This was one of the mandates from LEAA. Most clearly recognized the 
direct service needs and the local gaps in services to status offenders. 
However, in at least two sites, some competition appears to have developed 
between the Grantees and their programs and other collaboration programs. 
In these sites, the collaborations had to approach planning for direct 
services in a round-about way so that the Grantee would approve and 
therefore refer clients to the program. 
There were two major problems with the process of developing the 
program plan. First, the push of time precluded a collaborative 
working out of the details. This problem was exacerbated by the previous 
step, the lack of time for an adequate needs assessment. As time became 
short and the local coordinators received pressure from the national 
staff, the tendency was to write the program plan to appease national 
rather than to develop a collaborative document. 
The second problem was the lack of program expertise available to 
the coordinators. It is at this crucial point that pre-arranged assistance 
from the national staff and task force would have contributed to better 
programs. Several coordinators turned to outside sources for their 
expertise. Those sources were not necessarily familiar with how non-
profit organizations operate. The results were program plans to which 
the National Assembly affiliates could not easily relate. 
The Plans. The phased action plans were evaluated on the basis of 
the following criteria: 
1. Are the priorities suggested by the needs assessment study? 
2. Are all program areas included in the plan? 
3. Do the programs have a rational intervention plan? 
Tables 5 and 6, Appendix A, show the data on the phased action plans. 
The local program priorities varied in the degree to which programs 
related directly to needs assessment. Program priorities were identified 
by percent of program budget allocated and other resources allocated for 
implementation. Both Tucson and Spokane collaborations' plans closely 
reflected needs assessments and collaboration members' perceptions of 
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problems. The Spokane collaboration felt that the community services 
were good but not well known, utilized or coordinated. Spokane gave 
highest priority to community education and better use of resources, 
including volunteers. Spokane also set fewer priorities so that the 
impact would be greater. 
Spartanburg and Connecticut's priorities seemed to be direct services 
to youth. They conformed well to their youth needs assessment. However in 
both of these sites the actual numbers of status offenders appeared not 
to warrant this priority. In both sites collaboration members cited 
community attitudes as one of the three top priorities, which would-
indicate that capacity building and advocacy should have had high 
priority. 
Oakland's needs assessment study was judged least complete of all 
sites. Even so, the direct service plans failed to deal with priorities 
found in the needs assessment. The national had no needs assessment so 
its program plans cannot be evaluated on this measure. 
All of the local program plans included capacity building, advocacy 
and direct services in their program plans. Direct service used the 
largest proportion of the program budgets. However, since much of the 
capacity building and advocacy was directed by the coordinator, part of 
the administrative costs were program-related. 
The national 
few resources for 
collaboration did not have a program plan and allocated 
14 program. The program proposal had suggested three 
national conferences of agency executives. In addition, the participation 
of agency staff in local site visits was a capacity building activity. 
Some national staff work with individual agencies also could be considered 
capacity building. Neither of the latter two activities was part of a 
program plan. The national advocacy plan was developed in the middle 
of the second year. 
In addition to capacity building, advocacy and direct service programs, 
most of the collaborations developed at least one program for facilitating 
the collaborative process. These programs ranged in extent from an 
assertiveness session at one site to a two day retreat of the national 
collaboration. In future collaboration programs some programs of this 
sort should be included as essential. 
14The continuation proposal contains capacity building and advocacy 
elements. 
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There was little chance to evaluate the program intervention rationale. 
The phased action plans were not specific. In many cases only brief 
descriptions were included. Tucson's direct service programs, which we 
examined, included several very good interventions and several that were 
not as good. Some programs from other sites included more detailed 
descriptions in their progress reports, written after the program. In 
some cases the intervention rationaleswereclear and very good. However, 
it is not clear whether this was a pre-planned intervention. 
In summary, the plans required a great deal of effort from many 
dedicated people. Because of the extreme pressure from national staff 
and LEAA to get them in, they were less collaboratively produced and less 
consistent than they might have been. This was a primary factor in the 
program implementation. 
Program Implementation. In spite of the short time available, 
programs were implemented at all sites. More than one thousand status 
offenders and other children at risk were served, some in long range 
training programs and some in short term, one session programs. Table 7, 
Appendix A, summarizes these data. Details on each site can be found in 
Tables 1 through 5 in Auxiliary Appendix A. 
More than 2,900 community leaders and youth program staff from both 
public and non-profit agencies attended training sessions offered by the 
six collaborations. 
More than 2,600 persons have received long term advocacy·, informational 
communication or an in depth planning instrument,from three sites. This 
wasinaddition to the extensive T.V. impact in Tucson, the bumper stickers 
in several sites, radio and T.V. interviews and on-going public relations 
in newspapers. 
We used two criteria from the program proposal to evaluate the 
implementation: 
1. The programs should be collaborative. The program planners 
believed collaborative implementation would increase the contact 
with and knowledge about people from other youth serving 
agencies. This would then encourage them to implement other 
human services collaboratively. 
2. The implementation should increase capacity of National Assembly 
affiliates. The program planners hoped to give National Assembly 
affiliates experience in serving a different client group in 
order to enable them to further serve the group. They hoped that 
affiliates would offer the programs through their own agencies. 
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In addition, implemented programs should serve enough people to be 
cost-efficient, be implemented according to the time planned and should 
take advantage of existing community resources. Table 7 in Appendix A 
shows the data. 
The degree of collaboration in implementation varied from zero in 
Spokane to 36% of the programs in Tucson. The other three were 32% in 
Connecticut, 30% in Spartanburg and 19% in Oakland. Had we included 
the collaboration staff or committees in the count, the percentage would 
have been higher. 
The percent of programs implemented by local affiliates varied from 
none in Spokane to 21% and 32% in Spartanburg and Tucson. The other two 
collaborations implemented 15% of their programs through the affiliates. 
We measured cost-efficiency by dividing program cost by days of 
program contact per person to determine cost per person per day. All 
time units were reduced to the percentage of a day. Costs for direct 
services varied from $2.87 in Spartanburg to $41.54 per site in Tucson. 16 
Generally, the lower the cost, the less therapeutic the intervention. 
The costs were much lower than most interventions reported by the public 
DSO Grantee. Weassumedthat some of the staff and equipment costs were 
absorbed by the implementing body. If the implementer was an affiliate 
of the National Assembly, thiswasanother measure of their participation 
in the collaboration. 
Capacity building costs varied less, from an average of $3.93 in 
Spokane to $15.82 in Oakland. 
Advocacy costs per contact were too varied in both content and audience 
for us to generalize. There was a great amount of public media donation 
of time and resources. The advocacy programs were also supported strongly 
by the National Council of Jewish Women and the Junior Leagues both 
locally and nationally and the National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
nationally. 
The delay in implementation rates varied from only 15% of Spartanburg programs 
implemented within two months of projected schedules to 52% in Spokane 
and Connecticut and Tucson implemented 42% of programs on schedule and 
Oakland implemented 33% of programs on schedule. Closely related are 
16 
Cost efficiency rates and the method used to determine them are 
presented in Table 7, Appendix A, and Tables 1 through 5, Auxiliary 
Appendix A. 
36 
cancellation rates, or percent of planned programs cancelled. They varied 
from none in Tucson to 30% in Spartanburg. Table 7, Appendix A, shows 
these data. 
We measured use of existing resources in implementation as the percent 
of programs implemented by community agencies including National Assembly 
affiliates. Connecticut implemented 63% of programs in community 
agencies with Tucson a close second with 61%. Oakland implemented 
only 10% of programs outside of the collaboration. 
In summary Tucson's programs were implemented closest to all our 
criteria except cost. 1ihen the quality of the program was included, we 
perceived that the cost was quite in line. These criteria werenot affected 
by the fact that Tucson began the programs earlier. Connecticut's 
measures of implementationwerehigh but will probably develop little 
expertise or capacity of the affiliates to serve status offenders when 
the grant project is completed. 
Summary of Planning and Program Implementation. We would suggest 
that planning and implementing 116 different programs in seven different 
communities in 14-18 months has been a remarkable feat. The facts that 
the planning was rushed and the programs less than perfect were not 
surprising. What has occurred is that numbers of people who have never 
planned and implemented programs "from scratch" are now a little more 
experienced. There are also 1,029 youths who received service, 2,930 
adult youth workers who received training and innumerable persons more 
aware of the issue of status offenders. Two sets of factors affected 
the planning and implementation: organizational factors and program 
factors. 
Three inter-related organizational factors affected the planning and 
implementation: the press of time, the incompatability of goals and 
the absence of immediate on-site program assistance from the non-profit 
perspective. 
The local staff had two major directives. One was the directive to 
work with local organizations,mold them into a coherent body and plan 
programs with them. The amount of effort, time and skill involved in 
building a new organization that can function effectively appears to 
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have been minimized. The other directive was to develop, plan and implement 
new programs for status offenders. Most human service organizations spend 
many months developing and planning a few new programs. The collaborations 
were to plan many new programs in a few months. These two directives 
were incompatible in the timeallottedfor the program. Success in either 
or both of the directives required the staff to a) work with committees 
from the different youth-serving sectors (especially the National Assembly 
affiliates), develop an organization and set up an office; b) develop 
expertise in program planning, intervention logics, program evaluation; 
and c) become acquainted with the body of knowledge about status offenders 
and the effectiveness of past programs. These three different activities 
were to culminate in a plan of action within four months of the staff's 
hiring. When the push came, both LEAA and the national collaboration 
opted for programs over collaboration and quantit7 over quality programs because 
the alternative was no programs-at all to show for the two-year grant. 
Program Factors. From the analysis of the programs, several conclusions 
seem warranted. First, therewaslittle indication in organizational 
records or interviews of how the collaboration priorities were set or 
resources allocated. The absence of clear priorities, set with the 
explicit consent of members, resulted in some programatic confusion. 
Second, program outcomes were not clearly explicated by the program 
proposal itself. For instance, was the desired outcome increased direct 
service by affiliates in the community or increased direct services in 
the community? 
Third, the structure for implementing especially the direct service 
programs was important to the nature of the outcome. There were three 
structural arrangements for implementing programs: the collaboration 
as a direct service agency; the collaboration as a general granting 
agency, and the collaboration as a coordinator of funding which meets 
project priorities. The more involved the affiliates were with the 
implementation, the more their capacity was increased. The Oakland 
collaboration was an example of the collaboration as a direct service 
agency under the first coordinator. Spokane also appeared to fit this 
category. The Connecticut collaboration illustrated the collaboration 
as a granting agency with central staff monitoring and evaluating the 
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programs. Tucson and Spartanburg collaborations illustrated the collabora-
tion as a coordinator of funding. 
Affecting the Capacity of Member Organizations 
a major goal of the program was to develop the capacity of community 
based non-profit agencies to serve status offenders. Many of these 
organizations have traditionally been involved primarily with "good 
kids." The very idea of a sexually promiscuous girl in the Girl Scouts 
or Camp Fire Girls seems ludicrous to many. 
At this point, we could have used only the program participation 
of affiliates from the previous section as our measure of organizational 
capacity building. The rationale would have been sound. It is logical 
that if an organization collaborates to develop and implement a work-study 
program for youth referred by the courts, that organization will be 
better able to serve the same kind of youth in the future. 
However, we wanted a separate measure of capacity, one that could 
be used in other communities to test their capacity to serve status offenders 
and children at risk. We wanted independent indicators of organizational 
capacity so that before and after measures could be made and any change 
over a period of time could be recognized. If base measures were taken, 
we could monitor change over any period of time. It also meant we could 
compare organizational capacity of cities that had the LEAA collaboration 
grant with that of cities with no grant. 
First we had to define organizational capacity in a way that definition 
could be operationalized. The rationale and definitions are described 
in Auxiliary Appendix B. Briefly, the organizational capacity to serve 
any client group consists of the following elements: 
1. The client group must be defined and recognized as a legitimate 
group for the agency. 
2. The resources for meeting the needs must be allocated--board 
time, staff time, training, space, program materials developed. 
3. The organization must be able to attract the clients--that is, 
a. be perceived by the client group or those making decisions 
for the client group as able to provide service; and 
b. be accessible to the client group geographically, in time, 
psychologically and culturally. 
4. It must be organized to deliver the service. 
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This means that capacity to serve is not merely the delivery of 
service to a client group. Delivery of services to a new client group is 
an end product that requires internal organizational change in a number 
of ways. 
We developed the following indicators as measures of capacity to 
serve status offenders. The procedures and measures can be seen in 
Auxiliary Appendix C. 
1. Board attitudes toward the client group and the client needs. 
\~e developed an attitude scale with 23 i terns. 
2. The presence of a policy statement with specific reference to 
status offenders, children at risk, problem youth. 
3. The allocation of board time for discussion of status offenders. 
4. Sensitizing the larger membership to the client group. 
5. The allocation of funds, staff time or other resources for 
planning and implementation ·of programs/services for status 
offenders and children at risk. 
6. Training of board/staff/members to understand or work with status 
offenders and children at risk. 
7. Direct experiences in working with status offenders and children 
at risk. 
8. Location of program units accessible to client population. 
9. Service to status offenders. 
10. Numbers of other children at risk served. 
We measured the organizational capacity in Fall, 1976, and again 
in Fall, 1977. Since both the National and Tucson collaborations began 
before the evaluation, their datawerenot comparable. We did not measure 
the Connecticut organization because the membership was so fluid and the 
staff support available to the National Assembly affiliates there was 
less consistent. 
The data are presented in the following section: first we will 
describe changes in the internal organizational indicators--or the 
capacity to serve from the first time of measurement to the second. The 
measures used correspond to items one through eight above. Second, we 
will describe changes in actual program/services delivered from the first 
time of the measurement to the time of the second. These will be considered 
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under two headings: external advocacy and direct services to status 
offenders. 
Changes in Internal Organizational Capacity to Serve Status Offenders 
and Children at Risk. The board attitudes were measured by administering 
an attitude scale to boards of directors of local National Assembly 
affiliates near the beginning of the program, except for Tucson which was 
well under way in the Fall of 1976. 
The attitude statement fell into three categories: personal social 
distance, attitudes about the punishment of status offenders, and general 
attitudes on the rights of children. Several general attitude items on 
status offenders and the offenses were also included. 
The attitude scales were administered at organizational board 
meetings by the local researchers in Fall, 1976, and again in Fall, 1977. 
While we tried to standardize the procedures there was some variation, 
notably in Spokane, where some attitude scales were left for the executive 
director to administer. The 1977 Connecticut scales were less comparable 
because of the self-selective nature of their agreement to be retested. 
We analyzed the board as a unit even though there was turnover in 
membership. The rationale is that a board will tend to use education and 
selective recruitment to gain attitudinal consensus (Table 7 Auxiliary 
Appendix A). We also analyzed individuals who had taken the scale at 
both times. 
Several findings from the attitude scalesweresuggestive of future 
directions of board education. First, in both Fall, 1976, and Fall, 1977, 
the attitudes of boards of directors toward status offenders were 
ambivalent. On the one hand, more than 90% of all respondents said status 
offenders need help, not punishment. On the other hand nearly half the 
respondents said that failure to punish status offenders encourages them 
to be bad. Table 8, Appendix A, shows this distribution by site. 
Second, the most negative change in attitudes occurred in items 
related to punishment as a lesson to teach status offenders and detention 
of status offenders to protect society. Table 9, Appendix A, shows either 
little change or a negative change on the two detention items. 
Third, board attitudes that changed most consistently from Fall, 
1976, to Fall, 1977, were those related to personal social distance. 
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Table 10 shows the distribution of those agreeing to personal relationships 
with status offenders from time to time. 
Even with this general analysis, it appeared that there was some 
change of attitude toward status offenders during the year. The difference 
between sites with and without the collaboration would be revealing. The 
summary item for capacity building showed that three of the five sites 
increased in their positive attitudes about non-profit agencies mixing 
status offenders with other children. These board members are the people 
who make the decisions and hence these attitudes are significant. 
Of the sites, Spartanburg began as the most negative and had the 
highest percentage change in many items. If we discount Connecticut 
because of self selection, Spokane had most items with a positive change. 
There was a positive change of 13 of the 20 items. 
A policy decision by the local board indicated that status offenders 
and other children at riskwereproper clients or members; or that the 
organization should make an effort to serve such youth. This was 
considered a necessary capacity building effort. This indicator was 
collected from board minutes, program goals, annual meetings and other 
running records of organizations. The data in Table 12, Appendix A, 
indicate that four organizations in Spartanburg, three in Spokane, one 
in Oakland and one in Tucson had such policies toward status offenders. 
Of the 15 members of the national collaboration, eight reported policy 
statements in 1974 and 12 had policy statements in 1976. Some of the 
organizational literature suggests that national organizations are better 
able than locals to make unpopular policy statements because they are 
further removed from the membership. This indicates that many national 
organizations had already begun building their capacity to serve status 
offenders before the collaboration grant, and that perhaps the grant 
proposal was a result of the policy rather than vice-versa. 
The allocation of board time was determined through an item analysis 
of board minutes in the base year compared with the collaboration year 
(Table 12, Appendix A). In the local sites board minutes of member 
organizations of the Spartanburg collaboration showed the most increase. 
All of the organizations showed increase in discussion about status 
offenders. The average increase was 10% over the base year. 
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Of the six national organizations which released board minutes for 
this report, only one showed an increase in discussion of status offenders. 
However the data indicated that all had had substantial board discussion 
during the base year. These six were among the seven most active members 
in the national collaboration. 
Efforts to sensitize the larger membership to the client group was 
measured by the amount of information that related in any way to status 
offenders and children at risk in regular communication to members and 
special communication to members. We did a content analysis of these 
data where they were available. 
We found only a small number of local organizations had begun to 
involve their members in the work with status offenders. Many of their 
local publications and communications were directly related only to program 
"how-to's." Some had no regular local communications to members. Oakland 
and Spartanburg had the most change in the number of message inches in 
their communication related to status offenders or status offenses. 
Spartanburg impact is greater since 50% of the organizations showed such 
a change. 
All of the national organizations for whom we had these data showed 
an increase in communication to members in regular publications. The 
average increase was seven percent over the base year. 
Many of the national organizations with Washington offices also 
sent out regular or periodic communication to members. Of the 12 for 
whom we have this data 10 had an increase in messages about status offenders 
and children at risk. These messages tended to be informational about 
the politics surrounding allocation of Federal money and the delivery of 
programs/services to status offenders and children at risk. The section 
on advocacy will discuss this in more detail. 
There was no new formal allocation of organizational resources for 
programs and services to status offenders reported by local organizations. 
This is not surprising since more than half of the organizations for which 
we have data had a decline in membership from the base year to Fall, 1977. 
Approximately one-third reported a decline in real income. During a time 
of financial reverse, organizations seldom increase allocation of funds 
for other than institutional maintenance. 
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Data from national organizations indicated considerable use of resources 
to develop programs, program material and other technical assistance for 
use in programs with status offenders and children at risk. Lists of 
these materials can be seen in Appendix A, Table 15. Some of the best 
materials we have seen are those from the YMCA, the Boys Clubs of America, 
the Girls Clubs, the National Council of Jewish Women and the National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency. While some of this material was developed 
before the grant, the continuation is certainly a result of the continuing 
support of the collaboration. 
Some of the most active national organizations reported a decline in 
resources allocated for direct service to status offenders. Five of those 
for whom we had data reported a decrease in staff to work with youth 
especially problem youth. Grant monies for four of the five programs 
were expiring. Only one had any plans for the incorporation of the new 
emphasis into the regular budget. 
Some resources were allocated informally for work with status offenders. 
As Table 12, Appendix A, indicates 38 percent of all local affiliates were 
involved in implementing collaboration programs. Much of the implementation 
cost of buildings and staff were in-kind donations from the implementing 
organization. The average cost of implementing these programs was far 
less than the cost of putting on the programs. Table 7 in Appendix A 
shows the implementation figures. 
Another informal indicator of, allocation of resources was the enormous 
allocation of staff time in the collaborations discussed in a previous 
section. 
The training of board members, staff, and members to work with status 
offenders was measured in three ways: a) participation of staff/board/ 
members in collaboration programs, b2 meetings to which the collaboration 
staff spoke and c) other training provided by the organization. 
Table 12, Appendix A,shows the days of staff/board/member training 
by the collaborations. Tucson started its program too early for us to 
collect this data, however, they reported considerable attendance at such 
training. Spokane trained the largest number of local affiliates to deal 
with status offenders. Both Oakland and Connecticut changed staff during 
the study period, so the data were incomplete and not comparable. 
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Data to measure change in location of program units were not 
easily accessible. We wanted to determine any change in the number 
of program units in high impact areas locally. Local organizations 
do not appear to keep records in this way. This indicates that 
planning for the location of new units is not done on the basis of 
where the need might be. Since the data are sketchy, the conclusions 
appear to be that density of status offenders and children at risk 
is not an important consideration in placing program units. 
Nationally, new units to serve status offenders and other child-
ren at risk had begun around the country in other than collaboration 
sites. Some groups, such as the Camp Fire Girls and the Girl Scouts 
reported efforts to locate new program units in the inner city, in 
childrens' institutions, and in ethnic neighborhoods. However, the 
record keeping procedures on numbers and locations do not indicate 
the degree of any change which may have occurred. 
Changes in Indirect Services--Advocacy. We have considered 
advocacy a service because the program output of several of the most 
active participants in the collaboration is advocacy rather than direct 
service. This is true of the Junior Leagues and the National Council 
of Jewish Women as well as the National Council on Crime and Delinquency. 
We measured advocacy activity two ways: the amount of regular 
communication to members on external societal change toward a more 
positive stance on status offenders and children at risk, and any 
new advocacies program specifically related to external societal change. 
Table 15, Appendix A summarizes the data. 
The collaboration staff spoke at board and other meetings of many 
local affiliates which we consider staff/board training. Three staff 
members at Spartanburg, Spokane and Tucson reported speaking to a total 
of 16 such meetings. The other two staff persons were new when we 
gathered these data. National staff reported little of this formal 
activity, but did report meeting individually with some executives and 
other staff persons of member organizations to increase their participation 
in the collaboration and to discuss change in their own organizations. 
The local organizations reported little other training related to 
juvenile justice activities. National organizations reported quite a bit 
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of this activity, The Boy Scouts, Boys' Clubs, YMCA and 4-H were performing 
joint staff training with a juvenile justice emphasis. Campfire Girls 
reported a national training program with one session related to juvenile 
justice programs. The Girls' Clubs had four regional juvenile justice 
workshops to train staff. The Salvation Army ran a corrections conference 
in Washington. The National Council on Crime and Delinquency has run 
seminars and workshops around the country. Several excellent ongoing 
training programs such as the one by the YMCA were being dispersed into 
regional offices because funding had expired. Unfortunately, none of the 
national organizations had hard data on numbers and geographical distribu-
tion of staff training in these programs except the Junior Leagues, who 
reported that 205 local Junior Leagues attended five day training seminars 
funded by LEAA in 1973. 
Direct experience with status offenders was gained by participating 
in implementing collaboration programs. The experience varied in both 
depth and variety. In Oakland the experience was limited to two direct 
service programs. In Spartanburg while 67% of affiliates were involved 
in implementation, they were involved in only two programs and only one 
in Spokane. 
Tucson collaboration affiliates gained the-most experiences in a 
variety of ways: writing, grants accounting, program planning, implementa-
tion and evaluation. Six direct service programs were let by contract to 
affiliates in that site. 
The regular communication to members of local o-rganizations show 
practically no advocacy-related messages in either Fall, 1976, or Fall, 
1977. In Spartanburg, where the Junior League has a girls' home, there 
were messages both years primarily related to that facility. The 
Junior Leagues in both Tucson and Spokane also had messages both years 
somewhat related to social change. 
The national organizations showed advocacy eommunicationS in both the 
base and current years. There was an increase in 10 national organizations 
and a decrease in two organizations. The latter included one of the 
most active and involved organizations. 
No new advocacy activity was reported at collaboration sites by local 
affiliates from Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977. Nationally, the Junior Leagues 
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and the National Council of Jewish Women reported an increase in advocacy 
activity at other local sites around the country. There was little 
evidence of formal advocacy activity among national direct service 
organizations. 
Much non-formal advocacy activity was reported by national organiza-
tions. Some of them, such as the YMCA, were active in getting youth-
related legislation passed. The YWCAwasactively seeking to get its locals 
involved in legislative concerns for systems change. 
Several of the national advocacy organizations developed special 
programs in the recent past. The Junior Leagues produced a film, which 
was shown on national television and is available for local information 
and education. The National Council of Jewish Women published a book 
reporting a national survey on the juvenile justice system and its 
detrimental impact on youth. The National Council of Crime and Delinquency 
sponsored an advertising campaign about status offenders. It also 
published a newsletter relating directly to legislation, research and 
other activity in the juvenile justice field. 
While much of this activity preceded the Juvenile Justice Program 
Collaboration grant, the national organizations have continued to deepen 
their awareness and educate their locals. Our perception is that 
gradually they are taking status offenders as a legitimate, on-going 
concern. 
Change in Direct Service Programs for Status Offenders and Other 
Children at Risk. In the introduction to the section on organizational 
change, we suggested that in order to serve a client group, the organi-
zation must be both accessible to that particular group and organized to 
serve it. Since most of the collaborations have only been in operation 
for 14-18 months, we cannot reasonably expect direct services to have 
changed very much. Organizations must plan and budget far in advance of 
a few months for this change to occur. The evaluation should continue 
to gather measurements on this variable for several years to determine 
long term change in client/member services. Other important factors are 
the number of adjudicated status offenders in the site and the nature of 
other services. 
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We measured change in direct services in three ways. Table 13, 
Appendix A, shows the data from these measures by site: 
1. The number of status offenders and children at risk served by 
affiliates while implementing collaboration direct service 
programs. 
2. The change in number of status offenders and children at risk 
served in own programs. 
3. Any new program reported as started or planned with status 
offenders and children at risk and/or new monies received for 
service to these clients. 
The numbers of status offenders and children at risk served in 
collaboration programs by local affiliates cannot be consistently reported 
here. Organizations in Tucson, whose program started several months early, 
served a total of 127 status offenders and children at risk in eight 
different affiliates. Seven Spartanburg affiliates served 73 youth and 
six Oakland affiliates served 113 youth. In other sites, the affiliates 
were not involved in implementing direct service programs at the close 
of data collection. 
The implementation of the direct service programs by the affiliates 
required a great deal of input of the organization's own resources. One 
executive reporteda match of thousands of dollars. It is certainly true 
that expenditures for buildings, recreational equipment, and executive, 
financial, secretarial and other staff time were not reimbursed. The 
average cost per day of the service to each youth excluding salary to the 
youth was lower than cost per day services reported by DSO Grantees in 
several sites. 
Many organizations reported a change in services to status offenders 
in their own programs over the year. This may represent only a change in 
definition in the minds of respondents. However, at the very least, it 
represents an increase in sensitizing program people. 
Many of the national organizations mentioned new programs around 
the country specifically related to status offenders. The actual data 
on the services did not reflect the change. Table 15, Appendix A, 
shows some of the reported new program units to serve status offenders 
and children at risk reported in the national interviews and program data. 
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Locally, new monies have been generated to serve status offenders. 
Tucsonreported$96,000 from CETA and other new sources to support some 
of the collaboration programs. Spartanburg raported $4,650 in new money. 
Nationally, several organizations received money from an LEAA 
prevention grant to continue the efforts by non-profit agencies toward 
developing alternatives to correctional institutions for young people 
convicted of status offenses and other children at risk. National 
organization data indicated other national programs under way. Some of 
the national organizations are making services for status offenders or 
children at risk a national priority. The National Council of Homemaker 
Health Aide Service has a new priority of family stability. Juvenile 
justice programs have become a high priority for the Girls' Clubs. 
The Boys' Clubs are giving emphasis to alcohol programs. 
Summary of Affecting Member Organizatio.ns. Organizational change, 
especially in local areas, is a slow process and cannot be expected to 
show immediate results. Our data indicated a very positive prognosis for 
the future. Locally, the affiliates were becoming aware of status offenders 
and the need to serve them in the community. They were involved in the 
collaboration; theywerebecoming more sensitized and trained in dealing 
with status offenders; and theywere justbeginning to sensitize their 
board and members. Those who have had unrecognized children at risk in 
their programs were more aware and better able to work with them. For some 
this awareness will be translated into more and better direct services 
for children at risk. Only another measure at a future time will deter-
mine the long-term impact on the organizations. 
The national organizations have been involved with the collaboration 
for a longer period. Some of them have been involved with status offenders 
since the early 1970's. The quality of the programs and program material 
indicate this continuing commitment. Some of the national organizations 
have become more involved with children at risk as a direct result of the 
collaboration. Some of them have refined their programs or added new 
emphasis as a direct result of their participation in the collaboration. 
In examining the usual trends of national organizational priorities, it was 
quite apparent that some of the nationals have committed more resources 
and for a longer period of time than usual. 
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The growing involvement, continuing participation and deepening 
commitment was difficult to document consistently because of the limited 
time and funds allotted for this evaluation, the inconsistent record 
keeping of the organizations, and the organizational nature of the nationals. 
However, the indicators that we had point to substantial growth in 
capacity of many national organizations to serve children at risk. 
Summary and Conclusion: Did the Collaboration Achieve the Program Goals? 
In summary, the collaboration did a commendable job in a short 
time. In fewer than two years one national and five local organizations 
were founded, staffed and operationalized. More than 60 local affiliates 
committed themselves to deinstitutionalize status offenders and to other 
children at risk; for most organizations, these were new client groups. 
Many of the local agencies had never heard of a status offender 
nor had some of them more than a nodding acquaintance with each other. 
Few had ever collaborated in program delivery. In both rounds of inter-
views, a large proportion of representatives stated that the major 
effectiveness of the collaboration was getting them together. Many of 
the organizations found themselves working with public youth serving 
organizations for the first time. 
The local collaborations, in a short time, demonstrated the kinds 
of programs that non-profit organizations can deliver for problem youth. 
Many different services to youth were planned and implemented at a 
relatively low cost. Some were excellent, some not so good; most of 
them add to our knowledge of the types of programs that are most effective 
for non-profit organizations to offer for status offenders and other 
problem youth. 
The organizations in the collaborations committed themselves to the 
issues of deinstitutionalization of status offenders in a variety of 
ways. Most spent enormous amounts of time in the collaboration; many 
got their staff persons and board members involved in training for work 
with status offenders and other children at risk; some began the educa-
tion process of their boards and members; some served status offenders 
and other children at risk in their regular programs; some collaborated 
with other agencies to try new programs. It is too soon to comment on 
the permanence of any new approaches but the prognosis for the future 
is bright. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EVALUATION OF THE COLLABORATION PROCESS 
It is difficult to develop a new service delivery modality in an 
already established community. It is even more difficult if the new 
service proposes to develop support from existing organizations with 
which it will be in competition. The basic hypothesis of this chapter 
is that some background demographic, and historical factors affected 
the nature of inter-organizational relationships both directly and 
indirectly. Background factors indirectly affected the collaboration 
structure and that change affected the collaboration process. Background 
factors directly affected participation in the collaboration and the 
process which evolved. 
Figure 6 diagrams the relationship between these three oets of 
factors and the outcomes of the collaboration. 
The evaluation of the collaboration process is presented in eight 
sections. In the first section we will define the factors in Figure 6 
FIGURE 6 
FACTORS INFLUENCING COLLABORATION PROCESS 
background I--
factors 
inter-
I-- organizational process process outcomes 
collaboration I--
structure 
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and describe how they were measured. Section 2 summarizes the key 
factors and draws some conclusions about collaboration. Sections 3 
through 8 illustrate the model in the six collaborations using data 
from each. 
Definitions and Evaluation Procedures 
Background Factors 
Three sets of background factors were important to the evaluation: 
key demographic variables, the nature of the social structure and the 
history of the collaboration itself. 
Demographic Factors, Seven general demographic characteristics of 
each collaboration site were important to this evaluation: the size of 
the city, the source of income, the economic health, the percentage of 
youth, the racial mix, the urban-suburban mix and the geographical 
location. In addition, data on the number and type of offenses of the 
status offenders of the area were essential for background. Most of 
the demographic data were gathered from the 1970 census, the mid-decade 
estimates and area respondents. 
Social Structure. The nature of the social structure relevant to 
understanding the collaborations included the nature of roles and status 
in the community, how traditional these roles were, who held power and 
influence and how change occurred in the recent past. These factors 
suggested where the local National Assembly affiliates fit in the social 
structure, how they perceived their relationships with their national 
organizations, their economic situation and their history of interaction. 
These data were gathered in interviews with participants and from insights 
of the local field researchers. 
Collaboration History. The history of the collaboration process 
included identification of which party arranged the first meeting, which 
organizations attended, how the chairperson was selected, previous 
inter-organizational relations and key events in the early history of 
their collaboration. These data were gathered from interviews with the 
chairperson and from collaboration records. 
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Structural Factors 
Decisions regarding membership, priority, roles of chairpersons and 
staff, staff-member relationships, and relationships to the national 
collaboration staff were considered keys to understanding the social 
structure of each local collaboration. 
Membership. Data on decisions regarding who could join and the 
status of organizational representatives were collected from records of 
the collaborations. 
Priority and Role of Chairperson. Roles and priority of chairpersons 
were determined in interviews at each site early in the study period, 
Fall, 1976, from the structured observations of collaboration meetings 
and from interviews with coordinators. Chairpersons' role perceptions 
were of two general types: as managing and decision making or as presiding 
over a forum for input of ideas and joint decisions. 
Priority and Role of Staff. The priority and roles of coordinators 
were determined in interviews with staff people throughout the study 
period, daily logs kept by local staff and structured observation. 
Staf_f-Memp".E__Boe_l"ction_s_hips. The staff-member relationships were 
determined from the two member interviews, the four staff interviews 
and from the relationships apparent in the observations. 
National-Local Relationships. The relationships of the local staff 
and members to the national staff and members were determined by the 
staff interviews and by analysis of communications between the national 
and local collaborations. The assessment included perception of super-
visory roles and relationships and perception of program control. 
Process Factors 
Three major process factors were observed: inter-personal communi-
cations processes, the decision making processes and the presence and 
interaction of power persons or groups. The data for this analysis were 
obtained from the structured observation of process, interviews with 
members and analysis of the minutes of collaboration meetings. 
Communication Process. Analysis of the communication process was 
based on insight from experimental research on communication materials. 17 
17 Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns 
Dynamics Research and Theory, (White Plains: 
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in Task-oriented Groups," Group 
Row, Peterson, 1953), pp. 493-506. 
The primary interests were the flow of communication during the meetings,, 
from members to chair and staff and the nature of the communication's 
content. The process observation produced these data. 
Decision Making Process. The decision making process was analyzed 
from the perspective of who made the inputs, whether decisions were 
made collaboratively, the relative weight of public and non-profit 
agency representatives and the staff roles in decision making. The data 
were from the process observations and the interviews and analyses of 
meeting minutes. 
Power Sub-Groups. The activity of influential persons or subgroups 
was analyzed from the perspective of their role in setting priorities, 
in program decisions, in conflicts or crises and in implementing programs. 
Data were gathered from collaboration records, the interviews and process 
observation. 
Process Outcomes 
Several outcomes could be recognized from the process. In the second 
interview (Fall, 1977) we asked collaboration members what they considered 
the most successful activity of the collaboration, how effective they 
thought the collaboration was, and whether they would involve their 
organization again, knowing what they knew then. Responses to these were 
used as measures of process outcome. The ultimate outcome will be the 
nature of future inter-organizational collaboration and of future work 
toward collaboration goals. 
Summary and Conclusj_on 
Most of the seven local and the regional and national collaborations 
demonstrated real progress toward building an organizational structure 
for inter-agency cooperation and developing the trust necessary for an 
inter-agency collaborative work style at the end of their 14 to 24-month 
initiation period. All collaborations were successful in some areas, 
and all encountered problems in other areas. 
The process of collaboration development was not a high priority of 
the national collaboration project directors. Practically no national staff 
time was spent to develop the national collaborative process or in programs 
54 
or staff training that would facilitate the local process development. 
Furthermore, the emphasis from national staff persons and LEAA on program 
goals and time lines was often at the expense of process. The national 
staff had little choice in this because of the nature of the project 
monitoring, the six months lost, and because of special conditions of 
LEAA's insistence on one site becoming operational before funding the 
other sites and LEAA's emphasis on getting direct services into the 
community immediately. 
Nevertheless, should the non-profit service sector choose to develop 
inter-organizational mechanisms for delivery of services in the future, 
several factors that appear to have affected the direction of the inter-
organizational collaborations and their relative success as organizations 
should be considered. Some of the factors summarized here will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1. When geographical boundaries are well defined and recognizable 
and fairly contiguous with organizational boundaries, potential 
membership is more consistently identified. The problems in 
Oakland and Connecticut illustrate this statement. 
2. When recent history has been one of satisfying inter-agency 
cooperation, a collaboration can begin its goal activity sooner. 
Tucson, and Connecticut State are illustrations of this state-
ment. Spartanburg and Oakland illustrate the need to build 
trust before moving toward goal activity. 
3. When organizations belong to an already viable inter-organizational 
body with similar goals and similar memberships, competition and 
divided loyalties may be detrimental to the collaboration. This 
issue must be openly addressed rather than avoided as in Spokane 
and Tucson where conflict eventually emerged. It may be that a 
compromise of tasks to avoid overlap or an allocation of control 
over funds and staff to an already established collaborative 
organization might accomplish program goals more effectively. 
4. When an organization in a collaboration has considerably more 
power or resources than other organizations, the least powerful 
tend to go along with the powerful or to let the powerful 
organization do the work. This was true in Spokane and, to some 
extent, Danbury, Torrington and Spartanburg. 
5. When working with the non-profit sector if staff persons do not 
understand and respect how voluntary organizations work and how 
to staff committees, they cannot enable the organization to 
reach their full potential. Few of the staff persons of the 
collaboration project showed a real respect for the nature of 
the voluntary sector and the importance of enabling organizations 
who are donating time and resources to make their own decisions 
about programs. 
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6. When hiring staff persons as coordinators of inter-agency 
collaborations, committees should clearly define their own roles 
and the expectations of the staff. There are three general 
roles: that of facilitator or enabler, that of professional 
expert in the program, and that of executive director with 
organizational management priorities. The Spokane Coordinator 
tended to be an enabler; Tucson and Spartanburg coordinators 
and the National Associate Director functioned as professional 
experts who sometimes slid into an expert-advocate role. The 
first Connecticut and first Oakland coordinators and the 
National Director were primarily executive directors with 
management priorities. This is a crucial decision and will be 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
7. When communication at meetings is too strongly controlled and 
too centralized, tasks are facilitated, but people are less 
likely to risk their own ideas. 
8. When selecting the leaders of a collaboration, it is crucial 
that they have characteristics which will foster trust. Most 
functional collaborations appear to have: a) continuous 
leadership, b) leaders who work actively outside of meetings, 
c) leaders who preside over meetings rather than controlling 
the content, d) leaders who are organizational representatives 
rather than individuals and e) leaders who are volunteers rather 
than staff. Lay leaders are better able to commit themselves 
to the collaboration without having conflicts with their own jobs. 
9. When hiring staff of inter-organizational collaborations, the 
issue of professional support must be addressed. A local 
collaboration staff person is in an isolated structural situation. 
Neither the national staff nor the local collaboration have a 
vested interest in this position. The staff person is expendable. 
Relationships are based on role rather than on personal inter-
action. Neither local or national organizational support can 
tolerate failure of the role to be fulfilled. 
10. When organizing interorganizational collaboration, the issue of 
control and supervision of staff activities must be addressed. 
This is particularly true when the funds are provided by sources 
other than the collaborating organizations. This is a key 
structural issue and will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 4. 
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The National Collaboration18 
The national collaboration was composed of members of the 15 partici-
pating national voluntary agencies. The working body was the national task 
force composed of representatives of the organizations. A legislative 
consultant who had been involved in writing the proposal was also a 
member. The task force met monthly with project staff to oversee the 
management and the implementation of the project goals and to facilitate 
the achievement of the goals which related to the national level. 
Before getting into the actual process actions and decisions of the group 
it will be useful to fill in some of the background and direction. 
The task force was originally constituted in late 1974 by the 
executives of the National Assembly to develop collaborative program 
models and directions in the area of youth service. As part of this 
activity the interagency project for status offenders was developed and 
then funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The task 
force, with some change of membership but a basic continuity of leadership, 
then began to focus its attention on the implementation of this project. 
Organizational Structure 
As in the original form, the membership of this group was made up of 
a representative from each participating national voluntary agency. 
The typical representative was a staff member from the national staff of 
the agency and even in cases where the representative was a volunteer, 
he was still from the national level. In some cases members were 
previously known to each other from participation at national meetings 
or workshops as well as previous service on the original task force. The 
participation at the national level thus brought together people very 
knowledgeable about their own agencies, generally well informed of 
activities of other agencies throughout the country and clearly a part of 
the upper management of the voluntary social service sector. 
In view of the scope of national organizations and the work responsi-
bilities of many task force members there was rarely day to day contact 
18Because the national task force was in operation before the evalua-
tion began, the data gathered were in a different form from those from the 
other collaborations. Therefore, this section is not paralled to the other 
sections of this chapter. 
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between task force members and committee work was often compressed. The 
travel schedules of some members made it at least as likely that they 
would meet en route than in New York where most were based. This 
movement and travel was occasionally functional when it corresponded to 
the need for some activity in a local site but it generally made long 
term and continuous planning and interaction difficult. The dynamics 
involved in this situation were obviously very different from those which 
took place in the local collaborations where there seems to have been 
more day to day interaction within a more narrowly defined setting. 
While task force members came from similar social structures, some 
significant differences must also be noted. The collaborating national 
agencies varied in size, importance, service interest and delivery. Some 
agencies were hierarchical in structure; others were semi-autonomous 
confederations. Task force members thus represented organizations and 
held positions which varied greatly in importance, scope, power and 
responsibility. These differences notwithstanding the group was 
essentially homogeneous with universally accepted styles of discussion, 
presentation, committee procedure and language. 
From this background several patterns of work and behavior were 
established early in the project and carried on consistently throughout 
the life of the grant. These patterns were organizational participation, 
chair function, staff function and role conflict. 
Organizational Participation. There was a consistent record of 
attendance on the part of many representatives as well as an active 
participation in discussion of the issues of the meetings. The familiarity 
with the various issues of the grant and the consistent interest and con-
cern in their outcomes reflect the continuing involvement of the task 
force members. This was also exemplified in the willingness of members 
to make presentations at various sites. 
Chair Function, The chair person of the task force was a major 
influence in setting the style of presentation and both the content 
and flow of discussion. He was a major source of authority and stability 
both in and for the task force, having served the same function for the 
original group which developed the project. Meetings were run by the 
chair in a very enabling and involving style which consistently sought 
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out opinions and generally attempted to diffuse conflict by allowing all 
sides full expression. The chair worked very closely with the staff in 
attempting to develop the consensus necessary for task achievement. With 
his style and representing as he did a very major national agency, the 
chairman was a major source of authority, stability and continuity for 
the group. 
Staff Function. The staff of the project was professional in its 
ability to present issues and deal with complicated management tasks. 
It was always prepared for meetings and generally well informed regarding 
the various issues of the grant. Staff was usually in the position of 
explaining and presenting information regarding the various sites and 
issues and seeking task force approval for directions and actions. 
Because of the nature of the project, multiple sites with many agencies, 
the presentations were often complicated and decisions were often needed 
on pressing matters. There was a constant tension between full disclosure/ 
discussion and the need to get decisions made and tasks accomplished. 
Role Conflict. The pattern of the staff reporting complicated 
information and the task force feeling itself in a very reactive position 
was an issue of continuing concern throughout the life of the grant. The 
project director was at times the point of this tension holding the twin 
responsibilities of task accomplishment and the involvement of the group 
in the collaborative process. The task force had not been fully reconsti-
tuted, in the movement from planning the grant to overseeing the implemen-
tation; with a clear delineation of staff and board roles, this fact increased 
the tension. In addition, some task force members felt that the director's 
style was excessively centralized and controlling. 
Tasks of the Collaboration 
The national collaboration started long before the evaluation. 
Therefore, we did not monitor first hand the ongoing task development 
until late in the first year. Several collaboration tasks continued to 
affect the total project: the site development, the relationship with 
LEAA, the development of priorities, the national phased action plan, the 
match, crisis management and the issue of continuation. 
Site Development. The initial activity of the task force and of the 
project itself was concerned with the establishment of collaborative 
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structures in the five sites. This attention to sites was necessary but 
was the beginning of a continuing pattern of being overwhelmed by the 
responsibility of implementing the sites and managing them to the exclusion 
of the development of national capacity building and advocacy. It is of 
particular importance to note that the conditions demanded by LEAA called 
for the establishment of a collaboration in one local site (Tucson) 
before funds could be released for work in the other cities. This 
decision,which came from the administrator of LEAA and which was accepted 
by the original task force when it was involved in grant negotiations,had 
a major impact upon both the task force and the staff and most certainly 
upon their working relationship in the critical first six months of the 
project. 
Relationship with LEAA. The special condition of LEAA was in some 
ways a point of unity for both staff and task force in that it put them 
together in the role of attempting to deal with the funding source, answer 
various objections and continue making progress. The initial relations 
with the LEAA project monitor were extremely difficult and this also 
tended to help foster a unity within the task force and between task force 
members and staff as they formed a common front. This pattern was 
repeated several times during the process of the grant. As issues of 
conflict with the government emerged, the task force and staff would 
join ranks and work diligently to attain the most positive outcome and 
protect the project. This was an area of real group strength, demonstrating 
an awareness of the government funding process and also a very strong 
commitment to the integrity of the proposal and the value of the work 
being undertaken. It is significant that over the course of two years 
all major obstacles were removed and very harmonious and enabling relations 
were established between the project and LEAA. It also indicated a basic 
pattern within the task force, namely that whatever differences existed 
within the group or with the staff, the overriding interest in continuing 
and supporting the project always evidenced itself at times of crisis. 
Development of Priorities. Another effect of the special condition 
calling for the collaboration establishment in Tucson before releasing 
funds for other sites was much less positive and served to reinforce a 
tendency manifested very early in the group's operations. This was the 
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conflict between the tasks of the grant and the process of collaboration. 
The special condition established by LEAA called for some specific tasks 
to be accomplished quickly and the group and staff began to focus very 
directly on this implementation task for Tucson somewhat to the exclusion 
of national collaboration issues and their own efforts at collaboration. 
The staff, in addition to the massive logistics of initiating five compli-
cated local collaborations from a New York office, had the burden of getting 
one site fully operational before money would be available for the four 
others. This context does much to explain the previously mentioned 
tension between the national collaboration staff and some members of the 
task force concerning the role of each group. There was an agreement in 
principle that the staff person was responsible for day to day functions 
and that the task force should concern itself with major directions and 
issues, but there was a consistsnt lack of agreement of the part of some 
about the line between the two. The staff person was most conscientious 
of the need for task accomplishment, and while the task force members 
were aware of this need, they also wanted to be involved in the process. 
This gap was never really closed, although it never reached the point of 
causing major fracture. The group always responded to major issues but 
there was a constant tension. At the planning retreat held more than a 
year after the grant, issues were still being raised about "process" 
involvement and the respective roles of the task force and the staff. 
Only after some of this discussion was a job description for the national 
collaboration director developed. (See Auxiliary Appendix E.) 
National Phased Action Plan. The initial concern about the logistics 
of implementing the collaborations in the local sites, dealing with LEAA 
and establishing working relationships with staff regarding project 
activity set the pattern for the national collaboration's function and 
concerns over the following year. As a result, almost no attention was 
paid to the national phased action plan. When the plan was considered in 
1977, the discussion was very general, with the time considerably, and 
typically, shortened by pressing local site business. As mentioned 
previously, there were many reasons for this. In addition the very 
structure of the task force must also be examined. Though all task force 
members represented national agencies, these agencies were of very different 
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size and style and the degree of influence of members within these 
agencies varied widely. The ability of individual task force members 
to influence their own agencies was not a constant and therefore it 
was difficult to deliver a national plan which could be specifically 
implemented. From the point of view of the internal task force structure, 
there were also limits to the development of a strong effective national 
plan. There was also the question of impetus and direction. If the local 
was accountable to the national the local coordinators to the national 
project director, and the national staff to the task force, then to whom 
was the task force accountable? Not only was there a question of the 
capacity of the task force to deliver and implement an effective national 
plan but there was also the question of staff's ability to push for it. 
None of the leverage that existed in the local collaborations existed on 
the national level. The competing issues, varying degrees of influence 
and limited leverage accounted for the minimal effort regarding a national 
plan, which contrasts strongly with the major successes of the national 
task force in many other areas. 
The Match. This grant was awarded under the provision of a ten 
percent match which was to be used to draw down the awarded funds. The 
project was initially successful in raising money from foundations but 
ran into difficulty in raising the full amount. The first task force 
approach to the problem was to increase its efforts with foundations, 
enlisting executives to make presentations and at one point using a con-
sultant. When matters became critical, staff and task force members were 
able to elicit pledges from the National Assembly organizations for the 
amounts needed and used these pledges for a match from a foundation. This 
accomplishment is evidence of the major commitment of the national colla-
boration to the project and is a demonstration of the strength of the 
collaborative effort. It was another demonstration of the task force 
and staff's abilities to deal successfully with crises and cooperate to 
overcome major obstacles. The fact that this particular issue revolved 
around money and that staff and task force members were able to gain the 
assistance of the Assembly staff and agencies in a time of budget cuts, 
decreased membership and falling contributions cannot be overstressed: it 
was a critical accomplishment on the part of the project management. 
Crisis Management. The ability to respond to crises was also evident 
in actions taken by the task force with regard to site difficulties 
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throughout the life of the grant and in particular in the case of diffi-
culties in Oakland. The discussion regarding an attempted reconstruction 
of the Oakland collaboration evidenced a real sensitivity to the negatives 
of outside intervention as well as a willingness to offer whatever support 
services might be effectively used in reconstructing the local site. 
Several task force members attended a reorganization meeting in Oakland. 
In this situation as in other crisis incidents, the task force was able 
to unite, discuss possible alternatives and take (or approve) determined 
united action to meet the situation. This activity occurred in all the 
local sites except Tucson. This unity was less apparent during more 
ordinary discussions, a fact of which all members were aware but resisted 
directly confronting. (An attempt at "catharsis" during a two-day planning 
session was limited to only very general statements.) 
Continuation. The national task force, on the basis of work by the 
national collaboration staff, prepared a proposal for continuation of 
the project. The continuation would allow local coordinators to continue 
in these positions, though it would provide only a small amount of 
service money. The national office would also be continued. The 
development of the proposal and its presentation to LEAA was another 
significant accomplishment on the part of the national task force and 
staff and would clearly have a major impact on the future of the colla-
borations. The task force itself was the proposal as an opportunity to 
reconstitute itself in a different form with project management and over-
sight, being just one committee of a larger task force agenda. 
Summary of the National Collaboration Process 
Therewereobviously many areas of accomplishment: site development, 
governmental relationships, the match, crisis management and continuation. 
Therewe~ealso some areas of weakness: problems of priorities and 
national plans for capacity building and advocacy. One is struck by the 
enormous responsibilities assigned this group. It appeared that the structure 
of the task force was too narrow to deal effectively with the many 
necessary tasks assigned. This limitation had much to do with some of 
the limitations of the collaboration program. These areas should not 
detract from the very significant accomplishments of the national task 
force and staff in implementing the project. 
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The Tucson Collaboration 
Background Factors 
The Tucson metropolitan area, which accounts for most of the 
approximately 500,000 people in Pima County, is located in south central 
Arizona. It is the second largest city in the state and is about 120 
miles from Phoenix. It is only 70 miles north of the Mexican boarder. 
Tucson, like many cities of the sun belt, has had tremendous growth in 
the last few years. The 1975 population estimate shows a 26% increase 
over the 1970 population. 
Tucson has moved from a small dusty regional "cow town" with a 
population of under 50,000 in the 1940's to a major metropolitan center. 
The earlier growth developed around the new electronic industries, 
attracting a wide range of professional persons. A major university has 
also attracted professionals. 
The most recent growth is stimulated by the advantage of the sun 
belt for retirement, and the service industries have grown to accommodate 
the needs for new service. Tucson has also become a center of the youth 
culture. A 1973 estimate reports that 30% of the population is between 
ages of 10 and 25; 53% of the population is under 30. 
Tucson has a relatively stable economy. The unemployment rate, 
6% in late 1977, is not excessive. However, a large Mexican American 
population, estimated at 19% in 1975, the uncounted numbers of illegal 
aliens in the labor force, and the Indian population of about 3% do 
not benefit from the status of the economy. Many of these people live 
in squalid conditions with high unemployment, especially among the youth. 
The school drop out rate is high among the minorities, assuring the con-
tinuation of this cycle. 
The cities and counties of Arizona are struggling to keep pace with 
the ever-increasing population. There is much opposition to deficit 
financing, and the state as a whole, including Pima County, tends to 
forego increasing social services in order to keep the state on a "pay 
as you go" basis. 
The State of Arizona has a very conservative laissez-faire political 
stance of non-interference into local affairs. It has lost Federal 
funding rather than accept Federal standards in several recent instances. 
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Politically Tucson is reported to be somewhat more progressive. In 
addition, since most of Tucson's population is newly arrived, there are 
few old traditions. This means that society is more open, and social 
power is less concentrated in old structures. It also means that personal 
influence and expertise can be more readily developed. 
This is exemplified by the nature of the Juvenile Court. Despite 
the conservative political stance in the state, the Pima County Juvenile 
Court was already in the process of deinstitutionalizing status offenders 
before the Juvenile Justice Delinquency and Prevention Act required 
deinstitutionalization. 
The Pima County Juvenile Court was given the public DSO grant. It 
set up mobile diversion units for crisis intervention. When status 
offenders were apprehended, they were taken to the mobile diversion units 
and from there were referred to other services. The court contracted out 
the other services. It was a very expensive program to run because of the 
need for 24-hour coverage. Pima County reported 2,942 status offenders 
in 1975. The largest group was 1,716 runaways, with incorrigibles, 
moral infractions and substance abuse (alcohol and tobacco) accounting 
for about 350 each. 
The National Assembly affiliates are fairly healthy in Tucson. 
Seven of the nine for whom we have data report an increase in budget 
above the cost of living increase from 1976 to 1977. None reported a 
decrease in United Way funding and only one reported a decrease from 
other funding sources. 
The Pima County affiliates have good relationships with the national 
task force. About five (42%) knew the name of the national task force 
representatives. Another three (25%) knew the regional representatives. 
Table 17 in Appendix A shows these data. Six of twelve representatives 
reported that they had received some or much communication from their 
national affiliate about the collaboration. The other six report having 
received little such communication (Table 18, Appendix A). 
There appears to be underlying competition among Pima County 
affiliates. Even while they work together there seems to be a lack of 
complete openness and trust. 
Agencies and concerned citizens were already relating to each other 
in Tucson before the collaboration began. Three organizations were 
operating. The Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children was a 
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rather loose organization of individuals and agencies founded to advocate 
for change. The Metropolitan Youth Council (MYC) is a youth planning 
agency funded by the city and the county to coordinate service to youth. 
All youth programs were to be planned through the MYC in order to avoid 
duplication and to centralize accountability. The Pima County Court 
Foundation, a non-public advocate for the court, was also in operation. 
To some extent the collaboration was in competition with each of these 
groups although initially they were all very much involved. 
Relatively little public-private interaction history was apparent 
except for the Juvenile Court. In fact, only recently have the public 
schools demonstrated any interest in involvement with ~nyone on the 
issue of status offenders and other children at risk. 
In January, 1976, the Coalition for the Community Treatment of Children 
along with the Youth Development, Inc. (formerly, Youth Services Bureau) 
sent letters to interested persons to attend a meeting. The meeting was 
held in February where the National Director explained the program and 
indicated that Tucson was one of the cities under consideration. Many in 
the group felt that planning was already occurring through the Coalition 
and without program money the activity would be a duplication of Coalition 
activity. 
In late March, Tucson was informed that it had been selected as a 
site and a second meeting was called. The National Director returned 
to help the local group develop plans for participation. The first 
steering committee was held March 31st. Officers were elected and committees 
appointed to draw up a job description, draft a statement of purpose and to 
screen and interview applicants for the job of coordinator. 
The National Director returned in late April to outline the stages 
of development and LEAA requirements and to formalize the statement of 
purpose and the steering committee. He returned in early June to 
finalize the hiring of the local coordinator and to assist with the pro-
gram planning work groups. During the latter part of June the National 
Director helped the steering committee establish priorities, formulate 
a timetable, and obtain approval of the phased action plan by the colla-
boration. In early July another national staff person assisted with 
revisions of the phased action plan, and it was sent to the national 
collaboration Office. 
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Structural Factors 
The crucial decision on delineating qualifications for voting members 
and officers was made during the first steering committee meeting. 
Objections were raised when a non-affiliate representative and a concerned 
individual were nominated for office. The decision was that officers 
would berepresentativesof National Assembly affiliates and that all 
affiliates and representatives from the various operating coalitions 
would comprise the steering committee. 
Priority and Role of Chairperson. The chairperson was a represen-
tative from the National Council of Jewish \-/omen. She was strongly 
committed to the collaboration and its goals. Her priorities were to 
insure the collaboration would be permanent so that the spirit of the 
collaboration remained after the project period expired. 
The chairperson's formal meeting role was primarily that of a presider. 
She moved the meeting along, referred to speakers, summed up points and 
called the questions. She reported a major concern to keep the procedure 
open so that people did not feel they were being manipulated. However, 
her leadership extended far beyond this formal role. She worked 
extensively with the staff to prepare for meetings; she attended and 
participated in most sub-committee meetings. She recognized the issues 
and persons most likely to cause open conflict and she directed the meetings 
in a way that minimized that conflict. 
Priority and Role of Staff. Our first interview with the Tucson 
coordinator occurred after the phased action plan had been written. At 
that time the coordinator's priority was to push training for agency 
personnel. He felt that the agencies and the city as a whole would benefit 
from such training. 
The staff role was a strong management role with control over the 
details of planning and managing the program. While he was instrumental 
in the direction ofthe program, he was also responsive to the members and 
involved them as much as possible in all phases of the collaboration. 
When questioned about work plans, he reported both long and short 
term work tasks in mind. He specifically mentioned meetings and administra-
tion tasks. Table 19, Appendix A, shows that he reported about 41% of 
his time in appointment/phone calls, 35% in study/administrative/paper 
work and 17% in meetings. Table 20, Appendix~ shows that 69% of Tucson's 
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members reported frequent contact with the coordinator. 
Staff-Member Relationships. The chairperson had an excellent 
relationship with the coordinator. They worked closely together setting 
up the agenda, the work to be done and doing some guidance about likely 
problems. Many of the members also had good relationships with staff. 
They generally felt he was doing an excellent job. However, about 20% 
of representatives reported that he was "one-sided,'' "controlling" or 
"going along with the influential affiliates." Even persons reporting 
that the coordinator was doing a good job appeared guarded when discussing 
their relationships with him. This guarded caution toward the coordinator 
characterized, to some extent the collaboration's relationship to the 
DSO Grantee. 
The data support the contention that the staff person was a strong 
leader. He tended to do considerable staff work on his ideas and present 
them to the committee for their support. However, many of these ideas 
appear to have initiated in discussions at steering committee meetings 
and discussions with individual members. Once developed, he became an 
advocate for them reporting on them at meetings, answering questions and 
overcoming objections. 
The conflicts in the Tucson collaboration tended to be over position 
boundaries rather than role definitions as in some other collaborations. 
We could say they were over "turf." For instance, on some issues the 
Tucson collaboration addressed, members who were very active in one of 
the other inter-organizational coalitions felt that the collaboration 
was intruding unnecessarily in their field. Some of the "turf" problems 
were a result of the emphasis by national that the local collaborations 
needed to find future support. This emphasis, of necessity, raised the 
question of competition for scarce resources. The several conflict issues 
seldom came into the open but did hinder the full development of inter-
organizational trust. 
National-Local Relationships. The Pima County collaboration staff 
person had few problems in his relationship with national during the 
early organizational phase. He felt national collaboration staff had been 
helpful and understanding. He did feel at a later time that several 
technical assistance requests had been responded to inadequately and some 
technical assistance that he did not wish was foisted upon him. 
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He also felt that in the latter part of the program, communications were 
overly slow. 
Therewasno indication of dissatisfaction of collaboration members 
with the relationship with national other than the complaint of the time 
pressure in the project beginning. 
Process Factors 
The meetings were mostly smoothly run and informational. Reports on 
the activities of the sub-committees and staff were made with questions 
asked from the floor. Some meetings however were very disorganized and 
without focus. These often dealt with new approaches, searching for 
solutions to problems, etc. 
The National Assembly affiliates had good participation. The DSO 
Grantee representatives kept their participation at a minimum. When asked 
about their participation there were two responses: they did not wish to 
overly influence the direction of the collaboration and there were some 
personal political problems involved. 
Communication Process. The communication process tended to be fairly 
centralized in Tucson. The staff person and the chair person represented 
about 48% of the actions at formal meetings, (Table 22, Appendix A). A 
large percentage of the chairperson's actions were related to running the 
meeting. The staff person 1 s acts were primarily reporting committee 
activity, other collaboration activity, answering questions on reports, 
explaining issues, etc. There was good participation from most of the 
other collaboration participants. However seldom were more than one or 
two remarks made without their being directed to the coordinator for 
response. A sub-pattern was seen when a report was given by someone other 
than the coordinator. Questions were directed at that person following 
the report. At the end of that period the communication reversed back to 
a central pattern. 
Decision Haking Process. Tucson followed a formal decision making 
process. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that a relatively low percentage 
of decisions were made at steering committee meetings. The agenda items 
were more usually reports of progress not followed by formal vote. A 
higher percentage of decisions were made in the sub-committee, but that, 
too was relatively low. It appears that many decisions were made by 
staff, either based on previous discussion, on staff expertise or on 
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behind-the-scenes power blocs and then fully developed upon presentation 
to the steering committee. 
Power Sub-Groups. There are several indications that there were 
informal behind-the-scenes power blocs in the Tucson area. The interviews 
indicate some hostilities over the perception that the staff was more 
favorable to one group or the other. Some of the persons most critical 
appear to have gradually become less active. 
Process Outcomes 
In general, the process outcomes of Tucsonwerepositive. About 79% 
of the respondents in the second interview felt that the collaboration was 
very effective or moderately effective. Table 23 in Appendix A shows 
these data. 
There was not as much concensus about what the collaboration had done 
best. An equal number, 33%, said that the collaboration was most effective 
in its advocacy program and in getting people together, Table 23, 
Appendix A,shows the distribution. 
A remarkable 100% of the representatives reported that they would 
involve their agencies again, knowing what they did at the end of the study 
period. 
Conclusions About the Pima County Collaboration Process 
The Pima County collaboration appeared to have developed a process 
that was basically satisfying to participants who continued and fruitful 
in programatic outcome. It also evolved into a strong organization 
which developed and implemented successful programs. Several factors 
appear to have affected these outcomes. 
First there was agreement between the national staff and the local 
collaboration over structure. The presence of a national staff person at 
key points during the early organizational stages virtually assured this 
agreement. The compatibility avoided a large conflict area present in the 
other collaborations. 
Second, the Tucson agencies had a history of inter-organizational 
relationship. This means that the initial task getting to know each 
other was unnecessary. Third, because of the rush to get Tucson opera-
tional so that the other sites could begin, the collaboration moved 
swiftly past its land marks. Each land mark was successfully reached in 
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aminimum oftime providing a great deal of satisfaction which was increased 
by the amount of recognition given by national. 
Fourth, the collaboration had consistent and interested leadership from 
its chairperson and agreement between the chairperson and staff over their 
roles and priorities. 
The major problem in the Tucson collaboration appeared to be the 
collaborative relationships among the members and the failure to encourage 
continuing trustful relationships. Whether this will hamper future working 
relationships remains to be seen. 
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The Oakland Collaboration 
Background Factors 
Oakland, a city of just over 361,000 in the San Francisco Bay area 
just east of San Francisco, is spread over a fairly large area. This 
fact, with the proximity of San Francisco as a central city and the 
proportion of the population who live in single family housing, gives 
Oakland the appearance of a large urban sprawl, crisscrossed by super 
highways and dependent upon the automobile. 
The Bay Area increased in size following World War II. This rapid 
growth included a high proportion of blacks and Mexican Americans who 
moved from agricultural occupations to take advantage of the growing 
number of industrial jobs available. 
The rapid growth without time for assimilation led to the division 
of Oakland into ethnic areas. In the SO's and 60's Oakland's total 
population started to decline. During this time the minority proportion 
increased. As with many large industrial cities during the era, parts 
of Oakland have become "ghettoized." In 1970, 35% of Oakland's population 
was black and 8% was Mexican American. 
The Oakland Community is heterogeneous and relatively non-traditional. 
There appear to be diverse power structures; a person with prestige and 
power in one area does not necessarily have power in another area. 
Several different cultural patterns exist side by side with an apparent 
outward tolerance. 
In the late 60's the Bay Area gained the reputation of being a haven 
for the contraculture. Some of the social experimentation remains and 
appears to have engendered a generally innovative climate. 
In 1975, there were 3,200 identified status offenders in Alameda 
County. Since the County was too large for the small program grant to 
have an impact, the Oakland collaboration narrowed its focus to East 
Oakland. East Oakland has the 
non-white and 37% with Spanish 
highest concentration of minorities, 51% 
19 
surname. It has a high percentage of 
old housing in poor condition, high unemployment, a high percentage of 
19
nescription based on a 1969 planning brochure of East Oakland. 
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persons on welfare and a high percentage of persons below the poverty 
level. 
In 1976, the Department of Probation received the DSO Grant. Their 
proposal was to offer family counseling to status offenders and operate 
two houses where young people are brought by the police. 
The local National Assembly affiliates in Oakland have been hard 
pressed in the last few years. The cost of living in the Bay Area has 
risen faster than contributions to United Way and other non-profit 
funding. Six of the eleven responding organizations said that they had 
had a reduction in United Way funds in the past year. Four said that 
funds from other sources had also been reduced. The total budget of 4 
of the 11 agencies either decreased or increased less than the cost of 
living during the period of the program. 
The method of obtaining funds from either the United Way, public 
programs or other sources appeared to be highly political in Oakland 
with various power blocs competing for the scarce resources on which their 
survival depends. The tradition of "charity" was not as strong here as 
elsewhere but, the tradition against the use of government funds for 
non-profit human services is also not as strong. Some long-standing 
resentments over past inequities, funding slights and other incidents 
appear to exist among the Oakland agencies' inter-organizational 
relationships. 
The local affiliates of National Assembly organizations did not 
appear isolated from their national representatives. Table 17 indicates 
that 8 of 11 affiliates (73%) knew the name of the national task force 
member at the time of the first interview. 
The non-profit agencies in Oakland were not a unified group and did 
not appear to have a history of inter-agency cooperation. Apparent 
contributing factors are a) the urban sprawl, b) the heterogeneous nature 
of the area, and c) the fact that Oakland is not an independent city so 
far as the agencies go, but is a part of the Bay area region in planning, 
program and relationships. 
Into this fiercely competitive atmosphere, a letter came in late 
1976 to the local Camp FireGirls explaining the project and asking the 
Camp FireGirls' Executive Director to call a meeting of the National 
Assembly affiliates and other appropriate youth serving agencies. 
73 
Approximately 50 persons attended, to whom the National Director 
explained the program. A representative from the Oakland Manpower Office, 
who asked many questions about the nature of the funding and the time 
line, was selected temporary chairperson. 
In mid-March a second meeting was attended by about 25 persons. 
During the next four or five meetings the group discussed a range of issues 
including program needs and priorities~ money, levels of trust, etc. 
They also discussed the possibility of forming a collaboration with or 
without the money. 
The group formed task forces to further plan programs, incorporation 
and funding. The small groups met two or three times a week with full 
meetings about once a month. Papers were drawn up for incorporating 
the group about the same time that a search for staff began. The group, 
however, has not incorporated at this time. 
The group made two crucial decisions in the early stage. One was 
to incorporate for the purpose of becoming a political power in Oakland. 
This decision follows the guideline of grass roots organization popularized 
by Alinsky. 20 The second was an informal decision that staff representa-
tives were most appropriate members, somewhat excluding volunteers. 
In advertising for staff, the position called for an executive 
director. The job advertisment called for a person who can organize, 
plan, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs program 
21 in Alameda County. The staff person was hired to direct a program of 
service rather than to coordinate services by members. 
During the summer, the chairperson gave up the chair and went onto 
the personnel committee. The second chairperson, a member of the Boy 
Scouts' staff, took over in late August and the coordinator was hired. 
The staff person was without an office or secretary for several 
months. It was difficult to reach her by phone even though she had space 
at the Boy Scouts office. These months appear to have slowed the progress 
of collaboration somewhat, with apparently waning enthusiasm and commit-
ment, and a lack of direction. 
20 Saul D. Alinsky, Reveille for Radicals (New York: Vintage Books, 
1969). 
21
A copy of the job description can be found in Auxiliary Appendix E. 
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To overcome this, in November the coordinator proposed a program 
development seminar to deal with resources and attack the problem of lack 
of commitment to the collaboration. After some conflict with national 
staff who she felt handled the project review less seriously and promptly 
than necessary, the seminar was presented and revitalized the collaboration. 
Structural Factors 
Early in its history, the Oakland collaboration limited membership 
to staff. There were some non-staff persons involved, however, from the 
Junior League, the National Council of Jewish Women and the Camp Fire 
Girls. The early members felt that it was the staff that got things 
done in social agencies, and volunteers or board members tended to muddy 
the water. Other early members included representatives from the Oakland 
Manpower Department, Oakland Public Schools, Oakland Police Department, 
and County Probation Department, who was the DSO Grantee. Half of the 
participants in the Oakland collaboration were line staff rather than 
executive directors, and this presented a problem. These staff people 
were really unable to commit their agencies. 
Priority and Role of Chairperson. The first chairperson of the Oakland 
collaboration thought that the collaboration's major goal was to become a 
political power so that the major public agencies, including the DSO Grantee, 
could be forced to improve their service for youth in East Oakland. 
The second chairperson, the only leader observed, also stressed the 
politicizing of the traditional agencies as a primary goal. He felt this 
would be a valuable contribution to increasing the public service sector's 
accountability. 
The second chairperson was designated president of the board rather 
than chairperson. He perceived his job as direction, with the executive 
director implementing the decisions. However, he appears to have taken 
little task responsibility outside of the meeting. The coordinator would 
occasionally push him to take a more active role in collaboration business 
but generally he deferred to her opinions and decisions. In some areas, 
the chairperson would request that the coordinator represent the group at 
some meeting or on a board. As the collaboration progressed the chair-
person appears to have given even less leadership and the coordinator was 
making most of the decisions. 
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Priority and Role of Staff. The coordinator's major priority at the 
beginning was "the political education" of the local affiliates. She 
also saw the need to educate the group to real collaboration. She felt 
they really did not understand it. She perceived a major organizational 
task was to reduce committee work so that she could do the work herself. 
The coordinator perceived herself as the director of a program. 
She intended to educate the local collaboration members out of their 
notions, which she considered naive. She saw herself as the major source 
of the program planning and the collaboration as the implementation agency 
with herself as director. A diagram developed by the staff person 
illustrates her role definition. It is a series of circles one within the 
other with the coordinator in the center. The diagram is included in 
Auxiliary Appendix E. 
The coordinator's perception of her role is not inconsistent with the 
job for which she was hired. The job calls for an executive director to 
organize, develop and administer a comprehensive youth service and needs 
program for status offenders. 
The Oakland staff person's operating style was more that of an 
independent professional than that of a coordinator. She tended to develop 
position papers and program decisions rather than enable the collaboration 
to discuss such issues. The data from the daily log shown in Table 19, 
Appendix A support this analysis. An average of only 25% of her time was 
spent in telephone calls and appointments and 26% was spent in study, 
paper work and administration. 
The coordinator and chairperson had some conflict of role definition 
for several months after the coordinator was hired. During that time the 
collaboration office was housed in the Boy Scouts office where the chair-
person was employed. The staff person felt the chair was using her as an 
employee rather than as the director of the collaboration. 
Staff-Member Relationships. There was conflict between the coordinator 
and many of the Oakland collaboration members over proper staff role. 
Many of them expected her to follow their recommendations. She expected 
to lead them and to make her o\vn decisions. At several meetings, the 
issue of staff role arose, usually with an implicit criticism of the staff. 
She would explain the incompatibility of their perception of the job and 
her perception of the job. 
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One of the areas of conflict was her lack of preparation for meetings 
and the follow-up work required. Consequently a number of conflicting 
situations arose, such as the members wanting to see the budget and staff 
person not having it available, or, conflict ridden discussions over 
elements of the phased action plan developed by the staff person. Much 
of the conflict was spearheaded by representatives of two of the affiliates. 
These representatives were relatively inactive and were viewed by some 
of the others as deviant and troublesome. 
This unsatisfactory situation was relayed to the juvenile justice 
task force in New York by local members and a decision was made by the 
national collaboration that failure was imminent unless they intervened. 
A meeting was held on September, 1977, at which four national task force 
members and two national staff persons tried to clarify the issue and 
reexamine priorities. Following this meeting with some behind-the-scenes 
agreements, and with the help of national staff, the executive committee 
was re-constituted with a new chairperson. Shortly thereafter, the 
coordinator temporarily put the program implementation at a disadvantage 
at a time when full-time effort was most necessary. It was felt that 
the alternative of no staff at all would have been even more detrimental. 
National-Local Relationships. One final structural issue was the 
national-local relationship. A great deal of conflict existed in the 
Oakland collaboration about the supervisory role of the national collaboration 
with regard to both staff supervision and program supervision. The 
coordinator felt that the supervision was unnecessary, cumbersome and 
belittling. She also felt that national staff supervision of program was 
not responsive to the local problems and needs. A time-lapse problem 
was perceived, where national staff appeared slow to recognize the need for 
immediate program decisions. 
The coordinator's perception of her role and her ideas which developed 
in the phased action plan led to a crisis in Oakland. The plan outlined a 
separate direct service agency to be placed in East Oakland, with additional 
staff hired to implement all of the program. This was contrary to the 
philosophy of the program and the national task force and staff intervened. 
They felt hampered at every turn by the need to have national colla-
boration approval for every move. This surfaced when an early workshop 
was planned to get members together and improve communication. The 
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collaboration, led by the coordinator,planned the workshop with an outside 
consultant, and then felt that approval from New York was excessively 
slow. 
A similar reaction to the phased action plan occurred. After months 
of hard work, the finished plan was not immediately accepted and the 
implementation could not begin. Part of the delay was caused by the 
coordinator's failure to respond to questions or to begin implementing 
programs that had been approved. At the second interview, the collabora-
tion representatives reported that one of their major problems had been 
with the coordinator. 
Process Factors 
The definition of roles was a problem reflected in the group process. 
Table 22 Appendix A, indicates that the chair and coordinator together 
accounted for about half of the action. With the new coordinator and chair-
person, the percent declined to 27% of the few meetings we observed. The 
DSO Grantee accounted for 12% of the action when present. One interesting 
finding is the activity level of the affiliates. The three most influential 
affiliates and all other affiliates together account for a large percentage 
of acts. Most meetings were lively with discussion of those present. 
Much of this discussion, however, was conflict-related and from time to 
time a lot of it was destructive to the collaboration process. 
Communication Processe The communication pr-ocess was usually 
centralized in the Oakland collaboration meetings. The direction was 
from the chairperson to the floor and back, or from the staff person to 
the floor and back. There was good participation by most participants 
but very little discussion among them. Only occasionally were more than 
two or three remarks made from the floor without the chair or staff 
participating. The chair tended to move the meetings, while the staff 
responded to substantive questions. 
Decision Making Process. The decision making process appeared to have 
been by consensus rather than formal action especially with the first 
chairperson and coordinator. Examination of the substanne of discussions 
and decisions revealed that many decisions were related to petty matters 
such as days on which to have meetings, and little of programatic importance 
was decided in meetings. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that only 24% 
of items discussed were followed by formal decisions. 
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The direction in which decisions went appeared to have been controlled 
by the staff. The programs developed by the program committees were 
based on position papers developed by the staff. She chaired at least one 
of these sub-committees. At the board meetings, reports were given and 
while details were discussed, the nature of the program appeared not to 
have been discussed. Many of the meetings were reported as lack-luster 
and low-energy. This could have been because few important decisions 
were discussed. 
Power Sub-Groups. Two changing sub-groups appeared to affect the 
life of the Oakland collaboration. In the formation days a difference in 
perspective arose between some of the minority persons and the representa-
tives of the old line traditional affiliates. The minorities, who were 
the first and second chairpersons, and the staff perceived organizational 
development from a grass roots perspective. The notion of advice and 
direction from New York seemed ridiculous to them. The political realities 
of East Oakland were the important issue to them and their highest 
priority. These persons appear to have controlled the early collaboration 
patterns and expectations. 
As the program got underway, the conflict between the grass roots 
persons and the influential affiliates surfaced, often around the role 
of the staff. However, the coordinator blamed the national staff for much 
of the problem and appears to have galvanized both groups against the 
national collaboration. 
At another level a competition between some of the affiliates 
remained, probably related to past history. Different blocs emerged around 
different issues. 
Process Outcomes 
The process outcomes in Oakland were not outstanding. Asked 
during the second interview how effective they thought the collaboration 
was, 82% (14) said not very effective and 18% (3) said moderately effective. 
Table 23, Appendix A, shows the distribution in other sites. 
During the first interview, 16 of 18 respondents thought the 
collaboration was beginning to move and would become effective soon, 
This change indicates that in late Fall, 1976, there was more hope for 
the Oakland collaboration than in late Fall, 1977. 
79 
When asked what they thought the collaboration had done best, 44% 
responded, "getting people together," 19% said planning programs and 19% 
said they didn't know. The distribution can be seen in Table 23, 
When asked if they would involve their organization again, a 
surprising 94% (16)said yes and 6% (1) didn't know. However, most per-
ceived that only 50 to 60 percent of other members would participate 
again. This is a good sign of continuing verbal commitment despite 
disappointment. 
Conclusions About the Oakland Collaboration Process 
Several factors that affected the Oakland collaboration process can 
be noted. First, many of the problems of the Oakland collaboration struc-
ture apparently could have been avoided with more direction from national 
staff early in the organizational stages. For six months while priorities, 
roles, patterns of interaction, job description and organizational 
perspectives were being developed, there was little interaction with 
national collaboration. The interaction which did occur was neither 
prepared for, acted on or reported locally. The six months between the 
organizational meeting and the hiring of the staff person allowed these 
patterns to set. 
Second, the contradictory priorities from the national staff were 
more explicitly perceived in Oakland than elsewhere. The meeting at which 
the national task force and staff intervened openly addressed the question. 
Oakland members had thought collaboration was the priority. They felt 
now that the national collaboration had switched signals from collaboration 
to direct services. This confusion supports the hypothesis that inter-
organizational collaboration, especially if the time is limited, works 
better around a single clearly defined goal or issue. 
Third, there appeared to be no payoffs in the program for the Oakland 
National Assembly affiliates, and so commitment waned. Few of them had 
programs in East Oakland; they were to get little of the program money 
and little else either. Development of the phased action plan was very 
slow. When it was finished, participants appeared drained. Commitment to 
the collaboration fell sharply as summer approached and the necessity 
for mounting their own summer programs and the prospect of vacations 
increased. 
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Fourth, the Oakland collaboration felt that the national collaboration 
was putting them into a competitive position with other collaborations. 
They interpreted the message from New York to mean that more program funds 
would go to the collaboration with the phased action plan in first. This 
was contrary to fostering inter-organizational trust. 
Finally,the choice of East Oakland as the impact area was problematic. 
Although the most pressing problems were found there, the affiliates had 
no vested interest in the area. Consequently the collaboration had to 
learn about the community and establish ties with other local activities 
as well as to develop a direct services project. 
With all of the problems Oakland has had, most of the affiliates 
remained committed to change. They continued to serve youth in East 
Oakland, they were interacting with each other and they were becoming 
more aware of youth at risk at the end of the study period. With more 
realistic goals and structure, Oakland may very well overcome some of the 
other situational factors which plague them. 
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The Spartanburg Collaboration 
Background Factors 
Spartanburg County sits in the northwestern part of South Carolina 
at the foot of the Blue Ridge Mountains exactly midway between New York 
and New Orleans. The City of Spartanburg is a regional center for the 
County and is intersected by two Interstate Highways, I-85 and I-26. The 
estimated 1977 population was 46,485 within the City and 73,638 people 
within the urban area. The County has an estimated population of 192,100. 
The Greenville-Spartanburg SMSA is the retail trade center of north-
western South Carolina. The cities of Spartanburg and Greenville (30 miles 
to the east) are rapidly growing toward each other and are expected to 
meet in the 1980's. 
The Spartanburg area is presently experiencing relatively rapid 
economic and industrial growth, although a decade or two ago the area 
was characterized as economically depressed. These events are stimulating 
social changes which conflict with traditional behavior patterns. As 
new industries have moved into the area, they have also sent in large 
numbers of management level personnel who have become involved in civic 
affairs. They do not share the traditional southern cultural patterns, 
which occasionally places them in conflict with the traditional power 
structure. While much of the work force and political structure is 
composed of long-time residents and products of the traditional southern 
social structure, these newer elements are characterized by higher educa-
tional levels and active political participation. Their influence is 
increasing and this trend is likely to continue. These seeds of social 
change are not reflected in the Census data from 1970. For example, in 
1970, only 1.5% of the population was of foreign stock but local respondents 
note that this percentage in increasing. 
The educational attainment of Spartanburg County residents is low. 
In 1970, 64% of the population 25 years of age or older had not finished 
high school and 40% had not attended school past the 9th grade. In 
1970, 14% of families were below the poverty line with a mean family 
income of $2,111. Of these, 12% were receiving some form of public 
assistance. At the same time, the median family income for all families 
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in the County was $7,924, and the mean family income was $8,908. These 
statistics reflect the fact that there is an economic bifurcation with 
a substantial number of families earning rather high incomes (the manage-
ment levels and retailers), and a substantial work force of relatively 
uneducated and unskilled or semiskilled workers earning relatively low 
family incomes. The unemployment rate is presently at about 5%, 
although it jumped to 9.4% in 1975 when the energy crisis and economic 
depression in the textile market resulted in major layoffs in that 
industry. 
A substantial number of young people drop out of school before 
completing the twelfth grade and subsequently many of them become problems 
to the juvenile justice system. 
Culturally, Spartanburg has a traditional deep South social structure. 
The social values of politeness, non-conflict and surface friendliness are 
operative and geniune. 
Educated and well-traveled, the Spartanburg professionals and others 
tend to be defensive about their cultures. While they recognize the 
problems of a traditional society in 20th-Century America, they also 
appreciate the advantages of group consensus, warm relationships and 
pleasant inter-personal relations. Many of them are working hard within 
the structure to achieve social change. 
While most relationships are friendly on the surface, Spartanburg 
respondents indicate that society is fiercely competitive. This is 
indicated in inter-scholastic basketball where traditional rivalries 
amount to near hatred. 
The National Assembly affiliates are highly visible and influential 
in Spartanburg. The reported membership/client contacts of about 53,000 
represent about 28% of the County's total population. (This does not 
include the 300,000 contacts reported by the Salvation Army). 
Many of the most influential people in town belong to the Junior 
League and/or the YMCA. The YMCA is a complete gymnastic and recreational 
facility and is well used by upper middle class residents. There are also 
two country clubs which cater to the affluent. 
Reported salaries of staff members of the affiliates averaged about 
$9.600. This was relatively lower than salaries at other sites. Budgets 
of five of the six affiliates indicated a decrease in income or an increase 
rate less than that of the cost of living. 
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Spartanburg has no history of inter-organizational cooperation among 
the affiliates. There had been the usual competition for scarce financial 
resources from United Hay. Several incidents were reported which indicated 
some resentment and bitterness at perceived past slights and injustices 
by the United Hay. 
Previous public-private cooperation did not extend much beyond the 
presence of Scout troops in the schools, a few referrals for recreation to 
the YMCA and referrals to the Junior League's Girls' Home. Previous 
grass roots non profit cooperation was virtually non-existent. 
Into this atmosphere in early 1976, a letter arrived to the executive 
director of the YMCA from his national office. It was addressed to the 
previous executive who had retired and already had been replaced. It 
explained the project and asked him to call a meeting of National Assembly 
affiliate representatives and other pertinent youth serving agencies to 
meet with a site visitation team from New York. 
One respondent reported that the meeting was horrendous. The site 
team was not there long enough to deal with southern customs; they called 
the "friendliness" shallow; they called the group racist because there 
were no blacks. (Nor were there any in some other collaboration sites.) 
After letters of apologies, a second site visit and a summer visit by 
the National Director to help with the hiring procedures, the Spartanburg 
collaboration was under way. 
The local Spartanburg affiliates felt isolated from their national 
organizations. Of the 11 persons responding 45% (5) knew no one in the 
national or regional offices. Hhen asked if they had been contacted by 
their national organization about the collaboration, 62% (8) said they had 
had no contact, 8% (1) said they had had some contact and 31% (4) said 
they had had much contact. One additional member said his regional staff 
person would not agree to let him join. Tables 17 and 18 in Appendix A 
show these data. 
Structural Factors 
By late June, the group was feeling a sense of movement. The YMCA 
executive was temporary chairman. The first committees dealt with external 
structure, personnel search, public relations, finding an office and 
equal opportunity. The Spartanburg group had received some assistance 
from national staff and task force members on the statement of purpose, 
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a job description, letters of commitment and the phased action plan. 
In early July, the first chairperson went to Europe and a member 
of the Junior League became chairperson. She was a replacement for a 
previous Junior League representative anc appeared to have assumed the 
role of chairperson without the vote of the members. The new chairperson 
felt the press of time and ran the meetings in a task oriented manner. 
Priority and Role of Chairperson. The perception of the role of 
chairperson and the chairperson's own program priorities were sources 
both of direction and of tension for collaboration. The original chair-
person was a strong leader but with a non-directive style. He worked 
behind the scenes to gain acceptance for his ideas. He appeared to have 
clearly understood the dual goals of program and process. 
The second chairperson appeared to have perceived the program goals 
as the top priority of the Spartanburg collaboration. She had worked 
intimately with status offenders, recognized the need for service and saw 
this as an opportunity for Spartanburg to increase services. She also 
perceived, quite accurately, that to reach the program goals, as stated 
in the proposal in the limited time, a strong task-oriented leader was 
necessary. She also appeared to want to strengthen existing programs 
and services, an_d seemed uninterested in innovative new service. 
This chairperson saw her role as to initiate, direct and coordinate 
the collaboration; the coordinator was to provide staff support to implement 
board decisions. 
As the search for coordinator accelerated, the new chairperson 
reappointed the personnel committee, omitting some previous members and 
thereby causing hard feelings. She also appears to have made other 
executive decisions to facilitate progress toward the goal with which some 
other collaboration members and staff people disagreed with. The leader-
ship style of the second chairperson and the disagreement over chair and 
staff roles and procedures ultimately led to a crisis in the collaboration. 
At least two meetings were spent in discussion about the staff role and 
job description; the coordinator was excluded from one of these. Eventually 
the conflict was so destructive that the national collaboration intervened. 
The National Director and several national task force members went to 
Spartanburg to facilitate some local decisions about leadership. Several 
weeks of negotiation, another national staff visit and a great deal of 
conflict followed until finally the Spartanburg chairperson resigned. 
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The Spartanburg collaboration was virtually without a formal chair-
person for about three months. During that time committees continued to 
meet, and an overview of status offender case files was being performed as 
part of the needs assessment, but little other progress was made. 
After the second chairperson was hired and then resigned, the colla-
boration looked around the community for "someone of equal status 11 to 
become chair. After two more months they found a person connected with the 
University of South Carolina who had been involved with status offenders. 
Several meetings were spent in discussions about a new leader and 
the massive amount of work required to direct the project. At one time 
they considered a chairperson and vice-chair who would share the work. The 
vice-chair role as they described it was really that of a staff coordinator. 
There was also indication that some decisions were made behind the scenes. 
The vice-chairperson, a non-affiliate member of the collaboration and 
a public participant, became chairperson during the interim between the 
second and third chairperson. He and the collaboration coordinator worked 
well together. During this time the phased action plan was written and 
finalized, primarily by them. 
The third chairperson took the chair in June but in late October 
resigned because of health. During her short term of office she appeared 
to be in control of the meetings and to direct the interaction. She 
was very effective in terms of both style and position. She delegated 
responsibilities and followed up to see if they were being handled. As 
an outsider selected by the collaboration, she had no vested interest in 
any agency but truly cared about children and the goals of the collaboration. 
The authority of leaders in the collaboration appeared to come from 
sources outside of the collaboration rather than from inside. They were 
looking for persons with status in the community not expertise on inter-
personal skill within the collaboration. This is typical in traditional 
societies. 
Priority and Role of Staff. One source of tension in Spartanburg 
was conflict over perception of staff role. The original coordinator 
perceived the staff role as that of facilitator. She expected the committees 
to make decisions and she would do the staff work--especially the implementa-
tion. 
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Her original priorities for the program were to enable some structured 
change to occur especially in the realms of racism and service to youth 
and to enable the local organizations to redefine the roles of non-profit 
organization in the field of human service and in relationships to each 
other. 
The coordinator's work style indicates that either her real priority 
was program or that she was blocked in dealing with the organizational 
change and collaboration. About 50% of her time was reportedly spent 
dealing with program (Table 19, Appendix A). The log data also indicate 
that she spent more time than average in phone calls and appointments and 
this is reflected in the perception of the committee members when asked 
how often they related to her (Table 20, Appendix A). 
In Spartanburg, no outsider is allowed to criticize the system. 
One must raise consciousness and stimulate the local citizens to suggest 
the needed changes and then help implement them. The multiplicity of 
goals and the limited time did not allow this process to develop. The 
coordinator tried but found the initial reticence of the members to suggest 
innovative or major changes frustrating. The pressure from the national 
collaboration to "produce" was also difficult to ienore. 
While the coordinator and the committee appeared to agree on the role 
of coordinator, they did not agree on the role of the committee. The 
coordinator wanted planning decisions to be hashed out together in the 
collaboration even at the risk of confrontation and conflict. Instead, 
she felt that the committee was waiting for her to be the leader. Added 
to this was the strong task oriented second chairperson whose priorities 
did not include the collaborative process. 
This conflict between the staff and other collaboration members was 
resolved three ways. First, the committees were gradually rearranged 
and the chairperson resigned. In the new arrangement, the coordinator 
functioned as expert and the chairperson ran the meetings, Second, work 
style was changed. The coordinator gradually changed from the facilitating 
iole to a more central position, spending more time with other experts in 
the community in the planning and implementation of direct service programs. 
The data suggest that without the DSO Grantee and the Appalachian 
Council of Government representative, very little would have occurred in 
the Spartanburg collaboration. Third, staff priorities changed. The 
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coordinator gradually placed a higher priority on direct service program 
implementation. 
National-Local Relationships. The relationship of the Spartanburg 
coordinator with national collaboration staff appeared to change over 
time and as the coordinator shifted roles. Originally she perceived the 
national staff as a source of support and expertise as she proceeded in 
her job. Several perceived failures of both support and expertise in 
the necessary time, amount and form precipitated a search for alternative 
local support. As she developed her own expertise, supervision from the 
national staff was tolerated with some diffused hostility. 
Process Factors 
The group process data indicate that when the second chairperson 
resigned the coordinator was more active in the meetings. The observations 
also indicate that in the later stage, the coordinator presented reports 
and information, brought program models and details into the meetings and, 
regularly made outside decisions for implementation on the b.asis of her 
own knowledge without referring back to committee. 
Table 22-, Appendix A, indicates that Spartanburg meetings were active, 
and that there was good participation by the DSO Grantee and other public 
agencies. This activity increased when the second chairperson resigned 
because not only was the DSO Grantee active but the acting chairperson 
was ~ith the Appalachian Council of Governments. The analysis shows that 
the executive committee meetings were consistently dominated by the chair-
person, the coordinator and the DSO Grantee. 
Communication Process. The communication process in Spartanburg was 
centralized when the second chairperson was in control. Someone would 
speak, the chair would respond, another speaker, the chair, another speaker, 
the chair, etc. The break in this pattern came when someone reported. 
Then there would be some give and take around the issue before the pattern 
resumed. 
When the interim chairperson took over the pattern changed somewhat. 
The chairperson did not respond to every response. However no decentralized 
communication pattern developed. 
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Decision Making Process. In the early months, decisions appeared 
to be made by vote with the second chairperson running things by Roberts 
Rules of Order. The decisions brought to a vote seem to have been developed 
outside of the collaboration, reportedly by the chair and one powerful 
sub-group. Issues would appear that had not been discussed either in the 
executive committee or with the coordinator. It is possible that many 
of the decisions brought to a vote were the results of the manipulations 
of the various power blocs behind the scenes. In later months the 
decisions appeared to have been engineered by the coordinator toward her 
program goals. On issues that she had given up, she did not push very much 
and so no formal decisions were made on those issues. Table 21, Appendix A, 
shows that formal decisions followed discussion of issues only 25% of 
the mite in the sub-committee and 35% of the time in the executive 
committee. 
Power Sub-Groups. Differences in perspective between two well-defined 
sub-groups, each led by a powerful affiliate, appeared to be behind much of 
the dissention in the Spartanburg collaboration. It appears that one was 
oriented to change without upset and the other was oriented toward better 
services without substantial change. Neither are very radical views. 
It is not surprising that the coordinator tended to ally herself with 
the latter. 
Despite the conflict, tension and problems the collaboration was 
relatively successful in its process goals. At the time of the second 
interview, 29% of members felt the collaboration was very effective 50% 
thought it moderately effective and 21% thought it not at all effective. 
There was a general consensus about what the collaboration did best. About 
64% (9) thought direct service was the highest accomplishment and 29% (4) 
thought getting people together was the greatest achievement (Table 23, 
Appendix A) . 
The collaboration members reported strongly that they would involve 
their organizations again knowing what they knew at the end of the study 
period. Seventy-nine percent (11) said yes, 14% (2) said not in the same 
way and one non-affiliate said no. 
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Conclusions About the Spartanburg Collaboration Process 
Institutional change did not yet come to Spartanburg. However, there 
was no doubt that several important things had occurred. Certainly 
National Assembly affiliatesweregetting to know each other and beginning 
to trust each other. The public agencies were working with non-profit 
agencies in a respectful relationship. 
Spartanburg presented a good opportunity to test interagency coopera-
tion because it was small enough for the impact to be felt, and had no 
previous history of interorganizational cooperation. Five factors were 
important in understanding the Spartanburg collaboration. A major factor 
in Spartanburg was lack of consensus on role and procedure. More consensus 
could have been achieved had the time been longer, had leadership been 
more carefully chosen and had the explanatory materials on priorities 
been clearer. 
A second factor was the direct intervention into the process by the 
national collaboration. We do not know what would have happened had this 
not occurred. A third factor was the suspicion and bias Spartanburg 
leadership has against Federal intervention into local issues. There were 
those who reo;ented LEAA telling them what their children needed. 
A fourth factor was the coordinator's change of roles. The change was 
quite functional for delivery of services to status offenders. The process, 
however, caused her to go to other sources for technical assistance that 
were not necessarily most functional for inter-organization cooperation or 
capacity building. Had the national staff or the national task force 
provided technical assistance on process and program, the programs could 
have been more easily understood by the local affiliates, and more readily 
planned and implemented. 
A final factor was the interaction of the public representatives in 
the collaboration. The coordinator apparently felt more support from them 
than from most of the non-profit agencies and perceived more rewards from 
developing and implementing direct service programs with them. 
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The Spokane Collaboration 
Background Factors 
Spokane, a city of 173,698 in an SMSA of 305,600 on the eastern 
edge of Washington, is the regional center for an area 200 miles north 
into Canada and for eastern Washington, western Montana and northern 
Idaho. Through the mid-1950's Spokane had a relatively stable popula-
tion. Since 1950 the population has grown 47%; about 11% from 1950 to 
1960, 39% from 1960 to 1970 and 6% from 1970 to 1975. The growth includes 
a high proportion of young people who moved into the area because of the 
beauty of the natural surroundings and the outdoor recreational opportuni-
ties, and some increase in the older population. 
The economy of Spokane reflects its status as a regional center. The 
regional university and medical services are located there; seven railroads 
converge on Spokane; about 27% of the work force is employed in retail 
and wholesale establishments and another large proportion of workers is 
employed in service industries. There are few large industries other than 
Kaiser Aluminum, but some electronic industry and tourism contribute to 
a healthy economy. 
About 9% of the population was below the poverty line in 1970 and 
in October 1977 about 5% of the work force was unemployed. 
Spokane and its area has a relatively stable society partially because 
of its isolated geographical situation, pratially because of the nature of 
its population. It was settled in the late 1800's by Northern European 
farmers, workers on the seven railroads and a sizable Mormon group. Wealthy 
farmers from the area and Air Force personnel retire to Spokane which at 
one time established the third highest percentage of persons over 65 
among the nation's cities. 
The geographical isolation, the values of an agricultural population 
and the percentage of retired persons combined to give Spokane society an 
insular quality. The political situation tends to be conservative with 
several visible right wing organizations. There is a general suspicion of 
the Eastern folk, especially government and governmental interference. 
Social patterns are stable or slow to change. One respondent reported that 
"kids still drag up Riverside and meet at the drive-in on a Saturday night 
in Spokane." The conservative patterns, however~ appear to be changing 
slowly with the population influx. 
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Social status and influence appear to be concentrated in the heart of 
the old familiar businesses and several larger religious institutions. This 
is changing somewhat because recent arrivals are young professionals who 
bring their own prestige. 
Spokane is the only collaboration site with a non-public DSO Grantee, 
the Spokane Area Youth Committee (SAYC), a planning, coordinating and 
service assessment body of community leaders from both public and private 
sectors including a city councilman, the Chairman of the Board of County 
Commissioners, the Chief of Police, the Superintendent of the Spokane 
Schools, a Superior Court Judge and the Episcopal Bishop. Since SAYC is a 
planning body, it incorporated the second organization Youth Alternatives, 
to implement the DSO program. The program developed by Youth Alternatives 
was primarily crisis intervention by program staff and referral services 
to community agencies for status offenders. In 1976, Spokane reported 
898 status offenders, about 76% of whom were runaways, 13% uncontrollable 
and 3% truant. 
Spokane has an active volunteer population. The National Assembly 
affiliates appeared to be financially healthy. All seven showed a budget 
lncrea,;e frum Fall, 1976, to Fall, 1977. Five of the increases were 
significantly larger than the cost of living increase. The affiliates 
appeared to have active relationships with their regional or national 
offices. Ten of the fourteen respondents knew the regional program person 
or the national juvenile justice task force representative. Eight reported 
that they had received some or much communication from their national 
offices about the collaboration. 
It appeared originally to both the site selection committee and the 
evaluation that Spokane had a well developed pattern of inter-organizational 
relations. On more careful consideration, this was not an accurate assess-
ment. The inter-organizational relationships were built around persons 
rather than around organizations. There are a great number of interlocking 
board memberships which manifest themselves in split loyalties, inter-
organizational gossip and competition for individuals, but apparently little 
inter-organizational cooperation. Even the Spokane Area Youth Committee, 
the inter-organizational planning body, considered its participants as 
influential citizens, not as organizational representatives. Because of 
this, considerable jealousy and hostility between organizations was 
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recorded in the interviews. 
A considerable amount of inter-organizational hostility, bitterness 
and jealousy in Spokane is reported in reference to United Way. These 
feelings appeared to have institutionalized inter-organizational suspicion, 
reserve and lack of trust while preserving, on the surface,personal 
relationships. 
The relationships between public and private agencies appeared to 
have been minimal, with some purchase of services from private agencies by 
the public agencies. The Spokane Area Youth Committee attempted inter-
systems planning by including both public agencies and private citizens. 
The first communication to Spokane from the national collaboration was 
in mid-February, 1976. On March 4th, eighteen representatives of Spokane 
agencies met to begin the collaborative process. In early March the 
National Director and national task force members made an initial site 
visit and the local agencies committed themselves to the program. A 
representative from the Junior League assumed the role of chairperson at 
the second meeting. Tbe Spokane collaboration immediately formed five 
committees: steering, personnel, finance, nominating and program 
development. By late April, when the collaboration was informed of its 
inclusion in the final selection, a statement of purpose had already 
been developed. 
From late April through August, the collaboration met at least monthly. 
Officers were selected, the program development committee developed, 
goals and objectives formulated and personnel committee began the search 
for a staff person. The chairperson reported that direction from the 
national collaboration was primarily through "numerous phone calls 11 
between national staff and the chairperson. With the search for staff, 
the chairperson resigned and the nominating committee had difficulty 
replacing her. A volunteer from the YMCA assumed the temporary chair role. 
In late August, a member of the national staff returned to Spokane to 
interview the final candidate for collaboration coordinator, and on 
September 1 the position was filled. The collaboration office was set up 
in the SAYC office in an open area with no privacy or sense of work space. 
By late summer, some uncertainty, frustration and dissatisfaction was 
growing in the collaboration primarily around the leadership. The 
National Director spent two days in early October working with the Spokane 
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staff person, the new chairperson and the collaboration to help the process. 
The dissatisfaction continued and there was a noticable rise in behind-the-
scenes gossip, 'backbiting' and criticism. There was also open confrontation 
at the collaboration meetings. The local executives were loathe to take 
responsibility to reshape the collaboration at this point for fear that it 
would appear to be a power play. 
In early November the chairperson of the national collaboration 
spent a day in Spokane working with the local agency executives. He 
worked toward getting them to take responsibility for the leadership of 
the collaboration and to restructure the roles and tasks. He discussed 
with them various strategies that could be used for this necessary reorgani-
zation. Following his visit, the entire executive committee resigned 
with many rumors running through the various inter-locking boards. 
In early December the National Director spent three days in Spokane 
working with the coordinator and the collaboration members. He worked to 
diffuse the feelings of the group about the resignations and restructuring 
and to plan strategies for the future. An all day workshop had been 
scheduled while he was there to develop program plans and priorities. 
In the following weeks, the executives of the collaboration agencies 
began the restructuring. After a reluctant beginning the group discussed 
extensively the pros and cons of the options. They made several important 
decisions about the structure of the collaboration. There appeared to be 
no schism between the affiliates and the non-affiliates at this meeting 
and the beginning of rebuilding appeared to have occurred. During the 
remainder of December, the one major decision was that the executive of 
the affiliates should comprise the program committee. Reconstituted 
committees worked hard at developing the phased action plan even though the 
nominating committee had not named the new executive committee. This 
leaderless situation lasted until February when the collaboration voted 
on an executive committee with a rotating chairperson. 
Structural Factors 
At the second meeting, when the first chairperson took office, two 
crucial decisions on membership were made. First, it was decided that the 
collaboration should be composed of only non-profit organizations; 
second, that agency staff should bow out and only committed volunteers 
should participate in the collaboration. By the middle of May, however, it 
94 
became apparent to the volunteers that they could not make decisions that 
affected their agency's programs without staff participation and so the 
staff coordinator was invited back. The first chairperson then appointed 
both staff and volunteers to the collaboration committees. 
In the reorganization meeting of the collaboration of December 9, 1976, 
several structural decisions were made. First, the program committee was 
to be composed of the executive directors; second, the executive committee 
would have six persons (plus the chairperson) at least half of whom would 
be volunteers with decision making power--presidents or vice presidents of 
boards; third, the chairperson should have leadership skills; fourth, the 
chairperson should be a volunteer; fifth, the SAYC, Youth Alternatives and 
United Way were to be non-voting members on the executive committee and 
the program committee. 
A major structural factor in Spokane was the relationship between the 
Spokane DSO Grantee, the SAYC, the DSO program organization, Youth Alterna-
tives, and the collaboration. In the early months of the collaboration, 
apparently before either collaboration staff or local agency staff were 
involved, a working agreement was developed outlining the structure of the 
relationship between the three groups called the Interlock. This agreement 
established a council through which, they would operate for "division of 
labor, sharing of resources and other matters that would 
avoid duplication" (Appendix E). 
The crucial structure of the agreement was that the collaboration 
would be housed in SAYC offices with the SAYC contracting to provide space, 
secretarial, telephone, bookkeeping and payroll services as well as 
supervisory support such as monitoring programs, community and agency 
assessment and evaluation. 
In late summer the Director of SAYC, who drew up the agreement, was 
replaced. The new administration of SAYC did not want the relationship 
and in November withdrew from the Interlock. No alternative relationship 
developed after that. The Spokane coordinator reported several attempts 
to develop a working relationship to no avail. 
Priority and Role of Chairperson. The priority of the first chair-
person, a member of the Junior League, was to enable the groups to work 
together. She was really committed to collaboration and a firm believer in 
the power of volunteers. Much of the early work of the collaboration was 
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because of her dedicated work. She was without staff and with support 
from the national office at a distance. Though she was not observed 
by the evaluation it is reported that she functioned in the role of 
organizer and manager, allotting tasks and committee roles, keeping 
records, and maintaining contact with the national office. 
An interim chairperson took over when the first chairperson resigned. 
He functioned through the development of job description and the hiring 
of the coordinator and appointment of a permanent chair. 
The third chairperson was a representative of a non-affiliate youth 
serving agency. His priority was to "get things rolling" toward results. 
By the time he was appointed, the collaboration had been in operation 
for seven months with little to show except the coordinator, a statement 
of purpose and several operating committees. 
He perceived the role of chairperson as directing the meeting with 
the staff doing the work. He felt that the collaboration should "be run 
like you run your business; the volunteers just don't understand." He 
felt the pressure from national to produce but without direction. He 
also felt the pressure from SAYC was causing the collaboration to be 
less independent. The chairperson had li.ttl e support from the collabora-
tion members. Although the affiliates had been unwilling to take leader-
ship themselves, they were critical of the leadership of the chairperson, 
his style of operation, his style of operation, his interaction with them 
and his role activities. The general discontent with the leadership was 
the issue about which the national collaboration intervened; the entire 
executive committee then resigned. 
Following the resignation of the executive committee, the collabora-
tion was without leadership for about three months because no one would 
take the chair. The collaboration finally voted to have a rotating 
chairperson. The second chairperson, who had been the interim chair-
person following the original chairperson, had continued to provide a 
good deal of the leadership. 
Priority and Role of Staff. The Spokane coordinator was interviewed 
by the evaluation team immediately after she was hired. Her highest 
priorities at that time were to attend meetings get to know people, 
and develop some workshops. She also mentioned developing communication 
via a newsletter. By the middle of October, she was aware of the problems 
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of organizational structure and the problems of leadership in the colla-
boration and these became immediate priorities. 
The coordinator's work style was to develop the supportive work for 
the collaboration. She was aware of the jobs necessary to facilitate 
the operation. She took care of administrative detail and worked toward 
developing relationships with collaboration members. She appears not 
to have pushed her own ideas but to have enabled collaboration members 
to develop theirs. Table 19, Appendix A, shows that the coordinator 
spent an average of 39% of her work time in administration/study/paper-
work and 57% in meetings and personal interactions. 
The staff person's role relationships with collaboration members 
was to work behind the scenes to change the organizational structure; she 
worked with collaboration members so that they could develop their own 
ideas. 
The role and style of the coordinator, combined with her inexperience, 
affected the collaboration. Many collaboration members reported that the 
leadership was "weak" even in the fall of 1977, though the collaboration 
programs had been planned and implemented as they wished. The collabora-
tion perceived the coordinator's role as a leadership position rather 
than a staffing position, even though the collaboration members were 
loathe to give up any of their own power. 
The staff-member relationships were generally good. With the staff 
in the background, there was little conflict around her ideas, or person 
or her job performance. 
National-Local Relationships. The staff-national supervisory relation-
ship was without conflict. The staff person appeared to accept supervision, 
ask for help when needed. While she expressed dissatisfaction with lack 
of technical assistance and support from the national collaboration whe 
generally did not become emotionally involved with the national-local 
issues. 
Process Factors 
Most meetings in the Spokane collaboration were smooth and informa-
tional except for those prior to the restructuring sub-committee would 
report on their activities and the progress of programs, were then related. 
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Questions were raised and answered in a friendly non-hostile manner. The 
one exception was the activity of the SAYC representative who would often 
raise the negative position, point out possible problems and difficulties, 
and ask the probing questions. A certain amount of control was exercised 
in this way. 
Communication Process~ The communication process in the Spokane 
collaboration was inclusive, with active participation by most members. 
Table 22 in Appendix A shows that about 25% of actions were by the chair-
person and 8% by the coordinator. Another 25% were National Assembly 
affiliates and 18% by other participants. The SAYC and Youth Alternatives 
(together constituting the DSO Grantee) were responsible for about 22% 
of all actions. 
In the earlier meetings the director of Youth Alternatives partici-
pated as the juvenile justice program expert, and the SAYC representative 
often participated as the planning expert. The coordinator had little 
input in substantive information. About February, 1977, the coordinator 
began to participate more in the expert role. 
The communication pattern was decentralized with many persons 
participating before returning the floor to the chair or the coordinator. 
Decision Making Process. The decision making process appeared to 
occur in the executive and steering committees and less in the other 
sub-committees. Table 21, Appendix A, indicates that 43% of agenda items 
resulted in formal decision, considerably more than in the subcommittee. 
This may indicate a more formal decision making process. There was 
practically no conflict in this decision making process. However, the 
members report that many of the directions of the collaboration came from 
previous discussion around town, among the interlocking boards and that 
by the time a formal vote was taken, there was no need for conflict. 
Power Sub-Groups. The active presence of power sub-groups was mentioned 
in many of the interviews with both collaboration members and other 
respondents. The United Way and the SAYC and several of the affiliates 
were considered to be the leaders depending upon the issue. Several of 
the program directions of the collaboration appeared to result from power 
plays by a bloc to protect its own "turf." Several of the least successful 
programs appeared to be a result of lack of freedom to program where the 
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strengths of the collaboration lay. This is especially true of direct 
service programs where the referral relationship with SAYC was problematic. 
Process Outcomes 
Even with the problematic process, the Spokane representatives were 
generally positive in the outcome measures. Table 23, Appendix A, indicates 
that 10 of the 15 persons interviewed felt that the collaboration had 
been very effective or moderately effective. Seven of the 15 reported 
that the collaboration was most effective in getting people together. 
This confirms that the local agencies had had little previous interorgani-
zational relationships. Six of the remaining eight mentioned advocacy 
or capacity building and one mentioned direct service. 
Most of the Spokane respondents would involve their agencies again. 
Only two reported that they would not. 
Conclusions About the Spokane Collaboration Process 
Several factors appeared to affect the development and operation 
of the Spokane collaboration. First, about six months elapsed between 
the start of the collaboration and the beginning of the staff work 
because of LEAA's special condition. During this early organizing period 
there was a change in collaboration membership and leadership so that when 
the coordinator began there was not a large core of people who had been 
involved continually. Several of the most active and committed were no 
longer activea The new members were not socialized into the structures 
that the national collaboration thought necessary. 
Second, with the six month start up time and the leadership crisis, 
nearly nine months elapsed before the collaboration had any sense of 
accomplishment. Third, the lack of consistent leadership was problematic 
to the collaboration. 
Fourth, the structural relationships between SAYC, YA·and the 
collaboration early in the collaboration exacerbated several problems 
such as competition for power in the juvenile justice field. 
Fifth, the decision to exclude the public sector was a real problem 
especially when programs developed which required working relationships 
with public agencies. Finally, interlocking activity among private 
agency representatives in Spokane had an impact on new programs. 
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The Spokane collaboration moved a long way toward building working 
relationships among the non-profit agencies. They, more than many of 
the collaborations, had to face the factors of commitment and ownership. 
The staff person, operating as their employee rather than as their leader, 
forced them to consider the issue of leadership, They faced less effectively 
the issues of political intrigue and power among competing organizations 
and the public-private sector interaction. When these issues have been 
addressed, we feel that the active voluntary sector in Spokane can use its 
energies in a creative way to serve problem youth. 
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The Connecticut Collaboration 
Connecticut is an industrial East Coast state of over 3,000,000 
inhabitants. It is relatively small with much religious, ethnic, economic 
and political diversity. The history of Connecticut's cultural diversity 
is, to some extent, a remnant from the pre-revolutionary war township 
divisions. In other ways the diversity relates to the economic patterns. 
The southwest corner, extending from Bridgeport on the coast to Danbury 
inland, contains suburbs of New York City and some of the wealthier 
cities in the country. 
Many residents are highly educated professionals with heavy concentra-
tions of New York executive personnel, lawyers and bankers. Many national 
corporations have moved their headquarters out of New York City to take 
advantage of the pleasant suburbs and the lower taxes of this part of 
Connecticut. 
Other sections are heavily industrialized. These areas have a 
concentration of immigrants or citizens of foreign parentage who came 
for jobs in the factories and are first to be unemployed when industry 
leaves. The flight of New England manufacturers to the Sun Belt haR 
left pockets of unemployment and generally depressed economic conditions. 
In addition, the northern sections of the state and some of the coast 
contain agricultural and fishing industries, many of which epitomize the 
New England Yankee conservative cultural and political stance. 
The national collaboration originally selected the whole state of 
Connecticut as the site for several reasons: The DSO public grantee was 
a state agency, it would provide an opportunity to test a collaborative 
model on a state basis, and several coalitions of human service organizations 
were already operating in Connecticut on a state-wide basis. After several 
months of deliberation and negotiations, it became apparent that state 
wide program collaboration was not feasible. Ratherthanmove to a local 
site, the state committee decided upon a regional collaboration in western 
Connecticut for delivery of capacity building and direct service programs 
while retaining the advocacy programs on the state level. Subsequently 
three towns in western Connecticut were selected for actual programs 
administered through the regional office--Danbury, Waterbury and Torrington. 
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Western Connecticut 
Background Factors 
The local collaboration site in Connecticut is most of Western 
Connecticut, an area corresponding to Region A of the State Human Service 
Districts divisions. The region encompasses a 42-town area covering a 
1,365 square miles with a population of 475,070. The area is extremely 
diverse socially, economically, geographically, and politically. Three 
distinct types of communities are in the region: urban, rural and 
suburban. Median 1969 incomes ranged from $9,775 in Bridgewater, a 
small semi-rural town, to $16,833 in Ridgefield, an urban New York City 
"bedroom11 community. 
Eventually, the state steering committee decided to develop three 
local collaborations in Region A rather than only one. A regional executive 
committee with representatives from each would make policies, work with 
staff and be a liaison body with the national collaboration. IVhile this 
decision appeared to be largely political, it did present the opportunity 
to test the regional concept of delivery of collaborative programs and to 
determine the extent to which collaborations could be viable without full 
staff. The nationrt_l Htrtff had warned the Connecticut collaboration 
earlier of the problem of trying to stretch the program funds over such a 
wide area. 
The three collaboration sub-regions mirrored the state's diversity. 
The northwest section centered in Torrington, a town of about 32,000. 
Torrington was reported by collaboration members to be a manufacturing 
town with conservative status-quo attitudes. It retained the rural-farm 
cultural patterns and attitudes considered typical New England Yankee. 
The area is stable or declining in population as young people move away. 
The Torrington area was reported by collaboration members to be a 
picture of economic contrasts. On one hand, a sizeable blue-collar 
population commuted 50 miles daily to Hartford because the pay scale was 
so low in Torrington. On the other hand, the area had a number of persons 
with old wealth, illustrated by the large show-place mansions and estates. 
As in most of Connecticut, there is considerable town loyalty among 
the population in the northwest area. Torrington and Winsted, a nearby 
town, have long-standing feelings of competition and separation referred to 
by respondents as "local nationalism." 
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Waterbury, with a stable population of about 113,000, is the center 
of the southeastern portion of Region A. An industrial hub with several 
Eastern European ethnic populations, Waterbury is surrounded by 13 towns. 
Currently, the economy is depressed, with 7.2% unemployment for December, 
1977, the highest rate in Connecticut. 
Danbury, with a population of 57,000, is the center of the southwestern 
area of Region A. It is a town in transition from old native New England 
to New York middle management commuters. While the area is growing, the 
political control remains in the hands of long-term residents. This 
means that growth of human services has not kept pace with population 
growth. 
The DSO Grantee in Connecticut was a council on Human Services, a 
state public structure coordinating 11 different departments responsible 
for service to youth. With a change of administration following the 1976 
election, the Governor of Connecticut abolished the Council on Human 
Services. The Department of Children and Youth Services was than chosen 
to administer the DSO project. 
Connecticut's DSO program attempted to test three service delivery 
models: maximum intervention with follow-up community services, limited 
crisis intervention with counseling by court personnel and with no follow-
up, and limited crisis intervention services with no follow-up. The three 
models were to be tested in three different areas of the state. Testing 
the latter two models in areas where the collaboration existed presented 
a substantial problem for the DSO Grantee. While the director of the 
DSO public grant agency was enthusiastic in his support of the collabora-
tion, the above problem required that the collaboration work with a 
status offender population which would not be involved with the DSO 
project. 
From January to March, 1975, Connecticut had 648 status offender 
cases referred to the courts. About 25% of them were institutionalized 
in the state detention centers. The largest number of cases were runaways, 
with truancy in second place. There were 209 status offenders from 
Region A in 1975-76. 
However, as the collaboration completed their community needs 
assessment, the public schools and youth bureau estimated that an additional 
986 youth had committed status offenses without being in the juvenile 
justice system. It was the status offenders from Region A who were not 
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participating in the DSO project, and the non-adjudicated youth population 
for whom the collaboration ultimately planned and provided service. 
The National Assembly affiliates in Region A were not easily 
identified. The regional organization of the affiliates were not contig-
uous with the boundaries of Region A or the sub-region. For instance, 
one of the sub-regions included Girl Scouts from two different councils, 
neither located in the region. This fact made the membership decisions 
ambiguous and time commitment to the collaboration from staff difficult. 
The financial situation of the affiliates was declining. Two-thirds 
of those on which we had data reported a decline in United Way funds in 
late 1977. About one-half reported that other funds have been cut. 
Although they were located closest to their national offices, the 
Region A affiliates reported less relationship with national office about 
the collaboration than the affiliates at other sites. Fewer than half 
knew the names of either national or regional representatives. Only 
15% reported any communication from national representatives about the 
collaboration. Some of this communications gap could result from the late 
September choice of Region A as the Connecticut local site. 
The Connecticut collaboration began with an agreement by three 
Connecticut State groups to co-sponsor an initial meeting in March,l976. 
The three groups were the Connecticut Association for Human Services, 
The Connecticut Coalition for Justice for Children and the Connecticut 
Child Welfare Association. 22 The meeting was convened in Hartford with 
interested affiliates and other youth serving agencies. The national 
staff, national task force members and the DSO Grantee described the 
project and invited their interest. 
For several months, the collaboration functioned on the state level 
with the national staff and task force members actively involved with 
decisions of procedure philosophy and structure. Eventually the local 
nature of delivery of service by the affiliates and communities in the 
State led the collaboration to choose a local site. 
The decision at to which local area the collaboration would move was 
a difficult one for the collaboration to solve. Hartford and Bridgeport 
22The Child Welfare League of America was originally a member of 
the national collaboration but dropped out late in 1976. The local 
affiliate, however, remained involved. 
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were excluded because a special emphasis program being tested in 
Bridgeport and Hartford was perceived to receive more than its share of 
human service programs·because of its status as State Capital. In June 
three proposals for local sites were presented to the national colla-
boration. Waterbury was chosen as the primary site and New London as an 
alternative site. The Waterbury proposal was later expanded to include 
all of Region A. There were feelings reported by some respondents that 
the latter decisions were made because of meetings "stacked" with 
representatives from Waterbury and Danbury. 
The state steering committee met through the summer with the national 
staff. They drafted a statement of purpose, a plan of action, the organi-
zational structure and a job description for project staff. In late 
August, they began screening applications for staff and recruited representa-
tives 'from Region A for the steering committee. In early September the 
coordinator was hired, to begin work in late September. 
By late August, a local and autonomous regional steering committee 
was instituted in order for the regional collaboration to be viable. A 
regional meeting was held September 17th and the transition was made at 
that time. Several key people from Region A had been active in the state 
collaboration. These people then assumed the leadership of the regional 
collaboration. The state steering committee retained management of the 
advocacy component of the project while the regional committee managed 
the capacity building and direct services components. That meeting broke 
up into the three sub-regional groups with the representatives agreeing 
to form coalitions or work through already in-place coalitions. 
On October 8th, the new regional collaboration met as a temporary 
steering committee. It was presented with a staff person who had already 
been hired, a nearly finalized structure and a January 1 deadline for 
their phased action plan. At that point the staff person had no office 
of secretary; the regional committee was meeting to work together for 
the first time, local collaboration had not met and the community needs 
assessment on which programs were to be based not even begun. 
October, November and December were spent establishing the structure 
of the collaboration, working on membership and setting up the office. 
The permanent office in Southbury was between Waterbury and Danbury in 
a pleasant suburban shopping center. 
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During the first three months of 1977, the three collaborations 
were rushing to do their community and agency needs assessments in pre-
paration for developing the phased action plans. In both Danbury and 
Waterbury, the membership was still quite fluid and no working core had 
developed. The regional committee appointed a sub-committee to develop 
the plan. The staff person had to work with the three local groups, 
continue to build membership of public and non-profit agencies, encourage 
the needs assessment and guide the development of the plan. 
In early April, the plan was submitted to the national collaboration 
for approval. Its basic elements were for an increase in regional staff 
to contract out and monitor programs implemented by local agencies. Some 
of the programs appeared not to be new and few were to be implemented 
by affiliates. The plan was not completely acceptable to either the 
national staff or LEAA. It was top heavy with regional support staff, 
and the amount of support of the direct service programs appeared low and 
in some cases. The grants to programs appeared to be reimbursements for 
programs already begun. 
Although the national staff clearly accepted much of the Connecticut 
phased action plan, requiring revision of some elements completely and 
revision of only some words and phrases of other elements, the Region A 
collaboration perceived the response as rejection of their ability and as 
interference with their autonomy. These feelings blossomed into a four 
month battle between the Region A collaboration and the national staff. 
Much of the local energy appears to have been directed toward this hostility 
rather than toward revision of the plan or mobilizing for implementation. 
Region A's delay in revising the plan combined with the national 
staffs' delay in immediately responding to their demands for a meeting 
generated continuing hostility, with the coordinator interpreting the 
communication between the two. The Connecticut representative perceived 
the National Director as obstructing the LEAA's sign off and their ability 
to continue. The National Director considered Connecticut's demands 
unreasonable in view of the fact that they had failed to revise their 
23 plans. The situation came to a head at a July 29th meeting of all 
23The National Director reported that his neck was in traction and his 
mother was dying during this period. 
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Region A collaborations. Following this meeting, a Torrington member 
wrote a letter to National staff expressing the feelings of the groups, 
and the group arranged to go to New York and "lay it on the table" to 
the national staff. 
The conflict was fairly well resolved at the New York meeting. It 
became apparent to some of the local representatives that the perception 
of New York as the enemy was not accurate. The national collaboration 
staff seemed to be helpful and genuinely concerned with having the phased 
action plan accepted. The New York meeting also surfaced some real 
incongruities between the Torrington and Danbury ideas of program, 
(Waterbury was not represented.) Some of the problems between the local 
collaborations had been hidden behind the attention of the group to the 
outside enemy and New York. 
The local staff person lost some credibility because of the New York 
meetings. She had been the lens through which the Connecticut members 
and the New York staff had viewed each other. It was apparent to both 
that the lens was somewhat distorted. It also became apparent that some 
of the delay in approval was her failure to make minor changes in the 
plan. The changes were made by the group in their hotel one evening and 
presented to the national staff next day. 
In late August, 1977, the plan was finally accepted and implementa-
tion began. Almost immediately a different set of conflicts between 
the Connecticut staff and the New York staff began. The local staff 
person, in order to get the programs moving, began hiring staff, letting 
contracts and appeared to change programs previously agreed upon without 
allowing New York to approve the decisions and apparently without the full 
input of local decision makers. A final straw occurred when the 
Connecticut coordinator read the Oakland coordinator's letter of resignation 
to the collaboration. That letter was extremely hostile toward the 
National Director. 
Upon hearing of these activities, the National Director contacted 
most of the local leaders to discuss termination of the coordinator. He 
went to Connecticut, terminated the coordinator on the spot and asked her 
to leave. 
A local volunteer became interim coordinator while a search was 
instituted. In November a new coordinator was hired to start immediately. 
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Structural Factors 
The organizational structure, which appeared viable on paper, was 
in reality problematic. Obtaining the size of staff necessary to solidify 
the structure and to firm the commitment of the affiliates as well as 
other members was not possible. One coordinator was responsible for all 
of the territory. The regional collaboration, therefore, tended to build 
on the previous inter-organizational relationships of local chairpersons 
and the priorities of the local staff personnel rather than to rather 
than to initiate new structures to address the issues of status offenders. 
The Region A collaboration had representatives from the three local 
collaborations and operated a regional planning body for direct services 
and capacity building programs. The Waterbury collaboration, in the 
largest city, had a moderate to large membership of 43 with 11 listed 
affiliates, but with no continuing core of affiliates committed to pushing 
for the collaboration. The membership varied radically from meeting to 
meeting. It was difficult to get a membership list because people would 
come several times and never return. The Danbury collaboration was also 
large, with only seven affiliates among its 47 members. It reported 23 
public organizations. The Torrington collaboration was a much smaller 
homogeneous group, built upon a coalition that had recently started in 
Torrington. Five of the nine non-profit members were National Assembly 
affiliates and another two were affiliates whose national organizations 
were not members of the national collaboration. 
The regional Connecticut collaboration made a special arrangement with 
the Court for referral of status offenders. It was necessary for the 
collaboration to make other arrangements to work with public agencies who 
identify and refer other problem youth. This meant working with health 
officials, police and schools of 42 towns. The numbers of organizations 
that became legitimately involved was overwhelming. The lack of resources 
to really build collaboration of these organizations is quite obvious. 
Priority and Role of Staff. The first coordinator perceived her role 
as a professional expert in the field of services to status offenders and 
a manager. Her first tasks were to build on her previous contacts with 
the public juvenile justice system in Connecticut to help educate the 
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non-profit sector. This role perception is consistent with the job 
description of coordinator through which she was hired. A copy is found 
in Appendix E. 
In the two-page job description, non-profit or voluntary agencies 
are not mentioned at all. The phrase 'National Assembly affiliate' is 
mentioned twice but with no mention of working with voluntary agencies. 
The phrase 'work with volunteers' is the only indication of the non-profit 
field. The major emphasis of the job description is on fiscal and program 
management, staff support to committee, supervision of staff, liaison 
with various groups, and public relations. 
The staff operational style reflects the above description of the 
role. Her reported activities early in the collaboration history were 
heavily weighted toward building relationships with influential local, 
public agencies, state-wide legislators and state government administrators. 
This is supported by the response of the first interviews of November and 
December, 1976, when 77% of the 39 persons interviewed who had attended 
some meetings or who were local affiliates had not met the staff person. 
The interim coordinator was a volunteer and a member of the regional 
committee and the Danbury collaboration. While she performed many of the 
jobs necessary to undo some actions of the first coordinator, she never 
really perceived herself in a staff role. Her role continued as it had 
been before; a knowledgeable, active, well respected person, with whom 
some did not agree. 
After an extensive search, the second coordinator was hired, also from 
the Danbury area. She was an able, intelligent person but was perceived 
as an outsider to many of the collaboration members. Many felt that she 
had loyalty to New York, rather than to the local collaborators. 
The first coordinator's perception of the proper role with committee 
members also reflected her role perception. She felt that ideas for the 
collaboration programs would come primarily from her own expertise. She 
felt she needed to educate people about who status offenders are. She 
worried about being co-opted by local chairpersons or committees into 
following their ideas rather than her own. 
Little conflict appeared in Connecticut over role expectations of 
the regional coordinator and the local members. The coordinator did not 
staff the local collaboration meetings, attending only about half of them. 
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The regional representatives accepted her planning-management role on the 
regional level and had little expectation of local support. They also 
accepted her role as liaison with New York and the DSO Grantee. The 
small amount of personal or professional support from the local representa-
tives, however, was frustrating to the coordinator. She reported a need 
for more feed-back from the local collaborations about her activities. 
National-Local Relationships. The Connecticut regional coordinator's 
relationship with the national staff, however, was in continual conflict. 
She perceived that the levels of approval of programs from local to 
regional to national to LEAA was cumbersome. She argued strongly for a 
direct relationship to LEAA. Her own role perception of management and 
planning for three local collaboration was similar to the National Director's 
perception of his role. National, however, did not accept her perception 
of her role. The supervisory relationship with the National Director 
was affected by their developing personal incompatibility. It more clearly 
illustrated the structural problems of control. Since it was the site 
nearest to New York, there was more participation from both the national 
staff and the national task force. At one point, the Connecticut 
coordinator was receiving contradictory assistance from a national task 
force member and a national staff person. 
Furthermore, the local members were closer to New York, could telephone 
about their problems and therefore could go around the expertise of the 
local coordinator to the expertise of the national staff. 
Priority and Role of Chairpersons. The state chairperson was a 
volunteer member of the National Council of Jewish Women. She had been 
active in the Connecticut Association for Human Services and was an early 
founder of the Coalition for Justice for Children. Her interest and support 
gave the impetus for the Connecticut collaboration for its initial six 
months on the state level. When it became regional, she remained as the 
chairperson of the state collaboration where most of the Connecticut 
advocacy program was implemented. 
Her role was perceived consistently as enabling changes in the system 
for dealing with children. To this end she worked through state public and 
non-profit agencies as an internal advocate, an external educator and a 
legislative prodder. 
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The local chairpersons were different in each site. The Waterbury 
chairperson was a director of a program which was already a collaboration 
between one affiliate and public agencies in Waterbury. He had been on 
the state steering committee and was instrumental in bringing the colla-
boration to Region A. The chairperson remained the keystone of the 
Waterbury collaboration. The Torrington chairperson was the executive 
of a National Assembly affiliate in Winsted, a neighboring town. His 
perception of the role was to organize efficiently and effectively. He 
was concerned that the power of his own agency not be a barrier to 
collaboration. His priority was to bring program money into the community 
for the good of youth. 
The first Danbury chairperson was the executive of a local coordinating 
planning body, the Danbury Area United Social Service. He had been active 
in the state collaboration and was also instrumental in bringing the 
collaboration to Region A. He was a dynamic, intelligent person with 
great personal charm and charisma. His agency was funded primarily by 
Community Action Program funds which were expiring. He perceived the 
collaboration as a means to continuing what he felt was a vital service 
in Danbury. 
His role was primarily to get local agencies to understand the 
problems as he did. In meetings he tended to interact as an expert 
rather than as a presider. 
Process Factors 
The nature of the collaboration meetings varied within the three 
collaborations and at the regional level. 
Process at the Regional Collaboration. The Region A collaboration 
seemed to work well together with good relationships. The chairperson, 
also chair of the Waterbury collaboration, acted primarily in a chair 
capacity. There were usually three active members of the Torrington 
collaboration, two active Danbury collaboration members and one or two 
other active Waterbury members. 
Communications usually followed the pattern of a report with 
discussion and the decisions made. The report would be made and the 
reporter would answer questions. After a report, a dialogue between the 
reporter and one or two other participants would occur. Other than the 
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chairperson, the coordinator and three other participants were most 
active (two from Torrington and one from Danbury). Table 22, Appendix A, 
indicates the distribution of action with 43% of the acts attributed to 
two of the most active non-affiliates. 
The decision making process was fairly formal with votes following 
the discussion. Table 21 in Appendix A shows that 56% of all agenda items 
were settled by a formal decision. 
The power blocs at regional level really represent each collaboration. 
In the end there were two that had impact, Danbury and Torrington. 
Process in Waterbury. The Waterbury collaboration process hardly 
got off the ground. The meetings themselves varied greatly in both size 
and energy from month to month. The coordinator was often not there at 
all, came late or participated little. The records showed that many 
representatives attended one or two times only. Even so, the meetings 
were friendly and the group got along well with each other. The inter-
views of Waterbury respondents indicate a degree of hopelessness and 
cynicism along with the desire to try anything. 
The communication process in the Waterbury collaboration was similar 
to a meeting rather than_a working committee. Informative reports were 
given and a few questions asked. Because of the turnover, much explanation 
was necessary at each meeting. The chairperson, of necessity, was most 
active in the meetings both presiding and explaining. The level of 
exchange and discussion was low in Waterbury. Many representatives, 
including two representatives of National Assembly affiliates, came once 
or twice, sat through the meetings, asked one or two questions and never 
returned. 
The first coordinator also had a low level of participation. At two 
collaboration meetings observed for the collaboration she said nothing 
during the meetings. 
Few decisions were made in Waterbury. Table 21 in Appendix A shows 
that only 18% of items discussed were followed by a decision. Even 
programs for the phased action plan were not decided in the meeting but a 
list was circulated from which members were to choose projects. 
We are not aware of power blocs operating in the Waterbury collabora-
tion. It is apparent that the chairperson's agency would have some 
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influence on collaboration decisions because of his own dedicated commit-
ment and participation. 
Process in Danbury. The Danbury collaboration held large meetings 
with active participation by a core membership. There was constant 
turnover in Danbury but there was a larger constant group. The observer 
reported good relationships in the group with good humor and laughter 
often reported. 
The Communication process in the group consisted of much reporting 
of progress and reports of activity to keep the members up-to-date on 
regional collaboration matters. The chairperson or another member of 
his agency acted as the program-planning expert and directed the process. 
There was little opposition to ideas supported by these two members. The 
participation of affiliates was very low in the process. Only 9% of all 
action was by affiliate, non~ of whom was in the core group or perceived 
as influential by interview respondents. The first coordinator's 
participation, when present, was to answer questions directed to her 
and to make reports on regional activities and planning matters. The 
second coordinator appeared to follow the same role. 
The decision making appears not to have been done in the meetings. 
Only 17% of items raised in the agenda were followed by formal decisions. 
Rather, it appears that the decisions for Danbury were made regionally 
and reported locally or that a small core of collaboration members made 
the major decisions. 
The presence of a power bloc in Danbury is indicated by the nature of 
the meetings and responses to the first interview. It was a leadership 
bloc which wanted to plan for and direct the collaboration's programs. 
Its power appears to have discouraged active participation by others in 
the work of the collaboration, In late 1977, when two of the members 
resigned, both the Danbury collaboration and programs were left with major 
problems. 
Process in Torrington. The Torrington collaboration was a much 
smaller group with a history in the recent past of at least meeting with 
each other and a high proportion of non-profit organizations. Meetings 
were lively and enthusiastic. 
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The communication process was primarily controlled by the chair-
person. However, during discussion ?r issues, the participation was 
vigorous by most members. The chairperson averaged 30% of the acts and 
other affiliates an additional 45%. Anyone reporting led the discussion 
on that report. The first coordinator, when present, participated little. 
She answered questions but did not appear to direct energies or discussions. 
Much of the decision making occurred during the course of the meetings. 
This is reflected in Table 21, Appendix A. The decisions were worked 
out with vigorous participation among participants and little hostility. 
The meetings were small enough to give everyone an opportunity to partici-
pate without dragging the flow of the meeting. 
While there did not appear to be power blocs in Torrington there 
were several marginal participants in the decisions of the collaboration 
generally representing women's affiliates. 
Process Outcomes 
Despite the problems_ recorded earlier, the process outcomes in 
Connecticut were fairly favorable. Although only 57% reported that they 
would involve their agencies again, six of the seven affiliates (86%) 
interviewed said they would probably participate again. These interviews 
were taken at the time of termination of the first coordinator when 
spirits were at their lowest. 
At that same time 28% of respondents said the collaboration was 
very or moderately effective and another 43% said, hopefully, it was too 
early to tell. Fifty percent of respondents felt the collaboration had 
been most effective in getting people together. 
Conclusions About the Connecticut Collaboration Process 
The Connecticut collaboration started with several major situational 
disadvantages. The nature of the grant and the subsequent decision over 
locality, clients, population and referral procedures required much time 
from the national staff and task force. Consequently, they were able to 
devote less time to the local problems. 
Several additional factors around structure and process contributed 
to the problem. Since they have been discussed above, we will merely 
list them here. 
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1. The lack of staff support necessary to build three new organi-
zations. 
2. The lack of lead time and staff available to build inter-
agency trust before collaborative planning. 
3. The decision to have a regional body coordinating three such 
different groups in such different areas with such different 
needs. 
4. The unrealistic expectations on staff to give support to four 
new organizations, with a total of 15 to 20 committees with 
membership to enlist, use and support of 117 agencies scattered 
over 1,365 square miles. 
5. Local chairpersons with declining budgets and little spare time 
to do major additional collaboration-related staff work. 
6. Local leaders who appeared to be pushing their own agenda rather 
than the collaboration agenda. 
7. Interpersonal and role conflict between local and national staff. 
Even with its turbulent history and many unresolved conflicts, the 
Connecticut regional collaboration during its 14 months of existence has 
mobilized tremendous energy. If the staff were available to support their 
energy in each site, both the capacity building programs and direct 
services could be among the most productive of all of the collaborations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
LESSONS FROM THE EVALUATION 
We have reported on the collaboration program and the collaboration 
process in the previous chapter, following as closely as possible the 
strict rules of evidence in quantitative analysis. In this chapter we 
would like to combine those results with some of the other more qualitative 
findings of the evaluation. Our presentation and interpretation come 
from many sources, the collaboration staff, the field researchers, the 
research literature, the voluminous data not included in the report, and 
our own intuition. 
This chapter has three purposes: first, to give some guidance to 
groups attempting to replicate inter-organizational collaboration programs; 
second, to suggest some hypotheses for further study of the phenomena 
studied in this evaluation; and third, to suggest some procedure that will 
make the relationship between research and program more productive for 
both. 
Guidelines for Inter-Organizational Collaboration 
We will briefly discuss four areas that should be resolved for inter-
organizational collaboration to be successful: ground-rule decisions, 
structural decisions, program decisions and conflict-resolution decisions. 
Ground Rule Decisions 
There are four decisions that set the stage for inter-organizational 
activity and structure. In the beginning stage of collaboration, these 
decisions should be made explicit and some degree of consensus achieved. 
Is the Collaboration for Planning or for Program? Planning and 
program collaborations have quite different tasks, require different 
memberships and have different outcomes. A planning collaboration can 
have a large heterogeneous membership. The wider the representation around 
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a problem, the more complete the plan will be. Members can include influ-
ential persons, professional experts, members of the potential client 
groups, organizational representatives, political representatives, volunteers 
and staff. The plan and the planning process require little organizational 
input other than time. However, since the outcome of such a collaboration 
is a strategy or plan, hopefully with some commitment of resources of the 
planners, organizational representatives should be included. A planning 
collaboration requires less commitment of the total organization since only 
one or two people are actually involved. However, the degree of inter-
organizational relationship achieved is also apt to be less intense. 
A program collaboration requires a smaller, more homogeneous group 
with similar clients or potential clients, values, methods of operation, 
resources and power. Where the collaborating organizations are not similar, 
the collaboration must be carefully structured to minimize differences 
between them, especially power inequalities. 
The Juvenile Justice Program Collaboration was, to some extent, both 
a planning and a program collaboration. During the early stages of the 
program, the planning was intense and the participation was maximum. As 
the programs were implemented, the general energy level decreased, a 
"let-down" was experienced and only organizations involved with implemen~ 
tation remained really satisfied. If the relationship between the task 
and the type of structure needed had been explicit, some of the problems 
about let-down, change of role, frustration and rewards might have been 
avoided. 
Are the Goals of the Collaboration Primarily Programs or Processes? 
A second decision necessary in inter--organizational relationships is the 
importance of the process goals relative to the program goals. Inter-
organizational collaborations organize most effectively around specific 
issues or programs. While the two types of goals are not mutually 
exclusive, their relative importance affects a number of structural 
decisions. 
Collaboration as an organization to achieve program goals requires 
strong central staff leadership with program expertise and a structure 
organized around the program goals, 
Collaborating as organizations to build a process requires staff 
persons with training and skills in interpersonal relationships and an 
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organizational structure which is more responsive to the development of 
the representatives' expertise in relation to a program or issue. 
When inter-organizational goals have a limited time for achievement, 
the process of building inter-organizational trust and work style receives 
much lower priority. 
Who are the Collaboration Members; Individuals or Organizations? 
For inter-organizational program collaboration to be viable, representatives 
must represent the organization in some capacity, whether from the stance 
of staff, board, membership, volunteer or client. Furthermore, a person 
only marginally related to the agency does not really perform as a repre-
sentative of that agency. 
One of the problems of the national juvenile justice collaboration 
was that organizational representatives of some of the larger organizations 
acted as individuals rather than organizational representatives. They had 
neither knowledge of the larger perspective of their organizations nor 
opportunity for input from the collaboration into their organizations' 
decisions. Their votes and actions on issues and programs were taken 
without reference to their organizations. These decisions did not bind 
or even influence their organizations' cooperation. 
What Stages of Collaboration has the Community Developed? A final 
decision at the start of inter-organizational collaboration is to determine 
the stage of collaboration that has been previously achieved. We would 
suggest that there are five stages in the development of collaboration: 
l. Meeting around a common problem or issue 
2. Getting to know each other 
3. Developing a working style 
4. Developing programs or plans 
5. Developing trust and respect. 
The development of trust and respect may never occur, may occur after 
the development of plans and programs or may occur simultaneously with 
these developments. Figure 7 illustrates the progression. 
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FIGURE 7 
STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF INTER-ORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION 
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An area with a history of inter-organizational collaboration, if it 
has been satisfying to participants, requires less effort and time for 
further collaboration than an area without this history or with some 
dissatisfactory collaboration. 
Structural Decisions 
Once the ground rule decisions have been made, the structure of inter-
organizational collaboration can be clarified and explicated. These decisions 
should be made by participants but with the guidance of some outside 
professional. Obviously these decisions will be made within the context 
of the community, the nature of the problem or issue and the explicit 
ground-rule decisions discussed in the previous section. 
We perceive five major structural decisions: goal-priority decisions, 
membership decisions, leadership decisions, staff decisions and control 
decisions. In this section we will pose questions that correspond to 
evaluation results reported in detail in Chapter 3. 
Goals and Priorities. The major goal of the juvenile justice 
collaborations was deinstitutionalization of status offenders. This was 
not, however, a program goal but rather the over-all guiding value. The 
project was designed to enable institutional change that would ultimately 
lead to community services for status offenders and other children at 
risk. Realistic program goals must be more narrowly focused than such a 
general statement. Program goals should be explicitly defined, measurable 
against program outcomes and realistic in terms of organizational resources~ 
Following are some of the important questions about goals and priorities: 
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1. What are all of the specific goals of our activity? 
2. How important to us are institutional maintenance, future funding, 
staff development, community support, buildings and grounds? 
3. What are our most important priorities among our program goals, 
process goals and maintenance? 
4. Does our allocation of resources (money, staff time and committee 
time) reflect our stated priorities? 
5. Is there consensus among the membership about goals and priorities? 
6. How will we deal with any lack of consensus? 
Membership. Membership was discussed previously relative to types of 
collaboration. Other membership decisions need to be made, relative to 
the goals and priorities and the issues or problems of the collaboration. 
In the juvenile justice collaborations, for instance, when advocacy was a 
high priority, wider membership was functional for wider contacts. When 
capacity building of affiliates was a.high priority, a more focused working 
membership was functional. The following questions are appropriate: 
1. Who should belong to the collaboration and why? 
2. Do we want only working members? 
3. Are we willing to have some members in name only? Who and why? 
4. How much staff time do we want to allocate to developing 
commitment of members and potential members? 
5. How large a membership do we want? (Large groups are not functional 
as decision making bodies or as work·groups.) 
6. How homogeneous do we want our membership? (The more homogeneous 
the more consensus, the less conflict.) 
7. Is the presence of potential client groups, power minorities, 
competing groups and funding sources in our membership functional 
toward our specific goals? 
8. What is the basis for membership? 
9. What roles and activities are expected of members? 
Leadership. Leadership in the various juvenile justice collaborations 
was somewhat dependent on the local cultures. Several questions, however, 
are appropriate when developing the leadership of inter-organizational 
collaboration. 
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1. Will the leader's primary loyalty be to the collaboration or is 
the vested interest in the parent organization too strong? In 
the juvenile justice collaborations, the best leadership came 
from volunteers rather than from staff. (A staff person's major 
interest and commitment must be to his/her own job. Volunteers 
are more likely to develop stronger loyalty to organizations 
which they chair.) 
2. Does the leader have a real commitment to the collaboration's 
goals? 
3. Is the leader able to guide without forcing his/her own priorities? 
4. Does the leader have inter-personal skills and experience in 
leadership, especially in the voluntary sector? 
5. Does the leader have the personal qualities required to gain 
respect from the membership? (The leader does not need to have 
professional characteristics.) 
Staff. The staff person in an inter-organizational collaboration is 
the only participant without a role in a supporting organization. The 
staff person, and perhaps the voluntary leadership, are the only participants 
for whom the collaboration is the major work priority. This puts the 
staff person in a very vulnerable position. On one hand, staff personnel 
lead, direct, cajole, and enable the members to reach the collaboration 
goals. On the other hand, if they are too far ahead of the membership, 
the organization can let them sink. We have already mentioned that staff 
should be hired to fit specific collaboration group-rule decisions. Some 
additional questions to be considered: 
1. Does the staff person understand non-profit organizations, the 
functions of committees and boards and the staff function in 
such organizations? 
2. Has the staff person had experience with the working of non-profit 
organizations? 
3. Does the staff person respect volunteers and the contribution to 
human services of the voluntary sector? 
4. Does the staff person have skills in inter-personal relationships, 
social work, community organization? (This is more important 
than knowledge about the juvenile justice system because the 
latter is more easily acquired.) 
5. Does the staff person show ego problems? Will the staff have to 
motivate self rather than members? 
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6. Is the staff person well organized to handle the tremendous detail 
involved in staffing committees, developing membership, planning 
and/or programs, organizing and managing an organization? 
7. Does the staff work style fit the major priorities of goals 
previously decided? (If maintenance is a priority, a manager-
executive; if process is a priority, a facilitator, enabler; 
if program is important, a professional with program expertise.) 
Decisions about the professional and personal characteristics of staff 
personnel are crucial in inter-organizational collaborations. The issues 
should be discussed openly before a job description is adopted. The 
actual duties and the lines of supervision of potential staff should be 
explicated and some consensus of the body reached before the search begins. 
If the collaboration reaches some consensus on roles of staff, it may very 
well resolve issues which otherwise would lead to conflict. 
Control Decisions. The location of control is another crucial issue 
of a collaboration and must be resolved openly. In this program, the 
control by the national collaboration raised problems after the fact. 
Had some of the potential conflicts been anticipated, methods to deal 
with the conflicts in responsibility and supervision might have been 
avoided. 
Control decisions depend on the source of financing, the nature of 
clients, the control of a specific profession and governmental regulation. 
We have no answers to the dilemna posed by dual control. However, unless 
there is agreement between participants at all levels over goals, priorities 
and the ground rules previously mentioned, problems of control and account-
ability will be compounded. 
Program Decisions 
The actual development of program depends on factors such as what is 
already in the community, what is needed, the budget, available staff, 
the nature of the client group, the structure and history of the sponsoring 
group, and the location of clients and programs. The juvenile justice 
collaboration programs were effective to the degree to which the 
following questions were addressed: 
1. Were desired outcomes of each program specified? 
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2. Were the program activities designed so that they related 
logically to specific program outcomes? 
3. Was there an attempt to evaluate whether or not program activities 
actually did reach program outcomes? 
4. Was there a clear plan to implement programs? 
5. Was there a structure of accountability that would permit the 
plan to be carried through? 
6. Were clear incentives or rewards provided for all collaboration 
activities, both planning and program activities? (Altruism is 
seldom a sufficient reward for the input of organizational 
resources. To be really effective, a program should provide 
both long term and short term rewards; rewards for both planning 
and program; and rewards for both organizational and individual 
input.) 
Conflict-Resolution Decisions 
No matter how similar the backgrounds or perspectives of organizations 
or people, their positions will never be completely congruent. Therefore, 
in any inter-organizational collaboration some conflict is inevitable. 
The various conflicts in the juvenile justice collaborations were handled 
differently with different re~mlts. In Oakland and Connecticut, the 
conflict was originally diverted by directing energies at a common enemy, 
the national collaboration. In Tucson the conflict was never openly 
admitted but was present in a different form, resulting in lower levels 
of personal trust among participants. In Spokane, the conflict was 
directed at persons rather than at the differences in perspective, and in 
Spartanburg it was pushed on the table as an issue rather than dealt with 
as an inevitable presencea 
In truly effective collaboration some mechanisms must be made 
available to identify conflict and handle it in a non-adversary way. In 
some ways, the successful resolution of conflict served to solidify the 
collaborations in this program. Having successfully weathered the storm 
together, participants appeared more open and trustful and more committed 
than before they were involved in the conflict. The presence of rational 
structures for conflict resolution, skilled leaders and staff persons 
and the absence of pathological competition facilitated adequate conflict 
resolution. 
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Research Hypotheses Suggested by the Evaluation 
Each of the program guidelines suggested above are, in effect, working 
hypotheses that need further study. In this section, we will suggest some 
hypotheses which developed out of the theories and methodologies upon which 
the evaluation is based. Most of the hypotheses are consistent with either 
organizational theory dealing with participation or satisfaction or small 
group theory dealing with process or leadership. We will not attempt a 
description of the theories, but rather will briefly mention a theoretical 
area and suggest hypotheses which seem to fit our findings. A more 
thorough analysis of the findings must wait for a later date. 
Organizational Participation 
There is a growing body of theory and research on organizational 
participation in inter-organizational relationships. Our evaluation 
tends to support the following hypotheses. 
l. Boundary personnel, or members somewhat peripheral to their own 
organizations, are more able to work for organizational change 
but have less influence in bringing change to their organizations 
than members such as executive directors or board members. They 
a. are more easily coopted into work for collaboration goals 
b. experience less role conflict 
c. gain more satisfaction from·working for collaboration goals. 
2. The more members of an agency's organizational set who participate 
in an activity, the more likely that agency will participate. 
Goal Attainment and Satisfaction 
l. Individuals feel satisfaction from attainment of group goals even 
if their contribution is not identifiable. 
2. Group goals attained through individual performance set up 
competitive conditions. 
3. Goals attained through group performance set up cooperative 
conditions. 
Small Group Process 
Much of the research on small group process has been experimental, 
using unacquainted individuals. In this evaluation, we did consistent 
longitudinal group analysis using structural observation. Our findings 
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suggested that organizational representatives interacted with each other 
in a different way than isolated, previously unacquainted individuals in 
task-groups. Some results of previous studies also appeared to be 
supported by our findings. 
l. Persons with negative feelings toward goals and activities of a 
group interact less often and participate in group activities 
less. 
2. The organizational status of participants and the community status 
of their own organization affects the power relationship in 
inter-organizational collaboration more than does the amount of 
interaction. This is contrary to the findings of experimental 
group process analysis. 
3. Status in a group correlates with external status. 
4. When group members perceive themselves as similar to each other, 
there is high interaction and a cooperative atmosphere, and 
conflict resolution occurs through consensus. 
5. A group will strive for conformity of opinion except for individual 
members who disagree as a means for upward striving and personal 
recognition. 
6. The larger a group, the less opportunity for feedback from 
members and the less opportunity for conflict and dissatisfaction 
to be resolved. 
7. The degree of congruence between group goals and individual goals 
is affected by the individual original expectation of the group. 
8. Group cohesion tends to form around a perceived common danger or 
enemy. 
Leadership Roles 
l. A leader whose status rests on skills and knowledge valued by the 
group is less approachable than a leader whose status rests on 
feelings and personal characteristics. 
2. High status people in groups tend to conform to the group norms 
because they helped to develop those norms along lines of their 
own style. 
3. The more control a leader exerts over group behavior the less 
able the group is to adapt to new behavior or ideas. 
4. Leadership stability is related to organizational goal attainment 
and membership satisfaction. 
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The Relationship Between Program and Evaluation 
In closing, there are several problems that arose between the program 
and the evaluation that wasted energy and were dysfunctional to effective 
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evaluation. We have examined the basis for these problems elsewhere. 
Here we will discuss our perceptions of some of the problems in evaluating 
this program and make some suggestions for evaluating human service 
programs. 
"In the Beginning. " There appears to be a general lack of commit-
ment of program funders to real evaluation. While LEAA, HEW, and HUD 
usually include an evaluation mandate, they appear to mean fiscal 
accountability rather than program effectiveness when they include 
evaluation. 
For this program, LEAA did not include extra funds for evaluation but 
forced the program grantee to fund the evaluation with program money. 
It is little wonder, then, that some local agencies and collaboration 
staff lacked commitment to evaluation. Another "beginning" problem was 
time. For pre-testing for program evaluation, the evaluation content 
should be in place four to six months before the program begins rather 
than 4-6 months after the program begins. 
"Promise Her Anything But. " It is very important to the evaluation 
for the staff to understand and want the evaluation. Three of the original 
five local staff paid lip service to the evaluation but under-cut to 
various degrees our data gathering efforts. We involved the local program 
staff as much as possible in the development of evaluation procedures and 
tools. When program staff had strong objections to a procedure we very 
carefully reconsidered its use. 
"The Shadow Knows ... " The perception of the local field researcher 
by local collaboration members varied from time to time at all sites. 
Originally they were considered as spies, They were thought to have 
power over allocation of original funds, refunding and the future of the 
collaboration even though this was not so, 
24Genevieve Burch and Hobart A. Burch, "Coordination of Program Goals 
and Research Goals in Process Evaluation," 1977 NASW Symposium Volume 
(New York: National Association of Social Work, 1978). 
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At other times they were asked to judge the effectiveness of the 
program, tell them how they were doing, and advise on problems. 
"You '11 Never Know Just How Much .•. " One of the problems with 
longitudinal data gathering on new programs is to feed back material that 
is helpful to the program without incurring the hostility that might make 
future data gathering difficult. Even this two year report may hamper 
our ability to gather future data. If program's staff were less defensive 
and evaluators less negative, this process might not be so difficult. 
The difficulties involved mean that much of the evaluation is only 
now available to program planners who have already made plans for the 
next two years. 
"I'd Climb the Highest Mountain .. n When possible, in future 
research of any organizational records, budget or other necessary local 
data should be collected by researchers rather then depending on organi-
zational personnel. It was more efficient and produced much less hostility 
for our research staff to go from Omaha to the five sites to gather and 
process the material on the spot than the constant return envelopes, 
letters, phone calls, and implied threats. 
"One Has MY Name the Other Has My Heart. n One of the problems of 
the process data was that local field researchers had difficulty remaining 
detached. Without exception they became interested in the program and 
grew to like and respect the members. All recognized the danger of being 
coopted. One field researcher reported at the end of a grueling conflict 
that he had observed, 
While there's a lull in the action, let me deal with two things 
that are important to me. First, as is probably the case with all 
observers such as myself, I feel as if I'm always treading a fine 
line between scientific honesty and interpersonal betrayal. I've 
come to like many of the people in this project and to some degree 
I feel a personal stake in the success of this project. As time 
goes on, the struggle to be objective becomes increasingly difficult. 
By 'betrayal,' I refer to the personal nature of many of my obser-
vations. I must assume that no participant here will ever have 
cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you. The trust 
that exists between the group and myself is so fragile a thing. We 
may relax together, and yet they know I am observing them--for what 
purpose, in what detail they really don't know, a very strange social 
structure, indeed. 
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This conflict reflects the emotion with which I end this report. 
I respect the program, I think it did a remarkable job against tremendous 
difficulties. The people involved are dedicated to the program and 
to providing better services for youth. I hope that "no participant 
will ever have cause to suffer because of the data I transmit to you." 
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TABLE 1 
MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF 
NATIONAL VOLUNTARY HEALTH AND SOCIAL WELFARE ORGANIZATIONS AND 
MEMBER AGENCIES OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS 
AFL-CIO 
815 16th Street, 
Washington, D.C. 
(202) 637-5189 
N.W. 
20006 
AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR NATIONALITIES 
SERVICE 
20 West 40th Street 
New York, New York 10018 
(212) 398-9142 
AMERICAN FOUNDATION FOR THE BLIND, INC. 
15 West 16th Street 
New York, New York 10011 
(212) 924-0420 
''AMERICAN NATIONAL RED CROSS 
National Headquarters 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 737-8300 
*ASSOCIATION OF JUNIOR LEAGUES 
825 Third Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 355-4380 
*BOYS' CLUBS OF AMERICA 
771 First Avenue 
New York, New York 10017 
(212) 557-77 55 
*BOY SCOUTS OF AMERICA 
North Brunswick, New Jersey 08902 
(201) 249-6000 
*CAMP FIRE GIRLS 
4601 Madison Avenue 
Kansas City, Missouri 64112 
(816) 756-1950 
COUNCIL OF JEWISH FEDERATIONS 
AND WELFARE FUNDS 
575 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 751-1311 
FAMILY SERVICE ASSOCIATION OF 
AMERICA 
44 East 23rd Street 
New York, New York 10010 
(212) 674-6100 
*GIRL SCOUTS OF THE U.S.A. 
830 Third Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 751-6900 
*GIRLS' CLUBS OF AMERICA, INC. 
205 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
(212) 689-3700 
GOODWILL INDUSTRIES OF AMERICA, INC. 
9200 Wisconsin Avenue 
Washington, D.C. 20014 
(301) 530-6500 
INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL SERVICES OF 
AMERICA 
345 East 46th Street 
New York, New York 10017 
(212) 687-2747 
*NATIONAL JEWISH WELFARE BOARD 
15 East 26th Street 
New York, New York 10010 
(212) 532-4949 
LUTHERAN COUNCIL IN THE U.S.A. 
Division of Mission and Ministry 
360 Park Avenue South 
New York, New York 10010 
(212) 532-6350 
*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force. 
-'I 
MENTAL HEALTH ASSOCIATION 
National Headquarters 
1800 North Kent Street 
Arlington, Virginia 22209 
(703) 528-6405 
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR RETARDED 
CITIZENS 
2709 Avenue E East 
Arlington, Texas 76011 
(817) 261-4961 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC 
CHARITIES 
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 785-2757 
*NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR HOMEMAKER-
HOME HEALTH AIDE SERVICES 
67 Irving Place 
New York, New York 10003 
(212) 674-4990 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF THE CHURCHES 
OF CHRIST IN THE U.S.A. 
475 Riverside Drive 
New York, New York 10027 
(212) 87 0-2385 
*NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JEWISH WOMEN 
15 East 26th Street 
New York, New York 10010 
(212) 532-1740 
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF NEGRO WOMEN 
1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 223-2363 
*NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME & 
DELINQUENCY 
Continental Plaza 
411 Hackensack Avenue 
Hackensack, New Jersey 07001 
(201) 488-0400 
NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SETTLEMENTS 
AND NEIGHBORHOOD CENTERS 
232 Madison Avenue 
New York, New York 10016 
(212) 679-6110 
NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE, INC. 
500 East 62nd Street 
New York, New York 10021 
(212) 644-6500 
*THE SALVATION ARMY 
120 West 14th Street 
New York, New York 10011 
(212) 620-4908 
*TRAVELERS AID ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 
701 Lee Street, Suite 600 
Des Plaines, Illinois 60016 
(312) 298-9390 
UNITED SEAMEN'S SERVICE, INC. 
One World Trade Center, Suite 2601 
New York, New York 10048 
(212) 77 5-1033 
USO (United Service Organizations) 
1146 19th Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 466-8850 
U.S. CATHOLIC CONFERENCE 
1312 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 659-6600 
UNITED WAY OF AMERICA 
801 North Fairfax Street 
Alexandria, Virginia 22314 
(703) 836-7100 
THE VOLUNTEERS OF Al1ERICA 
340 West 85th Street 
New York, New York 10024 
(212) 873-2600 
*YMCA of the USA 
291 Broadway 
New York, New York 10007 
(212) 374-2172 
*YWCA of the USA 
600 Lexington Avenue 
New York, New York 10022 
(212) 753-4700 
*Agency participants in National Juvenile Justice Collaboration Task Force. 
OAKLAND 
COLLABORATION 
Davie White and 
Loretta McDonnell 
Coordinators 
Boys' Club 
Boy Scouts 
Campfire Girls 
Girls' Club (Alameda) 
Girls' Club (San 
Leandro) 
Girl Scouts 
Junior League 
National Council of 
Jewish Women 
Travelers Aid 
Association of 
America 
Red Cross (Alameda) 
Red Cross (Oakland) 
YMCA (Alameda) 
YMCA (Stiles Hall) 
YWCA (Oakland) 
YWCA (South County) 
DANBURY 
COLLABORATION 
Boy Scouts (Norwalk) 
Campfire (Bethel) 
NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES IN 
LOCAL JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS 
SPARTANBURG 
COLLABORATION 
Penny King 
Coordinator 
Boy Scouts 
Girl Scouts 
Junior League 
Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
YMCA 
SPOKANE 
COLLABORATION 
Karen Harwood 
Coordinator 
Camp Fire 
Girl Scouts 
Junior League 
Red Cross 
Salvation Army 
YMCA 
YWCA 
CONNECTICUT REGIONAL COLLABORATION 
Veronica McNulty and Sydell Spinner 
Coordinators 
TUCSON 
COLLABORATION 
John Sloss 
Coordinator 
Boys' Club 
Boy Scouts 
Campfire Girls 
Girls' Club 
Girl Scouts 
Jewish Family 
Services 
Junior League 
National Council 
of Jewish Women 
Red Cross 
YMCA 
YWCA 
TORRINGTON 
COLLABORATION 
WATERBURY 
COLLABORATION 
Boys'Club (Waterbury) 
Family Childrens Aid 
[Homemaker Health Air Service] 
(Danbury) 
Boy Scouts (Torrington) 
Girl Scouts (Torrington) 
Salvation Army (Torrington) 
YMCA (Torrington) 
YMCA (Winsted) 
Boy Scouts (Waterbury) 
Girls' Club (Waterbury) 
Girl Scouts (Waterbury) 
Junior League (Middlebury) 
Red Cross (Naugatuck) Girl Scouts (Wilton) 
National Council of Jewish 
Women (Danbury) 
Red Cross (Danbury) 
YMCA (Danbury) 
Red Cross (Waterbury) 
Salvation Army (Waterbury) 
YMCA (Naugatuck) 
YMCA (Waterbury) 
YWCA (Waterbury) 
TABLE 2 
MEMBERSHIP IN JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATION, JANUARY 1977 
Collaboration Membership National Assembly Affiliates 
Number Early 1977 Total Membership 
Percent Total And Client 
National Other Who Are Membership of Contacts of 
Assembly Non-profit Public Collaboration Collaborating Collaborating 
Site Affiliates Organizations Organizations Total Members Organizations Organizations 
-·---- --·--------·--
Oakland 15 3 5 23 88 46,130 54,339 
Spartanburg 6 4 11 21 86 5,421 386,946 
Spokane 7 6 0 13 87 12,839 142,397 
Tucson 11 36 9 56 89 20,986 74 '724 
Connecticut 
Danbury 7 5 23 47!!;./ 87 N/A N/A 
Torrington 5 4 9 27'p_/ 71 N/A N/A 
Waterbury 11 7 19 43'=-/ 89 N/A N/A 
National 15 0 0 15 NA 16,290,69#1 NA 
Total 77 65 76 245 90 85,376 658,406 
NA = Data are not applicable. 
N/A = Data are not available. 
!!;./Total includes 12 members of unknown status. 
'p_/Total includes 9 members of unknown status. 
~/Total includes 6 members of unknown status. 
~/Includes 12,702,000 youth members, 
·-
......... 
TABLE 3 
PROBLEMS OF YOUTH: COLLABORATION MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS AT TIME OF FIRST INTERVIEW, FALL 1976 
Question: From your know1edge of youth and the community, what would you say are the three most important 
problems with youth here? 
Connecticut 
Oakland Spartanburg Spokane Tucson Danbury Torrington Water bur 
Percent of Respondents 
Number of respondents 20 20 15 16 11 8 20 
Total number of responses 56 49 44 48 30 24 58 
Unemployment 55 0 40 50 27 38 25 
Schools - education 55 50 60 69 36 25 45 
Recreation 40 65 53 38 63 50 55 
Shelter 40 15 53 31 36 25 55 
Specific services, i.e., counseling 
emergency services 5 35 20 38 45 50 35 
Transportation 10 0 0 0 0 13 5 
Youth attitudes 40 25 27 44 27 50 10 
Community attitudes 35 55 40 31 36 50 65 
Percent in consensus on three most 
. a; 54 69 57 54 52 50 60 mentioned problems-
~/Total of three most mentioned responses divided by all responses. 
~ 
,;_,\j 
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TAUE 5 
NEEDS ASSESSMENT, PROGRAM PRIORITIES .AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT 
Phased Action Plans 
Percent of 
Pro,.ram Budget Allocated 
Needs Assessment :Procedures 
Need Identified 
From Needs Assessment 
:Priorities 
Identified 
In :Program Implementation :Plans 
Capacity Direct 
Building Advocacy Service 
Oakland 
Spartanburg 
Spokane 
Tucson 
Connecticut 
-Statistics on status a/ 
offenOers and other youth= 
-Community service inventory 
-Affiliate resources 
-Statistics on status a/ 
offenders and other youth"' 
-Youth input 
-Community service inventory 
-Data from professionals 
-Case analysb 
-Statistics on status 
offenOers and other youth~/ 
-Interviewed community 
professionals 
-Brainstorming 
-Yollth survey 
-Statistics on status 
offenders ana other youth-~/ 
-Conference to do self-assessment 
-Brainstorming 
-Data from Metropolitan Yollth 
Council 
-Early identification of 
problems 
-Education 
-Training of agency staff 
-Shelter for runaways 
-Reduce unemployment 
-Unemployment 
-Education 
-Transportation 
-Better trained ag~E:ncy 
personnel 
-Problems in family living 
-School and community 
attituOes and awareness 
-Education 
-V.'ork 
-Recreation 
-Volunteer and agency staff 
training 
-Better use of resource:s 
-Share information 
-Redllce unemployment 
-Improve schools' youth 
attitlldes 
-Training in work with youth 
-Commllnity awareness 
-Family relations 
-Statistics on status offen9ers~/ -Many children at risk in 
-Statistics on other yout~ community 
-Youth Survey -Trllancy 
-Community services available -Unemployment high 
-An organizational self- -Parent-child relations poor 
assessment -Agency training inadaquste 
-Community attitudes negative 
-Runaways 
-Truancy 
-Alcohol abuse 
-Staff training 
-Pllblic relations 
(All areas of 
youth needs were 
important. They 
didn't prioritize 
-Information referral 
services 
-Training volunteers 
-Youth activities 
(All areas of 
yollth needs were 
important. They 
didn't prioritize 
-Education 
-Recre:ation 
-Mental health 
services 
-The: collaboration staff was 
enlarged to develop and supervise 
all programs in East Oakland 
-The advocacy budget was for a 
public relations specialist 
-The"implementation plan is not 
clear; appears that collaboration 
staff supervised implementation 
Oirectly 
-The plan called for the 
collaboration to administer 
all programs, some in cooperation 
with Youth Alternatives 
-The plan did not call for 
implementation collaboratively 
or by affiliates 
-The implementation plan called 
for the collaboration to let 
contracts for direct service and 
to handle the: rest of the programs 
through volllnteer effort 
-The capacity building plans were 
good 
-The direct serviCe plan involved 
having central staff who supervised 
programs in existing commllnity 
agencies 
-Capacity building was implemented 
by collaborations and central staff 
-Advocacy was the major task of 
the state 
~/Statistics were from a variety of sources. The DSO Grantee in most cases had extensive data on the status offenders. 
1:/!nc:llldes ombudsman, which is classified as capacity bllilding by the plan. 
s./ Includes state collaboration. 
15 26 59 
11 19 70 
41 12 47E/ 
26 12 62 
18 1#-/ 67 
Assessment of Plan 
-The needs asse:ssment plan was 
poor. It related moderately well 
to the implementation plan 
-The implementation plan was not 
done collaboratively. It 
contained few real capacity 
building or advocacy plans 
-The direct service plan related 
well to the needs assessment 
plan but had little over-all 
integration 
-It appeared to be unrelated to 
the collaboration but had some 
creative program ideas 
-It contained few capacity 
building plans 
-The programs related well to 
the needs <tssessment 
-Clients represented a wide range 
of the community 
-The plan contained few Oirect 
service plans for status 
offenders but had more for 
children at risk 
-Capacity building was provided 
through training rather than 
experience 
-The program was good bllt it had 
relatively little impact because 
it was not well integr:~ted 
-It made very good use of the 
collaboration 
-The capacity building plans 
were good 
-The needs assessment was good. 
It related well to the needs of 
youth, poorly to organizational 
change but useO community 
resollrces well 
-It planned well for 
additional central staff 
() 
TABLE 6 
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM TYPES AND BUDGETS IN THE ORIGINAL PLANS 
Revised Budget Original Budge~/ 
Administration Capacity Building Advocacy Direct Service 
Percent Percent Percent 
Total of Reported of Reported of Reported 
Site Budget Budget Total Budget Total Budget Total Budget 
-- - '----
Oakland $209,515 $72,015 34 $17,409 15 $29,640 26~_/ $68,000 
Spartanburg 167,765 57,765 33 u , 6oo-"-1 ll 19,940 19 74,539 
Spokane 145,041 65,275 45 33,850 41 10,326 12 38,590 
Tucson 234,468 7l '623 30 41 ,12#1 26 20,450 12 98,718 
Connecticut 
Region A 182,458 62,548 34 14,175 15 5,500 ~I i_l 
Danbury 25,280 
Torrington 27,500 
Waterbury 20,875 
National 483,064 
2_/ Original. budget used for program because later comparable figures unavailable. 
~/Includes a full time staff person for public relation, information and education. 
~/Does not include Program Element AA. 
~/Does not include Program Eelment U. 
~/Advocacy is 13 percent of budget when State of Connecticut budget is included .. 
f/ . . 1 1 . 1 
- D1rect serv1ce program at oca s1te on y. 
Percent 
of 
Total 
59 
70 
47 
62 
79 
27 
30 
22 
Total Program 
Percent 
Reported of 
Budget Total 
$ll5,049 100 
106,079 100 
82,766 100 
160,293 100 
93,330 100 
..s:__ 
TABLE 7 
PROGR..\M IMPLEMENTATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE COLLABORATIONS 
Program Implementation 
Percent of 
Programs Percent of 
Total Implemented Percent of Programs 
Number of Percent Or In Progress Programs Using Existing 
Programs Percent 
Planned 
on a/ 
Time- Cancelled 
Oakland 21 33 
Spartanburg 27 15 
Spokane 2l 52 
Tucson 28 42 
Connec t:i.cu t 19 42 
NA ~ Data are not applicable. 
N/A ~ Data are not available. 
5 
30 
5 
0 
10 
With Affiliates Implemented b 
Part:i.cipating Collaboratively-/ 
14 19 
22 30 
0 0 
21 36 
16 32 
~/Implementation began within two months of projected date. 
~/Does not include programs implemented by collaboration staff or committees. 
E,! As of February 28, 1978. 
!}../Status offenders included in this figure, 
Community 
Resources 
10 
48 
19 
51 
63 
Total Persons Served£/ 
Capacity Dire.ct d/ 
Building Advocacy Serv~ce-
--- -----
460 N/A l96g/ 
70 N/A 286 
1 ,037 2,76(}!1 7 
1 .1oJs.l 5oo!.l 327 
97 40rft./ 2n£1 
~/Cost efficiency rate is dollar cost per contact per seven-hour day. The rate is derived by the formula; 
A -
C · D (--, 
B 
• E ) 
Where A ~ total cost 
B = salaries to youth 
C = hours per program per day 
D = number of participants 
E = number of days 
F = 7 hours per day 
i/Does not include mass media contact with the general public. 
g./Represents persons served to date but not separated by program. 
~/Numbers not available as of December 31, 1977 because program start was late. 
!/Monthly mailing. 
i 1cost efficiency rate based on persons served. 
11ooes not include Program Element R. 
Total Contact Days£/ Cost Efficiency Rate!/ 
Capacity D:i.rect Capacity 
Advocac·J_I 
Direct 
Building Advocacy Service Building Service 
---
240 NA N/A $15.82 N/A N/~/ 
140 NA 4, 99Efo./ 8.34 N/A $2.87 
1 '735 NA 49s;j 3.93 $2.29i/ 5. 29 
6,477 NA 2 ,11&9/ 4.92 1. 63i/ 41.54 
97 NA N/A 10.72 N/Ah/ 
}/Youth Service Manual for planning and distr:i.bution to youth serving agencies. In addition, Tucson did some very imaginative advocacy especially with the media. We are unable to 
count number of persons served for television programming. 
~/Monthly mailing by the state collaboration. In addition, attendance at state legislati:m committee, state conferences with presentations, leg:i.slative workshops, etc . 
TAJlLE 8 
BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD PUNISHMENT OF STATUS OFFENDERS, 
FALL 1977 
Most status offenders need Failure to punish encourages 
help not punishment. status offenders to be bad. 
Agree Neutral Disagree Agree Neutral Disagree 
Site a/ Percent-
Oakland (86) 91 5 3 34 17 49 
Spartanburg (53) 93 3 4 54 8 38 
Spokane (150) 91 5 4 43 10 47 
Tucson (269) 92 6 3 46 10 44 
Connecticut (72) 94 0 6 45 13 42 
a/ 
-Percentages may not total 100 in some cases, due to rounding. 
Oakland 
Spartanburg 
Spokane 
Tucson 
Connecticut 
TAJlLE 9 
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD 
DETENTION OF STATUS OFFENDERS, 
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977 
Children should not be Children who are beyond the 
detained while awaiting control of their parents 
a hearing just to protect should be put into detention 
society. centers to protect society. 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
Agreeing Disagreeing Agreeing Disagreeing 
1976 1977 1976 1977 1976 1977 1976 1977 
42 37 46 52 26 26 61 55 
56 52 34 38 25 35 60 55 
41 39 41 48 30 24 62 59 
45 40 41 46 22 28 68 60 
46 48 44 42 33 22 61 70 
! I i 
Oakland 
Spartanburg 
Spokane 
Tucson 
Connecticut 
Oakland 
Spartanburg 
Spokane 
Tucson 
Connecticut 
TABLE 10 
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES 
TOWARD PERSONAL DISTANCE AND BEHAVIOR, 
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977 
I would discourage 
my daughter from 
inviting a sexually 
promiscuous girl to 
stay overnight. 
Percent Disagreeing 
1976 1977 
23 
12 
30 
35 
32 
33 
7 
35 
4 
42 
I would be willing 
to pay more taxes 
for special school 
programs for kids 
who are constantly 
truant. 
Percent Agreeing 
1976 1977 
43 
58 
60 
61 
54 
TABLE 11 
43 
47 
65 
65 
56 
I would be willing 
to have a well 
supervised halfway 
home for runaways 
(4-6 kids) next 
door to me. 
Percent Agreeing 
1976 1977 
40 
43 
49 
61 
65 
40 
50 
57 
62 
74 
CHANGE IN BOARD MEMBERS' ATTITUDES TOWARD MIXING 
STATUS OFFENDERS AND OTHER CHILDREN, 
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977 
Organizations should not mix status offenders 
with other groups of children 
Percent Agreeing Percent Disagreeing 
1976 1977 1976 1977 
40 36 48 55 
24 19 7l 66 
19 26 7l 61 
31 22 62 66 
23 21 67 72 
-:i 
l':U!LE 12 
CHANGE IN ORGANIZAl'IONAL CAPACITY OF NATIONAL ASSEMBLY .AFFILIATES TO SERVE STATUS OFFENDERS, 
FALL 197S l'O FALL 1977 
Parc:.ant Board Awareness . I ::tembarship Awuraness Staff and Board Truining 
Organizations 
With 
Substantially 
lncraasacl 
Capacity 
(As Percaived 
Site and Numbar (N) I By Staff) 
Oakland (15) 33 parcent 
Spartanburg (6) Considerable 
raised 
consciousness 
Spokone (7) 43 percent 
Tucson (11) 55 percent 
Connecticut (23) Much more 
knowledge in 
all areas 
~ational (15) 50 percent 
NA " Data are not applicable. 
N/A" Data are not available. 
Change In 
Mambarshi 
Number Number 
l.Jith 1;'ith 
Increase Decrassa 
2 2 
3 2 
1 
0 0 
N/8 1'1/A 
3 3 
Percent 0£ 
Organizations 
Change In Number With 
Pro ram Bud et \<lith lnc:reasad 
l'lur.tber Numbar Policy Discussion 
With ll'ith Statemants At Board 
Increasa Oacrease On Services Neetings 
5 4 l 3l 
5 4 >00 
7 0 3 87 
7 2 1 ,<.I 
N/8 N/8 0 '!:/A 
4 4 12 20 
:g_/ Change in attitudes between first interview (Fall, 1976) and second inti?.rview (Fall, 1977). 
~/Represents only programs completed or c:urri?.ntly in progress. 
£;./New staf.l' mamber. 
~/Chang a in data gathering method. 
_£/Implcm<?.nted program be.l'ora form was developed. 
!/se.a Table 15, Appendix A, for tachnical assistance devaloped for locals. 
Number of l'otal 
Attitudas Organizations Organizational 
Pcrc~nt Parcent With Chauga Participation Number Of 
OJ' Items Of Items In Regular In Collaboration Organizations 
With With Communication Capacity Building Spokan To By 
p~~~~~~/ 1'1~~:~!~/ To )!embars And Advocacy Collaborotion ::.:legative Positive Progroms Coordinator 
55 35 l 3 0 N/AS) 
30 50 0 3 56 5 
65 25 0 1 142 3 
35 60 3 42£/ 8 
70 25 N/A N/A 283 N/A£/ 
N., N8 0 7 85 N/A 
Staff Ex 
Organizations 
Implementing 
Collaboration 
Pro rams 
Percent 
Of All 
Number A.l'filiates 
0 40 
4 67 
57 
6 54 
NA 
" 
erience 
Percent Of 
Collaboro.tion 
Programs 
lmpl<=Jnented b/ 
By Af£iliotcs--
29 
19 
" 
1-u 
s;_ 
'\.!\ 
TABLE l3 
CHANGE IN ORGANIZATIONAL ADVOCACY AND DIRECT SERVICE BY NATIONAL ASSEMBLY AFFILIATES, 
FALL 1976 TO FALL 1977 
Advocacy 
Number of 
Organizations 
Number of Reporting 
Organizations Advocacy Activity 
With Advocacy 1977 and 
Communications Planned 
Site 1975-76 1977 1975-76 For Future 
Oakland 0 0 0 0 
Spartanburg 0 1 0 0 
Spokane 0 0 0 0 
Tucson 0 0 0 0 
Connecticut N/A N/A N/A N/A 
National 12 n!e/ 9 12 
NA = Data are not applicable. 
N/A = Data are not available. 
~/Plus 10,000 reported by The Red Cross. 
Direct Service 
Reported Reported Number of 
Number of Number of Other Status Offenders 
Status Offenders Children at Risk Served in 
Served by Served by Collaboration 
Individual Affiliates Direct Service 
Affiliates Fall 1977 Programs 
0 3,420 113 
20 200~/ 73 
307 164 0 
763 985, 127 
N/A N/A N/A 
NA NA NA 
£/10 of the 12 for whom we have data increased advocacy content from previous year. 
New Programs 
Planned for 
Status Offenders 
arid 
Children at Risk 
4 
7 
3 
8 
N/A 
N/As_/ 
~/These data are not available in consistent form. Table 14 shows type and location of direct service programs. 
~/These data are not available in consistent form. 
New Monies 
Obtained or 
Allocated for 
Direct Services 
and Programs for 
Status Offenders 
by Affiliates 
N/A 
4,650 
N/A 
96,000 
N/A 
N/Aj_/ 
TABLE 14 
DIRECT SERVICE PROGRAMS DEVELOPED OR PLANNED 
BY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
STATUS OFFENDERS AND CHILDREN AT RISK 
AT OTHER THAN COLLABORATION SITES 
Boys Club 
60 percent have tutoring classes 
54 percent have work-training programs 
61 percent have youth employment 
27 percent have drug/alcohol abuse prevention 
National Alcohol Abuse Prevention Project - 13 pilot sites 
National Health Project - 5 local sites 
10 local clubs were recipients of Honor Awards for Program Excellence 
centered around programs for status offenders. 
Camp Fire Girls 
New Day Implementation Program 
Girls Clubs 
73 percent conduct juvenile delinquency programs 
88 percent conduct career/job development programs 
45 percent have joint planning with juvenile delinquency authorities 
Girl Scouts 
Eight direct service programs conducted by various local clubs 
Junior Leagues 
11 percent of programs were in criminal justice (101) 
8.4 percent of programs were in child welfare (77) 
Reflected interest in: 
1) Child Abuse 
2) Youth Service Programs 
3) Juvenile Justice Research and Impact 
4) Volunteer Participation 
5) Citizens Involvement and Advocacy 
6) Juvenile Courts 
:. 
National Council for Homemaker Health Aid Services 
Working with children at risk is high priority 
National Council of Jewish Women 
Task Force Progress Reports on Justice for Children list 77 different 
projects 
The Justice for Children Programs had three major program pieces 
1) children's rights 
2) how to set up a group home 
3) Coalitions For Action 
Major areas of work in 1976 
1) beginning direct service programs 
2) monitoring court services 
3) developing community awareness 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
Promoted the use of youth service bureaus 
Helped schools increase capacity to 
1) prevent delinquency 
2) develop alternatives to juvenile incarceration 
3) work with status offenders more beneficially 
Young Men's Christian Associations 
National Youth Project Using Mini-Bikes has 385 operating units 
Local YMCA Juvenile Justice Programs: 
l) 108 direct-prevention juvenile justice programs 
2) 70 diversion programs 
3) 13 alternative treatment programs 
Young Women's Christian Associations 
45 funded projects by community YWCA's from 1969-1972 
11 intervention programs in New England Area 
36 community association-sponsored projects 
New York State YWCA Intervention Project (5 year) with 6 participating 
YWCA's 
Boys Clubs 
TABLE 15 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE DEVELOPED OR PLANNED 
BY NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FOR 
STATUS OFFENDERS AND CHILDREN AT RISK 
BCA National Director William R. Brecker serves on the President's 
National Advisory Committee for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention 
four regional workshops on government funding 
BCA Programs and Services Survey by Carole Kazlow, Ph.D. and Susan 
Lackman 
BCA National Director met with HEW secretary and White House staff 
to formulate a national youth policy 
Camp Fire Girls 
Workshop for youth development and advocacy 
Girls Clubs 
4 regional Juvenile Justice Youth In Trouble Workshops 
Juvenile Justice Specialists provided Technical Assistance to 
individual clubs 
GCA training sessions designed to have impact on girls in conflict 
GCA national staff members served on U.S. Women's Agenda Task Force 
on Juvenile Justice 
GCA staff was represented on State Planning Agency and Regional Units 
GCA staff attended symposium on status offenders in Washington, D.C., 
sponsored by National Council of Jewish Women 
GCA appointed a Juvenile Justice Specialist to their National Staff 
sessions on locating funding sources and developing proposals were 
held for local clubs at regional meetings 
Resource News publications regularly reported information useful to 
the development of local programs 
Juvenile Justice Specialist represents GCA on the National Task Force 
on Juvenile Justice, National Assembly of Voluntary Health and 
Social Welfare Organizations, Inc. 
Junior Leagues 
Impact - 4 year project funded by LEAA 
l) provided orientation materials on crime and delinquency 
2) Impact Training Institute was attended by 192 community delegates 
who then acted as consultants 
3) Impact Follow-Up meetings were attended by 366 delegates, 
provided aid in program development and technical assistance 
upon request 
National Council For Homemaker Health Aid Services 
Costs of Homemaker-Home Health Aide and Alternative Forms of Service 
Child Abuse and Neglect - What Can Be Done 
National Council of Jewish Women 
published Children Without Justice: A Report of the National Council 
of Jewish Women by Edwin Wakin, New York, a NCJW Juvenile 
Justice survey 
developed 
published 
Children Without Justice promotional kit 
National Council of Jewish Women Symposium on Status 
Offenders: Manual for Action 
published article in Federal Probation discussing new volunteer in 
juvenile justice 
Symposium on Status Offenders held in Washington, D.C. 
May 17-19, 1976; published National Council of Jewish Women 
Symposium on Status Offenders: Proceedings, May 17-19, 1976 
St .. Louis Section prepared Child Abuse and Neglect Manual 
was featured in The Youngest Outlaws: Runaways In America by Arnold 
P. Rubins ~ublished by Julian Messner, A Division of Simon 
and Schuster, Inc, 1976) Chapter on the NCJW's Teaneck group 
home in Teaneck, New Jersey 
served as a resource in the area of Juvenile Justice and Voluntarism 
at the Volunteers Conference In Wisconsin 
presented "Symposium on Child Abuse: Let's Break the Cycle," held by 
NCJW Stamford Section and Junior League of Stamford and 
the Hospital Auxiliary of Stamford. 
National Council on Crime and Delinquency 
a basic service of NCCD is to provide technical assistance to state 
and local agencies and organizations; examples of the kinds of 
technical consultation offered include: 
1) Community Consultations - Several hundred were made each year. 
(Program assessments and evaluations, on-site technical assistance, 
survey of training needs, management studies.) 
2) Training Activities: 3 seminars, 5 workshops, 5 training programs 
Young Men's Christian Association 
11Planning For Juvenile Justice," a manual for local YMCA's 
"The YMCA and the Juvenile Offender" 
"The YMCA In the Streets, 11 manual 
"Report of Conference of Supervisors of the Detached Worker Program" 
674 on-site visits to locals by 8 regional Juvenile Justice staff 
directors 
Young Women's Christian Association 
"Job Guidelines for Teen Counseling Training and Career Development" 
"Lets Try a Workshop With Teen Women" 
"Attention Is Needed, Action Is Called For" 
27th National Convention - Juvenile Justice Optional Workshop 
1,;--.. 
r..:.: 
TABLE 16 
SELECTED POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLABORATION SITES 
Total Percent Per Capita 
Population/ Growth Income 
Estimat.;'- Since Estimate 
Sites (1975) 1970 (1974) 
Oakland 1,091,4o#1 1.9 $5,034 
Spartanburg 191,000 9.9 4,346 
Spokane 305,600 6.3 4,499 
Tucson 443,700 26.2 4,385 
c/ Waterbury- 761,000 2.2 N/A 
N/A = Data were not available. 
~/Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
b/ 
-Alameda ~ounty. 
Median 
Family 
Income 
(1970) 
$9,626 
8,187 
9,137 
8,759 
10,459 
~/No data were available for the other Connecticut sites. 
Percent of 
Population 
Under 18 
(1970) 
27.4 
32.5 
31.2 
33.7 
31.8 
Percent of 
Population 
Number of With High 
Status School 
Offenders Education 
(1974) (1970) 
4,500 56.9 
107 43.1 
898 64.0 
2,147 63.0 
648 42.8 
Sources: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing: 1970 [PHC (1) Series] for each 
SMSA; Current Population Reports, "Population Estimates and Projections: 1975 Population Estimates and 1974 
Per Capita Income Estimates" for each county [P-25 Series]: and Current Population Reports, "Population 
Estimates: July 1, 1975," for each county [P-26 Series]. 
TABLE 17 
KNOWLEDGE BY LOCAL AFFILIATE OF NATIONAL TASK FORCE REPRESENTATIVE, 
FALL 1976 
Site 
Oakland (11) 
Spartanburg (11) 
Spokane (14) 
Tucson (12) 
Connecticut 
Danbury (5) 
Torrington (4) 
Waterbury (12) 
Doesn't Know 
Anyone Nationally Knows Regional 
or Regionally Representative 
Percent 
18 9 
27 27 
29 36 
33 25 
80 0 
75 25 
25 50 
TABLE 18 
Knows National 
Task Force 
Representative 
By Name 
73 
46 
36 
42 
20 
0 
25 
REPORT BY LOCAL COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES OF COMMUNICATION 
FROM NATIONAL TASK FORCE, FALL 1976 
Amount of Perceived Conununication 
Site Little Some Much 
Oakland 3 4 4 
Spartanburg 8 1 4 
Spokane 6 3 5 
Tucson 6 3 3 
Connecticut 
Danbury 4 0 1 
Torrington 6 0 0 
Waterbury 12 2 1 
TABLE 19 
WORK STYLES OF LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF 
Percent of Time R d · a/ eporte ~n- Average Daily Number of 
Appointments Study and 
and Administration Phone 
Site Phone Calls Meetings Paper Work Meetings Calls Appointments 
Oakland 25 21 46 0.68 1.86 0.50 
Spartanburg 40 26 35 0.76 2.90 1.30 
Spokane 27 30 39 o. 77 3.97 1.37 
Tucson 41 17 35 0.71 2.80 2.30 
Connecticut 36 13 37 0.52 3.74 1. 25 
a/ 
-Travel and miscellaneous not included, 
TABLE 20 
COLLABORATION REPRESENTATIVES' PERCEPTIONS OF FREQUENCY 
OF CONTACT WITH LOCAL COLLABORATION STAFF 
Percent Respondini'"-1 
No Only at Some Frequent 
Site Contact Meeting Contact Contact 
Oakland (19) 21 5 32 42 
Spartanburg (21) 19 0 19 62 
Spokane (15) 33 0 20 47 
Tucson (16) 6 6 19 69 
Connecticut (39) 76 3 10 10 
a/ 
- Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding. 
·,~h. 
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TABLE 21 
PERCENT OF ITEMS DISCUSSED AT COLLABORATION MEETINGS WITH FORMAL ACTIONS TAKEN 
Site 
Oakland 
1 - Subcommittee 
2 - Board 
Spartanburg 
1 - Subcommittee 
2 - Executive Committee 
Spokane 
1 - Subcommittee 
2 - Executive Committee 
and Steering Committee 
Tucson 
1 - Subcommittee 
2 - Steering Committee 
Connecticut 
1 - Region A 
2 - Waterbury 
3 - Torrington 
4 - Danbury. 
National 
1 - Task Force 
2 - Steering 
Total Number of 
Items Discussed 
76 
106 
36 
371 
312 
398 
203 
213 
161 
51 
34 
185 
204 
26 
Number of Items 
Discussed With 
Formal Decision Recorded 
18 
25 
9 
131 
72 
170 
49 
35 
90 
9 
17 
32 
142 
30 
~/More than one formal decision recorded per topic discussed, 
Percent of Items 
Discussed With 
Formal Decision Recorded 
24 
24 
25 
35 
23 
43 
24 
16 
56 
18 
50 
17 
70 
u#l 
'v\ 
-!;___ 
TABLE 22 
ACTIONS OF COLLABORATION MEMBERS IN FORMAL MEETINGS 
Chairperson/Coordinator DSO Grantee 
Average 
Average Average Percent Average 
Percent Percent Of Acts By Percent 
Of Acts By Of Acts By Coordinator Of Acts By 
Total Chairperson Coordinator And Chairperson DSO Grantee 
Actions (When Present) (When Present) (When Present) (When Present) 
Site Number Percenti!/ 
Oakland 2,897 12 
1st Chair/1st Coordinator 26l 2~l 51l 2nd Chair/snd Coordinator 19 27 
Spartanburg 4,805 17 
2nd Chairperson 22l 17 J 39l 3rd Chairperson 22 27 49 
Spokane ao#1 25 s£1 33 22 
Tucson 1 '721 22 26 48 11 
Connecticut 
Region A 2,591 14 23 33 2 
1,388 33 £/ Danbury 25 33 N/A-
Torrington 1,565 30 14 44 f/ N/A-
Waterbury 507 38 12 34 
f/ 
N/A-
N/A = Data were not available. 
~/Percentages represent average participation per meeting attended throughout the observation period. 
100 percent. 
~/Chairperson represented one organization identified as most influential. 
£/Data gathering method varied from that used in other sites. 
~/Only two were identified as most influential. 
~/Had one or more influential non-affiliate. 
i/Did not attend observed meetings. 
~/None were identified as most influential. 
National Assembly Other 
Affiliates Participants 
Average 
Percent Average Average 
Of Acts By Percent Percent 
Three Most Of Acts By Of Acts By 
Influential All Other All Other 
Affiliates Affiliates Particiuants 
1#/ 27 7 
1#/ 14 28 
11~/ 14 18 
16 18 19 
,}/ 14 e/ 43-
£1 9 e/ 5s-
16 29 24 
11 13 
e/ 
44·-
Therefore row totals do not equal 
TABLE 23 
MEMBERS' PERCEPTIONS OF EFFECTIVENE3S OF TI:IE COLLABORATIONS, FALL 1976 
Perce tions of Process Outcome Perceptions of What Collaboration Did Best Perceptions of Whether They Would Join Again 
Getting People Yes But 
Very Moderately Not Very Too Early Together In Program Capacity Direct Don't Not in The Don't 
Respondents Effective Effective J::ffective To Tell Respondents Collaboration Plannin11: Building Advocacy Service Know Respondents Yee Same Way No Know 
Site Number Percent~/ Number Percent~/ Number Percent~/ 
Oakland (17) 0 18 82 0 (16) 44 19 6 13 0 19 (16) 94 0 0 
Spartanburg (14) 29 50 21 0 (14) 29 7 0 0 64 0 (14) 79 14 7 0 
Spokane (15) 27 40 20 13 (14) so 0 29 14 7 0 (15) 87 0 13 0 
Tucson (14) 37 43 21 0 (15) 33 13 0 33 13 6 (14) 100 0 0 
Connecticut (14) 14 14 28 43 (14) so 7 7 7 21 7 (14) 57 0 35 
~/Percentages may not total 100 because of rounding or nonresponse . 
..,_ 
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